As the first offshore project to operate a subsea crude oil pipeline below the Arctic Ocean sea ice, Northstar deserves the most rigorous assessment of its threats to the environment. Its proposal for a subsea oil pipeline in the arctic is unprecedented and relies on untried technology. The possibility of a spill is unacceptably high and the practicality and efficacy of cleaning up an oil spill in solid or broken ice conditions pose a great threat to the environment. It would be reckless to allow this project to proceed knowing a spill is more than likely to occur when there is serious questions about the oil industry's ability to respond to and mitigate a spill under everyday Arctic conditions.
This project will set into motion the development of many other offshore
fields using this new technology. It will allow areas of the Beaufort Sea and
other areas of the Arctic not currently reachable to come into oil production
and lead to further industrialization of the Arctic. Beyond these
unprecedented impacts across the region, Northstar would add greenhouse gas
emissions contributing to global climate change -- a source of cumulative
impact that was completely ignored in the DEIS. The potential for opening up
new reserves in this frontier region will exponentially increase the amount of
oil available to contribute to greenhouse gas emissions and diverts resources
away from the commercialization and development of alternative sustainable
sources of energy.
Northstar is the first oil production proposed for the federal Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) waters of the Arctic Ocean. BP Exploration (Alaska)
(BP-XA) proposes to reconstruct and enlarge Seal Island, a 1980's exploration
artificial gravel island and construct 6 miles of buried subsea pipelines from
Seal Island to shore and 11 miles of new above-ground pipelines to onshore
processing facilities. The project will require 700,000 cubic yards of gravel
extracted from 35 acres in a new gravel pit in the delta of the Kuparuk River.
Direct gravel or dredge spoils extraction and fill needed for the project will
cover about 80 acres. Ice roads for construction and operation will require at
least 96-124 million gallons of water from up to 41 lakes. About 1,940 to 2,180
round-trip helicopter flights to the drilling island will be required during
construction and module installation.[3]
BP-XA plans to drill 21-38 production and gas injection wells and 2 disposal
wells on the island, and inject over 120 million barrels (5 billion gallons) of
drilling and camp wastes and produced waters. Waste water to be discharged
into the Beaufort Sea includes system flushwater, vapor compression distillate,
surface drainage, temporary discharges of domestic sanitary wastes, temporary
construction dewatering, and seawater treatment plant filter backwash. BP-XA
plans to produce an estimated 145 to 172 million barrels of crude oil that will
be pumped down the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System and shipped in tankers to U.S.
and worldwide markets.
Our major concerns can be conveniently set out as follows:
*
The analysis of alternatives is inadequate and key information needed to
compare environmental impact of alternatives 2-5 is not analyzed.
* The No Action alternative is all but ignored and is not genuinely analyzed.
* Not all reasonable alternatives are considered. For instance, technological
alternatives such as double-walled pipeline or deeper pipeline burial are not
considered, nor are the alternatives of seasonal production through the
pipelines.
*
The threats to subsea oil pipeline or island integrity and the risks of oil
spills are inadequately analyzed and differences are not properly evaluated.
* Major oil spills are expected. Oil spill contingency plans required for the
Northstar project, including discussions of the major limitations of cleanup
methods and ineffectiveness in broken ice, were not analyzed in the EIS. This
is an unacceptable segmentation of the environmental impact review process.
* Environmental impacts of oil spills are downplayed (including from the Valdez
tanker terminal) and traditional knowledge is inadequately integrated into the
analysis of spills.
* The environmental impacts of noise, pollution, and other forms of industrial disturbance on bowhead whales, other marine mammals, and other wildlife and their habitats are underestimated in the DEIS.
Inadequate consideration is given to traditional knowledge, the impacts on subsistence and the concerns of the Native people.
*
The cumulative effects of using the new subsea oil pipeline technology in the
ice-covered Arctic Ocean to increase industrialization throughout the region
and related onshore impacts across the North Slope were inadequately
considered.
* Climate change is a major cumulative impact resulting from oil development in
the Alaskan Arctic that was not addressed at all in the DEIS.
The DEIS is misleading regarding its scope regarding other new production and transportation facilities across the Beaufort Sea. Environmental impact analysis is completely lacking for this broader topic which needs substantial additional information or to be deleted from the scope of the EIS.
The public process for this project has been dramatically abbreviated due to the consolidation of permit review concurrent with the DEIS review. This appears to be the public's only opportunity to comment on this unprecedented and complex project even though a preferred alternative was not given in the DEIS by the agencies.
Northstar would be the first oil and gas production platform in the Alaskan Beaufort Sea to include a connection to onshore facilities by buried subsea oil pipelines, instead of using causeways or directional drilling from land. Although the DEIS states that a subsea natural gas pipeline had been constructed in the Arctic at the Drake field in Canada, this line from a single well was never used for commercial production and has been abandoned.[4] The line was buried for only 820 feet in the nearshore area using a refrigerated glycol system to freeze the adjacent buried soil[5] -- a more elaborate technique than the current proposal -- and there was no program of monitoring, research or maintenance. Hence the Northstar proposal, which would involve two subsea oil pipelines below the sea ice, truly represents the first such development in the Arctic.
The unprecedented new technology of the subsea oil pipeline, including the shoreline transition zone, and the production island has not been shown to be safe enough given the magnitude of the potential impact from oil spills to the coastal and marine environment. The DEIS fails to analyze necessary information regarding threats to the integrity of the subsea oil pipeline and island from ice gouge, strudel scour, ice rideup, permafrost thawing, coastal erosion, and other extreme ice and weather events. It also fails to compare the risks from failure of pipeline integrity resulting in oil spills between alternatives.
While the DEIS acknowledges the lack of proven response, containment, and cleanup measures for oil spills, particularly in broken ice in Chapter 8 (though these limitations are inadequately highlighted in the executive summary), the draft omits the required review of the adequacy of oil spill response and cleanup plans and in the extreme conditions of the Beaufort Sea. This is a major shortcoming of the DEIS given that "the potential for, and difficulty of containing and cleaning up, a large oil spill from offshore facilities, especially in broken ice conditions, and the resulting expectation of significant impacts on the marine ecosystem" was identified by the agencies as one of two major issues raised during scoping.[6]
Because an Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan ("C-Plan") is
required by state and federal law for operation of the facility, much like the
NPDES or UIC permits,[7] it should also be
incorporated into the DEIS. This plan is also required for submittal to the
MMS as part of the Development Production Plan[8] but it is not contained in Appendix A. Similarly, the DEIS
failed to consider related federal approvals regarding harassment and
incidental take of marine mammals resulting from the direct, indirect, and
cumulative effects of Northstar required under the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA). Letters of Authorization or regulations are required by the U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Service for harassment and incidental small takes of polar bears
and walrus and from the National Marine Fisheries Service for bowhead whales,
ringed and bearded seals, and other marine mammals.
Although the oil industry may claim that it is not "required" to obtain such
incidental take authorizations, it has indeed garnered this "insurance" against
being in violation of the Marine Mammal Protection Act for polar bear
harassment due to its existing oil production activities.[9] Industry's self-reporting showed over 100 encounters
between polar bears and oil exploration and production operations during the
past five years, with 87% of these conflicts at development or production
sites.[10] Polar bears were actively harassed
by being shot with cracker shells and rubber bullets, herded with trucks,
snowmachines, helicopters, and vehicle sirens.[11] The offshore Northstar permanent facilities will
encroach farther into polar bear feeding habitats in the ice transition zone[12] where harassment and other conflicts are
even more likely. The DEIS also fails to acknowledge that this industrial
activity could be in violation of an international treaty, the Agreement on
Conservation of Polar Bears, in which the U.S. agreed to "protect the
ecosystems of which polar bears are a part, with special attention to habitat
components such as denning and feeding sites and migration patterns."
As well, noise disturbance to bowhead whales from pile driving, well drilling,
production facilities, and thousands of helicopter flights was inadequately
evaluated in the DEIS, and the cumulative effects of Northstar along with past
and existing seismic exploration were not evaluated even those such harassment
may violate the MMPA. Since BP-XA has already applied for incidental take
authorizations from two cooperating federal agencies, evaluation of these
issues should be done in the context of the overall impact analysis.
The agencies have acted arbitrarily in not including consideration of the
C-Plan and the incidental take/ harassment authorization requests in the DEIS.
Given the importance of these issues, this constitutes unacceptable
segmentation of the environmental impact review process. Furthermore, since the
federal leases are "subject to all other applicable statues and regulations,"[13] MMS's approval of the development plan and
other permits must consider compliance with these other laws.
As acknowledged in the DEIS, development of the Northstar oil field would have
major negative consequences on the environment. These include major effects of
oil spills on bowhead whales and subsistence users, Steller's eiders, other
birdlife and tundra. A major oil spill from Northstar could reach the
coastline of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge within 10 days or the
shoreline of the Teshekpuk Lake wetlands in the National Petroleum Reserve
within a month during summer.[14] Some of the
major risks to the project from ice and weather are described in the
Traditional Knowledge chapter and the high risk of oil spills and their
potentially broad geographic scope across 200 miles of the coastline is
revealed, although the DEIS concludes inaccurately that such a spill would
cause minor impacts.
The DEIS is clearly deficient in a number of key areas and fails to provide an
adequate analysis of the full range of environmental impacts to the Beaufort
Sea marine and coastal environments as required by the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1970. Although some of the major threats posed by the Northstar
project to the natural and human environment are disclosed by the DEIS, other
significant impacts are not adequately analyzed Impacts not properly addressed:
Indirect and cumulative impacts of the proposed Northstar project. Past oil
exploration and development in the Alaskan Arctic has caused significant loss
of fish and wildlife habitat, such as displacement of caribou including
abandonment of calving areas and reduced reproductive rates, deflections in the
migratory pathways of bowhead whales of 20-35 miles according to Inupiat
whales, and degradation of nearshore estuarine fish habitat from fundamental
alterations of circulation patterns and water quality across approximately 65
miles of the central Beaufort Sea coast due to causeways.. In particular, the
impacts enumerated in these comments need to be reanalyzed to include all
relevant scientific information and using scientifically defensible impact
analysis criteria so that the full extent of significant adverse impacts are
disclosed. Existing sources of marine pollution from exploratory drilling and
seawater treatment plant operations and from airborne sources also need to be
described.
In general, neither the direct, indirect nor cumulative impacts of the proposed Northstar project have not been adequately addressed in the DEIS. Past oil exploration and development in the Alaskan Arctic has caused significant loss of fish and wildlife habitat, such as displacement of caribou including abandonment of calving areas and reduced reproductive rates, deflections in the migratory pathways of bowhead whales of at least 30-35 miles according to Inupiat whalers, and degradation of nearshore estuarine fish habitat from fundamental alterations of circulation patterns and water quality across approximately 65 miles of the central Beaufort Sea coast due to causeways.
Northstar will result in a fundamental change in how the network of oil
field infrastructure can expand across the Beaufort Sea. Yet the cumulative
effects of using the new subsea oil pipeline technology in the ice-covered
Arctic Ocean to increase industrialization throughout the region, including
related onshore impacts across the North Slope, were inadequately addressed.
The effect of the Northstar development on the environment in terms of serving
as a precedent was not addressed at all, and nor were the impacts related to
global climate change. These fall into the category of indirect effects within
the scope of 40 CFR 1508.8(b) which include growth inducing effects.
Additionally, the Northstar project would lead to an exponential increase in
the oil reserves base because of the testing of new technology. This is
occurring at a time when the fossil fuels use should begin contracting and not
expanding.
The DEIS is misleading as to its true scope regarding other new production and
transportation facilities across the Beaufort Sea. Environmental impact
analysis is completely lacking for this broader topic of future development
options and needs to have substantial information added or to be deleted as an
aspect of the EIS scope.
There is insufficient scientific information provided to substantiate
differences in environmental effect of the various action alternatives,
especially to compare Alternatives 2 and 5. The impact analysis gives short
shrift to Alternative 1, "No Action" and fails to point out its important
environmental benefits. Alternative 1, not Alternative 5 should be considered
the Environmentally Preferred Alternative. This is the only alternative that
would not cause:
* increased danger from chronic and major oil spills from Northstar in a
project totally unprecedented in an extremely hostile and sensitive
environment;
* more danger from oil spills arising from the increased tanker traffic from
Valdez;
* more flaring with associated air pollution;
* more polluting discharges directly into the Beaufort Sea;
* more disturbance to wildlife and subsistence activities;
* increased destruction or degradation of wetlands and fish and wildlife
habitats and other aspects of the coastal and marine environments;
* an increased reliance on fossil fuels, increased carbon dioxide emissions and
the potential of opening up more offshore areas in the Arctic and sub-Arctic
environments.
* Cumulative impact including serving as a trailblazing precedent for future
development
Based on our review of the DEIS and other information discussed further in our
comments, we find that the proposed Northstar development project represents an
unreasonable degradation of the marine environment. It would pose unacceptable
risks to the local, regional, and global environment and is not in the public
interest. Further, we believe this project is the antithesis of the direction
that British Petroleum and the U.S. should be taking in order to achieve
sustainable economic and energy development. Therefore, we support the DEIS
Alternative 1 "No Action" and oppose approval of permits for BP-XA's proposed
Northstar development project .
The analysis of Alternative 1 fails to identify the numerous environmental benefits from this `no action' alternative which avoids the wide range of impacts which will occur if the project is allowed to proceed. The DEIS states that the "Corps is neither an opponent nor a proponent of the proposed action",[15] but this is clearly not the case as exemplified by the relative attention and detail that is paid to the different alternatives. While Chapter 4 which covers the Northstar Unit Development/ Production Alternatives dismissed Alternative 1 in only three sentences,[16] the rest of the 160 page chapter covers Alternatives 2, 3, 4 and 5 which differ only in respect of the routes taken by the offshore and onshore pipelines. The perfunctory nature of the comments regarding the first alternative (`No Action') falls far short of the requirements of NEPA.
Elsewhere in the DEIS, its bias becomes obvious. The Executive Summary of
the DEIS describes Alternative 1 - no action: as "145-172 million barrels of
recoverable reserves from Northstar reservoir would remain in place and
economic benefits to state and NSB would not be realized".[17] While this is true, a more accurate statement would be
that these economic benefits would not be realized at this time, and be there
for future generations. Not stated is that the environmental costs and risks
will not be realized either. Apart from one note that with Alternative 1, no
environmental disturbance associated with island reconstruction would occur and
that associated impacts with Northstar offshore facilities operation or
construction and operation of related pipeline facilities would not occur,[18] the DEIS dismisses this alternative out of
hand. Even this admission of the environmental benefit of no disturbance is
qualified by stating that this would not accomplish BPXA's projected
alternative of producing Northstar unit oil and gas resources and "would not
contribute any of the socioeconomic benefits associated with action
alternatives."
In fact several comments in the DEIS about Alternative 1 fail to identify the
numerous benefits associated with completely avoiding the entire panoply of
impacts the DEIS seeks to evaluate and attempts to mitigate. For example,
section 4.0 of the Executive Summary fails to include the elimination of oil
spill risk and associated protection of the physical, biological and human
environment and fails to include the elimination of industrial noise,
disturbance and pollution on bowhead whales and other marine mammals.
The Executive Summary and Comparison of Alternatives correctly state that `No
Action' would not contribute to any incremental increase to the cumulative
impact of other actions. This is a positive environmental
benefit. The fact that other cumulative impacts not related to Northstar will
continue if the No Action alternative is selected is no justification for
dismissing this alternative, rather the opposite. The increasing
industrialization of the Alaskan Arctic together with the associated cumulative
impacts will be greatly added to by allowing the Northstar proposal to go
ahead.
Furthermore under the No Action alternative, the effects of noise on marine
mammals, fish, birds and terrestrial mammals are described.[19] And again the point is missed that there is a large
amount of environmental benefit from the fact that the Alternative 1 will avoid
adding to the disturbance of wildlife which already exists in the area.
The dismissal of the No Action alternative is a major omission from the DEIS as
there are a wide range of positive environmental and economic benefits which
would arise from not undertaking the project. These include, inter
alia:
* No danger from oil spills from Northstar or the increased tanker traffic
proposed from Valdez;
* No increased flaring and the associated air pollution;
* No increased polluting discharges to the Beaufort Sea;
* No increased disturbance to wildlife and subsistence activities;
* No increased destruction of fragile habitats either on or offshore;
Massive savings from investments which could then be directed towards the
development of truly sustainable energy supplies. There is significant scope
for investing either in renewable energy supplies elsewhere or, better still,
the research and development of local, renewable energy developments in the
North Slope Borough and Alaska as a whole. The analyses of Alternative 1 fail
to identify it as a first step towards a just and equitable transition away
from fossil fuels and toward renewable forms of energy that provide jobs,
economic benefits, and a clean environment.
These positive environmental aspects of the No Action alternative should be
discussed and appraised in just as much detail as are the other alternatives.
All the alternative pipeline routes have serious negative environmental
impacts, many of which are identified in the DEIS. Indeed it acknowledges that
none of the Action Alternatives satisfy all the environmental
criteria.[20]
We believe the analysis in the DEIS justifies selection of the "No Action"
Alternative due to the serious risks and impacts that are disclosed, including
the following:
* All the action alternatives could result in oil spills resulting in pollution
of tundra, wetlands and coastal and marine environments with associated impacts
on fish and wildlife. Onshore spill response actions will cause further damage
to fragile tundra. Offshore the potential for spills is greatly increased by
the use of untried technologies. It is well known that oil spills degrade and
damage the marine environment and wildlife and that oil spill response is
hopelessly inadequate especially in these Arctic conditions, and there is no
evidence to the contrary in the DEIS.
* All action alternatives (with the possible exception of Alternative 5)
involve impacts associated with potential thaw bulb creation and related
subsidence created by pipeline trenching across the permafrost transition zone.
This subsidence will put differential stresses on the pipelines at their most
vulnerable place i.e. where they bend from the vertical to pass from the trench
in the permafrost to the surface.
* All action alternatives (with the possible exception of Alternative 5)
involve comparative impacts associated with potential shoreline erosion and
pipe damage hazard caused by construction across a natural shoreline.
* All the action alternatives would have comparable impacts on the bowhead
whale, including bowhead whale avoidance of Seal Island and support activity
noise, including a 3-6 mile migration path deflection and risk from oil
pollution.
* All the action alternatives would add to the overall cumulative environmental
damage - increased air pollution, water pollution, habitat destruction, noise
disturbance - and the cumulative risk associated with the industrialization of
the North Slope and offshore by the oil developments.
* The DEIS claims that because the Northstar project represents a relatively
small component of the total North Slope development (approx. 2.5% of the total
North Slope oil production over the projected lifetime), none of these
alternatives would substantially change the calculated 87% to 98% cumulative
risk of a major spill over the 15 year Northstar project lifetime. However this
is misleading at best because the Northstar proposal involves untried and
untested technology that presents new and unacceptable risks. Simply allowing
any `normal' development to proceed obviously increases the cumulative impacts
and risks; the unprecedented nature of this proposal, by definition, means that
it is impossible to assess the risks with any degree of certainty. In this
respect the precautionary principle demands that the project should not go
ahead.
The analysis of Alternatives 2 to 5 ignored significant issues and key information and therefore is deficient. For example, a comparison of the risks to pipeline integrity from various hazards such as strudel scour or permafrost thawing for the different alternatives is needed. While the DEIS states "the likelihood of strudel scour occurrence varies by alternative,"[21] it does not provide further detail about this except for a map that does not portray the proposed project or alternatives or provide a clear picture of the differences.
Strudel scouring is of great concern. It is noteworthy that BP-XA's
proposed project Alternatives 2 and 3 are both significantly closer to the
influence of the Kuparuk river delta and thus at higher risk from scouring
while Alternatives 4 and 5 are at less risk from this potential impact -- but
at the price of making a much longer offshore pipeline.
An analysis of the risks from local thaw bulb creation and associated
subsidence and instability and coastal erosion based on engineering and
scientific studies must be provided for the alternatives. Essential
calculations have not been made that would allow one to compare the differences
in environmental impact between the alternatives, especially 2 and 5 for these
key risks.
For example, an oil spill probability is provided for Alternative 2, but the
DEIS states "these calculated probabilities do not reflect concerns related
to permafrost thawing at the trenched shoreline crossing, which may increase
the risk of pipe failure and oil spillage in this area. No statistics are
available to calculate spill probabilities associated with this site-specific
hazard".[22] This is unacceptable.
Serious risks to the subsea oil pipeline posed by the susceptibility of
settlement of silts and unbonded sediments and permafrost thaw along the
alternative routes are obscured. The DEIS points out that "geotechnical
analysis conducted to assess the suitability of seafloor sediment with regard
to trenching indicated that sediments in an ice-bonded condition can support
significant loadings, but silts and unbonded sediments are susceptible to
settlement."[23]
The DEIS shows that the entire area outside the barrier islands along the
Alternative 2 route has unbonded sediments, but does not clearly portray the
situation for the rest of the route.[24] Fig.
5.3-5 shows that :
* the geotechnical borings were made along a somewhat different pipeline route
than the proposed action in 1996
* none was taken right next to the shoreline for Alternative 2;
* borings were last done adjacent to Seal Island in 1981;
* none were done for the 3 miles of Alternative 4 nearest shore;
* no borings were made for Alternative 5 in the 2.5 miles approaching the West
Dock causeway, and
* most of the data for this route was collected in 1976 and 1985.
In the nearshore waters and onshore tundra where there is bonded permafrost in
the soils, "warm buried pipelines in this region could, therefore, induce
progressive melting of the permafrost, leading to subsidence beneath the
pipelines".[25] However, site specific data
to evaluate this key impact is lacking according to the DEIS, even for the
proposed action: "a 1996 geotechnical exploration confirmed the thaw
instability of soils similar to those expected at the Alternative 2 shore
approach (data for the other alternatives require further research)"[26]
Since the issue of permafrost thawing at the transition zone is such an important issue that it has affected the Corp's designation of Alternative 5 as "environmentally preferred" [27] then it deserves much more elaboration--backed up by references and engineering comparisons--in the DEIS. We recommend that the Corps of Engineers use its considerable technical expertise to provide this more in-depth review of the subsea oil pipeline alternatives.
The DEIS does not provide analysis of technological alternatives that may result in significant differences in risks to pipeline integrity and therefore oil spill impacts. These include double-walled pipelines (e.g. pipe within a pipe), separation of oil and natural gas pipelines in different trenches, different leak detection systems, or other pipeline burial depths.
Each of the pipeline alternative routes should also address the alternatives
of placing the pipelines at greater depths under the sea floor to better
protect from ice gouging and strudel scouring.[28]
The DEIS fails to consider seasonal drilling and production restrictions. A
discussion of a "reasonable" range of alternatives should include the
possibility of halting drilling and production during critical periods of the
year. These would include drilling and production restrictions during fall
freeze-up and spring break up when the ability to clean up oil spills in broken
ice conditions are severely limited; and spring and fall Bowhead whale
migration periods when industrial noise will deflect whales from there
migration path. Additionally, winter production restrictions should be
considered due to impaired ability to detect pipeline leaks under ice. Oil
leaks in the pipeline could not be detected if smaller than 0.15 percent (or
0.0015) of the pipeline volume. Northstar's pipeline would carry up to 60,000
barrels per day. At this rate, over 4,000 gallons (almost 100 barrels) of crude
oil could leak out into the coastal environment each day. In open water, oil
spills cause a visible sheen. In the Arctic Ocean, however, sea ice covers the
surface for six months each year, from mid November to mid May. According to
the draft EIS, there would be no way to detect a spill under the sea ice unless
it was more than 4,000 gallons per day. This means during the winter over
700,000 gallons (16,500 barrels) of crude oil could leak out under the ice
undetected.
The DEIS fails to consider directional drilling from the mainland and all of
the negative terrestrial impacts which accompany this option.
The threats to subsea oil pipeline or island integrity and the risks of oil spills are inadequately analyzed and differences are not evaluated for technological alternatives or the different pipeline routes.
... There is scarcely a substance on earth that is so intractable, so
unexpectedly complicated, so deceptively passive yet irresistible...
Dr. E.F. Roots, authority on Arctic ice[29]
Northstar would be the first offshore oil and gas development/production facility in the Alaskan Beaufort Sea without a causeway to shore, and the first in the Arctic to include a connection to onshore facilities by a buried subsea oil pipeline. Hazardous sea ice conditions, such as ice ride-up, pack ice and broken ice movements, ice gouging, strudel scour, and the currents will not only affect the outcome of a spill if it occurs, but pose unprecedented dangers to the project facilities that could result in oil spills. As the risks cannot be accurately determined, the precautionary principle must guide decision-making.
Since pipelines contribute 97% of all oil spilled from Outer Continental
Shelf operations, according to the MMS,[30]
concern about integrity of the subsea oil pipeline is well justified. The EIS
must describe and critically assess the analysis that has been carried out, the
alternative technologies and engineering that were considered, and the
attendant risks.
The adequacy of the production platform and subsea oil pipeline engineering and
construction standards to protect it from the extreme Arctic conditions such as
ice gouging, strudel scour, ice-ride up, other ice conditions and coastal
erosion is not discussed in detail in the DEIS. The document merely states
that these issues were "addressed through the JPO (Joint Pipeline Office)
review," and lists the technical documents in an Appendix. This is not adequate
for full consultation and simply ducks the issue. A closer look at the
engineering reports listed in Appendix E raises questions. An independent
reviewer did not conduct these technical analyses, but instead, they were
conducted by the same firm that is contracted by BP-XA for pipeline design.
Although the Joint Pipeline Office reviewed them, it is impossible to tell from
the reports themselves whether all their questions were answered, and this
analysis is not reflected in the DEIS.
There is clear federal responsibility over these issues as well. First, the
federal leases require that "all pipelines, including both flow lines and
gathering lines for oil and gas, shall be designed and constructed to provide
for adequate protection for water currents, storm and ice scouring, subfreezing
conditions, and other hazards."[31] Second,
the U.S. Department of Transportation and/or MMS also regulates pipeline
minimum design standards and maintenance and operations requirements.[32] These regulations address pipe quality,
design pressure, welding, location of pipe, corrosion, pipe installation,
operator training, repairs, etc.
We question whether the best possible safeguards are being incorporated into
this project. For example, since "the transported fluids are expected to have
low potential for inducing corrosion of the inside pipeline walls ... a
corrosion allowance has not been included in the pipeline wall thickness, nor
would an internal protective coating be provided".[33] This is critical since corrosion causes most failures of
subsea pipelines in the U.S., and internal corrosion causes most failures for
medium to large-sized pipelines.[34] Internal
corrosion has also been a serious and chronic problem with the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline that has resulted in pipeline replacement in buried sections such as
in Atigun Pass.[35] Given the difficulty of
leak detection and repair under the ice or during broken ice conditions, and
the major risk to the environment, it seems irresponsible not to use the best
available technology to prevent corrosion.
The very real risks from ocean scouring are clearly shown by a recent
California oil spill at the Torch Operating Company pipeline that connects
federal OCS facilities to the Santa Barbara coast.[36] The 11-year old pipeline ruptured during a routine
maintenance pigging operation and spilled about 500 barrels of oil. The
initial pipeline failure led to a large crack that after moderate ocean swells
broke all the way through about 2 weeks later.
An analysis of the cause of the rupture by a metallurgical engineer found that
lack of preheating during the welding procedure may have been one of the
primary reasons for failure by causing the weld to become hard and brittle.
The "eventual failure occurred by shear or tear stress and strain due to
mechanical forces and stress overload." The physical stress may have occurred
due to scouring of ocean bottom sediments from below the pipeline, leading to
spans of unsupported pipeline in the area of rupture. A survey with a remotely
operated vehicle after the spill showed that the pipeline was suspended in a
freespan condition for about 180'. "The need for periodic external inspections
to detect freespans and other threats to pipeline integrity has implications
for all of the offshore pipelines permitted by Santa Barbara County and state
and federal agencies".[37]
For Northstar, the whirlpool-like action of strudel scouring poses a parallel
situation in that if "scour occurs along the pipelines, then pipeline free
spans may develop."[38] The DEIS ignores site
specific data from Harding Lawson (1985) showing larger strudel scours occur
(maximum diameter of 89' compared with range of 20-70')[39] and USGS and other data from other nearby sites showing
scours ranging from 52-300' in diameter.[40]
Northstar design calculations show the pipelines can "withstand an individual
strudel scour which could potentially form over the route,"[41]. However, it does not appear that the maximum-sized
scour was considered.[42] Whether the
pipeline would withstand more than one scour was apparently not evaluated. The
DEIS also does not describe potential risks from tidal cracks -- long linear
features as long as 210 feet, found during strudel scour surveys.[43]
Many risks to the subsea oil pipeline were also not well evaluated, including
local thaw bulb creation and associated subsidence and instability, permafrost
melting, and shoreline erosion, some of which we discussed earlier in the
section on alternatives, yet these risks appear to be the justification behind
the selection of the Agency's preferred alternative. It does not make sense
that if the maximum ice pile-up height is predicted to be 56 feet, how a 21-27
ft high sheet pile wall would adequately protect against ice override.[44]
It is unclear if the burial depths proposed are sufficient to be safe and what
alternatives were considered that might be safer. The DEIS states that "design
for the offshore pipeline is based in part on ice keel protection analysis and
specifies a minimum burial depth of 7 ft." This contradicts information in
BP-XA's State right-of-way application for the crude oil pipeline[45] that "the proposed burial depth of cover is
6 feet in the lagoon region and 7 feet in the segment beyond the barrier
islands." It is unclear what burial depth was actually used in the design
analysis, as one study has an errata sheet indicating "the trench depth in the
offshore section will now vary such that the design depth of cover will be
between 7-9 feet and not as mentioned in this report 9 ft... [but] no changes
have been made to the original body of the report".[46] This report concludes that "soil displacements of around
24 inches at pipe depth of cover" would occur, but does not indicate if this
shifting would be substantially reduced at would for greater burial depths.
There are risks to the pipeline not simply from the ice itself actually
grinding into the pipeline--a point not clearly made in the DEIS. The ice scour
pipeline interaction study contained in the above mentioned technical report
says, "if an ice gouge were to pass over the pipeline, soil would be displaced
both in front of the gouge and below the gouge, as the pipeline soil will be
moved both laterally and vertically. The pipeline will also move but its
response is a function of the soil strength, the soil displacement at the pipe,
and the pipe dimensions and properties. The configuration that the pipeline
takes up will dictate the strain induced in the pipeline. The goal of the
design is to prove that a trench depth of 10 ft protects the pipeline from ice
gouges and determine if a shallower trench depth will still adequately protect
the pipeline".[47] Yet the documents do not
clearly compare the safety of even the10 ft and 7 ft depths.
Key information needed to evaluation the environmental impacts of the shoreline
transition zone area is needed.[48] The
pipeline transition from the trench to the above ground VSM's is described at
p. 5.3-39 to be at 110 ft inland but this differs from the Final Project
Description which shows it at 150 ft.[49]
What would happen if there were dramatic erosion events, such as 35' eroding in
2 weeks? Would the pipeline remain buried in the trench that was now at sea
level? Wouldn't the ocean also remove the material filling in the trench? How
could this affect freeze-thaw action that could harm pipeline integrity? If 45
feet of the shoreline erodes over the 15-year pipeline life, leaving the
pipeline that was buried in land exposed along the coastline, what will be the
impacts? This needs to be addressed as it could affect the integrity of the
pipeline for Alternatives 2-4. We are disconcerted that BP-XA's Final Project
Description concludes that "the final dimensions of the trench and the
position of the pipelines within the trench at the shore approach have not yet
been determined, and conservative dimensions are provided... In this type of
environment, it will be difficult to completely stabilize the area because of
natural erosive forces".[50]
Coastal erosion effects on pipeline integrity were generally discussed but
conclusions were not substantiated.[51] Why
wasn't the coastal set-back for the shore approach facilities designed to
withstand the maximum erosion event, such as 35-ft event, instead of merely 3
ft/year? If the engineering evaluation was done only for the 3-ft/year rate,
what justification is there for the claim that "the pipeline is buried deep
enough that erosion will not uncover it."
We find it surprising and inadequate that "the impacts of bundled pipelines and
the potential for multiple lines to be damaged at the same located has not been
evaluated".[52] Information on the rates of
gas pipeline leaks and explosions is needed to determine how would this affect
oil pipeline spills and increase maintenance requirements.
We disagree that direct impacts to the offshore pipeline operations and
maintenance from ice would be minor.[53]
There would be extensive periods when repairs of the pipeline could not be
undertaken, e.g. broken ice conditions, and the ice would greatly increase the
change that a chronic leak of the pipeline would go undetected. The risks from
ice gouging and strudel scour would be significant, not minor due to the
increased risks to pipeline integrity. Additionally it is likely that a chronic
leak of the pipeline would go undetected due to ice cover.
Alternative 1 is the only responsible alternative, as well as the only
commonsense alternative and the only one consistent with the requirements of
NEPA. This is inevitable given the uncertainties associated with
* oil spills,
* untried technologies in harsh environments where there are poorly understood
hazards from ice and
* coping with spills in broken ice situations,
* when combined with
* the significant possibilities of ice spills from pipeline breaks
* increased tanker traffic, and
* the myriad effects of the environment and on residents
There are great uncertainties associated with oil spills, particularly with
untried technologies in harsh environments where there are poorly understood
hazards from ice and the impossibility of coping with spills in broken ice
situations. When this is added to the significant chances of spills from
pipeline breaks and increased tanker traffic which would result in catastrophic
impacts on the environment and residents mean that Alternative 1 is the only
responsible and commonsense alternative which is consistent with the
requirements of NEPA and other laws applicable to this project.
The only close precedent cited is not encouraging. The only other Arctic
subsea oil buried pipeline connecting offshore and onshore facilities was
constructed at the Drake gas field in the Canadian Beaufort Sea in 1978.[54] This was a gas pipeline, not oil, was much
shorter, and was in the event never placed into operational service and there
was no program of monitoring, research or maintenance. The pipeline was
abandoned in 1996/7, 18 years after it was constructed. The well remains
plugged and abandoned. The environmental costs in building the pipeline were
never offset by any benefits whatsoever.
Major oil spills are expected. Oil spill contingency plans required for the Northstar project, including discussions of the major limitations of cleanup methods and ineffectiveness in broken ice, were not analyzed in the EIS.
The public is fundamentally concerned about the risk of oil spills from
Northstar, and industry's ability to respond and adequately clean them up. The
Traditional Knowledge of sea ice and other aspects of the existing physical
environment given in the DEIS sets out ample reason for believing that
response, containment, and clean up of oil spills would be poor to impossible.
These factors include danger of boat travel during late summer and fall with
storms, storm surge flooding, and moving young ice;[55] under-ice currents, currents changing with depth,
underwater storms, and free water always moving underneath the ice;[56] and unpredictable leads that open and shut
quickly.[57] However, in some cases, the DEIS
contradicts these observations, e.g. "under-ice water generally is calm,"[58] without giving any western scientific
substantiation. Generally, these issues are not addressed elsewhere in the
DEIS, nor at all in BP-XA's draft oil spill contingency plan.
The DEIS has disregarded a large area of Traditional Knowledge for the analysis
of the "Effects of Oil" in Chapter 8.[59] It
arbitrarily did not include in this section relevant information on how weather
conditions, including broken ice, fog, winds and other hazards may impede oil
spill response and how it would influence potential effects on fish and
wildlife. They are relevant to many of the questions posed in Chapter 8,
including "what oil spill response could be used in ice and broken ice
conditions?" and other questions that were not posed well in that section. We
urge you to go back to the drawing board to use the ample wealth of traditional
knowledge on this topic. For example observations from public hearings,
written testimony, and other forums regarding ice hazards, weather, and
oceanographic conditions are they related to oil spill risk, response, and
environmental impacts of spill to the coastal and marine environment should be
included in this section. As well, traditional knowledge from other Alaska
Natives on the effects of oil spills, and oil spill cleanup, from experience
with the Exxon Valdez spill could be included
The DEIS lists some types of spills in Chapter 8: well blowouts, tank spills, maximum well blowouts, and of course pipeline failures, to name a few. However in its analysis it relies on non-Arctic and non-offshore data from California and the Gulf of Mexico - environments that are much more benign than the Beaufort Sea. Dynamic ice conditions such as ice gouging and strudel scour, months of darkness, harsh storms, white out conditions, fog, and constant winds are just a few of the factors that work to increase the risk of a spill in Arctic waters, and increase the difficulty of cleanup, by orders of magnitude. The report utterly fails to assess the difficulties of cleanup in darkness, which would significantly hamper or even render impossible any cleanup effort during the winter.
The characterization that a large oil spill would only have minor effects on
ice, or caused by ice is inaccurate.[60]
Broken ice conditions would greatly inhibit the ability of crews to respond to
spills, and oil spill clean up techniques would be ineffective in cleaning up
most of the oil.[61]
But even without taking into account the extreme environmental hazards of the
Beaufort Sea environment, the DEIS points out high risk of major oil spills
from the Northstar project. It says there would be a one in four chance of a
major spill: "based on MMS historical spill rates and the estimated Northstar
production, there is an estimated 23% to 27% probability of one or more spills
greater than or equal to 1,000 barrels (42,000 gallons) from the drill rig,
storage tank, and/or offshore pipeline occurring over the lifetime of the
Northstar project".[62] Yet the cumulative
impact analysis mischaracterizes this risk of a large oil spill as "low,"[63] and its contribution to cumulative impact as
"minor".[64]
The DEIS notes that "[e]xisting and potential future Outer Continental Shelf
oil and gas development was estimated by the MMS for Lease Sale 170 to result
in an 87 to 98 percent chance of a large oil spill (greater than 1,000
barrels). This estimate was made without specifically considering the
contribution of the Northstar Unit development".[65] This is a stunning admission of the possibility of an oil
spill in the region, a possibility that would be increased by the Northstar
proposal.
The risks are not limited to on-site: Northstar would require the operation of
additional tankers from the Valdez marine terminal - 181-198 total, or 23-30
tanker trips per year during peak production.[66] However, these impacts from tanker spills are not
evaluated at all in the DEIS.
The DEIS downplays the risks of blowouts by presenting inaccurate or incomplete
information. This has great bearing on impact analysis, since 9.4 million
gallons (225,000 barrels) of crude oil could be released from a blowout in the
first 15 days DEIS,[67] and it could flow for
much longer if a relief well needed to be drilled from a site other than Seal
Island to kill the flow. BP-XA says it would take from 4 to 8 months to drill
a relief well if timing was such that an ice pad could be built or a CIDS or
drillship could be moved to the site.[68]
Therefore, up to 113 million gallons of oil could flow from a blowout before
completion of the relief well (assuming oil flowed at the same rate of 15,000
barrels per day as used in the response planning standard for the first 15
days).
The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) conducted a more
rigorous analysis of blowouts as part of its consideration of BP-XA's oil spill
contingency plan.[69] Whereas the DEIS says
"there is no documentation on record within the Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation of a crude oil blowout ever happening on the North
Slope"[70], ADEC's recent report found there
were 6 blowout events on the North Slope since 1974, with the most recent
occurring at Endicott in 1994, based on an analysis of ARCO and BP-XA's
drilling records.[71] This report said that
although "none of these events resulted in a liquid hydrocarbon spill," it
defined a blowout as "any time primary and secondary well control does not
contain hydrocarbon gas or liquid... which then emanates... to the surface."[72] Therefore this data shows greater risks of
blowout spills than did the DEIS. Additionally, there is no discussion in the
DEIS of a natural gas blowout that took place from a drilling ship in the
Canadian Beaufort Sea in 1989 which forced the crew to evacuate the drill site
until the blowout expended itself.[73]
ADEC also scrutinized data for OCS wells and found that the rate of blowouts is
higher for the OCS compared with other areas. Whereas the DEIS says that "more
than 31,000 exploratory wells have been drilled on the OCS without any
occurrence of a blowout that released crude oil into the environment,"[75] ADEC summarized data from a recent industry
study showing there were 160 blowouts in the U.S. OCS in the Gulf Coast.[76] Of these, 45 occurred during exploratory
drilling and the remainder during development or production drilling). MMS's
own data shows that for the period 1995-1996 there were 5 blowouts, 8
explosions, 11 pipeline failures, 8 significant pollution events (greater than
50 bbls) and regrettably, 18 fatalities in the U.S. OCS.[77]
The industry publication Offshore recently noted, "about every 10 years,
a major accident takes place somewhere. In 1958, the US Gulf witnessed a large
blowout; in 1968, there was a blowout off Great Yarmouth in the North Sea; in
1978, a problem developed on Ekofisk in the North Sea; and in 1988, the Piper
Apha disaster occurred. Now, it is 10 years later, and no major event has
occurred yet."[78] It is important to
reiterate that the probability of an oil spill is a statistical prediction and
even low probability does not guarantee that a spill will not happen.
A review of recent news stories shows the very real risk of offshore and buried
oil pipeline spills even in areas with far less rigorous weather conditions
than Northstar:
"The heart of this unique community of 300 is about to be ripped out, to purge a huge plume of pollution underneath the downtown and shore.... Sand and gravel contaminated by petroleum that leaked for years from underground pipelines leading from a tank farm on the bluff down to the company's pier...leaky pipes had contaminated enough to form a toxic mound 10-stories high.
1.68 million gallons crude oil spilled from a pipeline connecting an offshore platform to a storage facility in Nigeria and spread to coastlines over 190 km away. About 1 million people living in 19 communities worst hit by the spill and over 14,000 individuals and groups filed claims against Mobil Oil.
Two unrelated oil spills from a leaking tanker and an underwater pipeline required response at the same time. The Amoco pipeline spill located offshore Texas was noticed after a sudden drop in pressure. It was unknown how much leaked but up to 1 million gallons of crude oil could have been in the pipeline. Although the Coast Guard located the spill after dark, cleanup did not begin until the next day. After 3 days the leak was still not found, even though divers walked the length of the 10,000' buried line.
4-mile long crude oil spill from ruptured Amoco pipeline leaked 33,600 gallons prior to shutdown.
Undersea pipeline ruptured during a routine pigging operation, spilling about 21,000 gallons of oil that formed an oil slick 8 square miles in size and killed migratory birds. The pipeline failure was caused by welding problems and stress and strain; physical stress may have occurred due to scouring of ocean bottom sediments leading to spans of unsupported pipeline in the area of rupture.
A Texaco pipeline bringing oil from 50 offshore platforms and buried 8' beneath the saltwater Lake Barre ruptured, spilling 210,000 gallons of crude oil across a 7-mile path. Shallow coastal wetlands where shrimp, crabs, fish, birds and other wildlife breed were oiled.
210,000 gallons crude oil spilled from a broken offshore pipeline into coastal waters north of the Aransas River. The cause of the pipeline break was not known right away and cleanup efforts were hampered by muddy conditions.
The Coast Guard fined two Shell Oil Co. subsidiaries a total $80,000 for a 176,000-gallon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The Coast Guard said the pipeline apparently was broken by a fishing net from a commercial trawler and Shell should have shut the pipeline and contained the spill. But the company said it did not know of the spill initially, and oil spilled from the pipeline for a week.
An earthquake at 7.5 on the Richter scale ruptured the pipeline from offshore oil fields in the Sea of Okhotsk to mainland terminals in 18 places where it moved and buckled. About 882,000 gallons of crude spilled into the rich fishing areas around the island. The earthquake was a human tragedy as over 2,000 people died, including most of the workers who ran the pipeline.
The agencies have acted arbitrarily about which permits and authorizations are included for analysis in the DEIS. The Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan (C-Plan) was not addressed. This leads to failure to analyze a key Federal and State plan required for operation of the Northstar facility in the DEIS.
As the DEIS notes, an C-Plan is required by Federal, as well as state and
local agencies. The document says "the potential for, and difficulty of
containing and cleaning up, a large oil spill from offshore facilities,
especially in broken ice conditions, and the resulting expectation of
significant impacts on the marine ecosystem, as one of two major issues raised
during scoping".[88] Given the importance of
this issue to the public and the controversy raised in past decades over oil
spill response-- particularly during broken ice conditions -- it is common
sense that the C-Plan be one of the documents incorporated into the DEIS.
Since this plan was not even submitted to the State or Federal agencies until
after the DEIS was released for public review on June 1, full analysis of the
impacts of oil left in the environment, as well as the impacts of spill cleanup
and containment measures was not done. Since most of the other C-Plans for
onshore North Slope oil fields are operating under temporary extensions, we are
very concerned about the adequacy of spill response in general for the Arctic
region. For example, Alyeska's oil spill plan for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline did
not meet the State's standards because it did not have enough equipment or
personnel and did not describe how crews would reach remote spills in bad
weather or protect environmentally sensitive wetlands.[89] We received a copy of the State of Alaska's request for
more information on the oil spill contingency plan and air quality permits on
July 15, weeks after the DEIS comment period started.. The Alaska Department
of Environmental Conservation's 23-page letter requesting additional
information, makes it clear that response plans are far from adequate.
BP-XA responded to the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC)
by the August 14, 1998 deadline, but their letter did not contain critical
information such as response scenarios for spills in open-water, on ice and in
broken ice and said that will be submitted by September 4, 1998 -- after the
close of the public comment period (see Attachment).[90] We are concerned that necessary information on spill
response measures and their planned effectiveness will therefore not be
addressed in the EIS process. Due to the unprecedented nature of the risks
from subsea pipelines and blowouts, this information is vital for impact
analysis.
For example, there is no information in BP-XA's draft contingency plan or
Alaska Clean Sea's draft Tactic manual that describes the operating limitations
for various equipment (e.g. what sea states or ice conditions the small boats,
barges, or skimmers could be used in). The C-Plan scenarios do not clearly
state exactly what equipment will be deployed at what time and how effective it
will be at recovering oil. The response scenario for a blowout in broken ice
relies on mining over 9 million cubic yards of oiled ice rubble, a technique
that has never been used before.
Spill response techniques with environmental impacts that have not yet been
addressed in the EIS have been proposed by BP-XA (spill response involving
"temporary" disposal on barrier islands) and suggested by ADEC, for example the
need for ice-breaking barges (see Attachment[91]). This is significant, new information on a potential
source of additional impact from Northstar operations to bowhead whales, ringed
seals, and other marine mammals. Icebreakers generate some of the highest
levels of vessel noise measured.[92] Yet the
Biological Assessment concluded that risk of noise effects from ships and boats
would be low because the boats would be only used during mid-summer to early
fall when few whales are expected in the area.[93] However, icebreakers used for spill response (and during
spill response drills) during broken ice conditions would likely overlap much
of the period that bowhead whales would be present in the Beaufort Sea. The
DEIS also failed to analyze the impacts to bowhead whales and other marine
mammals from icebreakers as a noise source during operation and maintenance
activities.[94] The DEIS pointed out that
there could be special problems because of the natural gas and oil pipelines
co-located in the same trench, "additional precautions for oil spill response
should be noted it the Northstar C-Plan for the scenario of rupture of both
pipelines (e.g. keeping all ignition sources out of the area until the gas has
migrated up through cracks in the ice and dissipated into the air). Repair of
the damaged pipelines should address any difficulties presented by the two
pipelines being located in the same subsea trench".[95] Yet it passed the buck to an as yet not formulated
C-Plan, completely failing to address a crucial issue at the heart of the DEIS.
And the draft C-Plan contains nothing in response to this circumstance.
Issues such as the State response planning standards, the actual record of
industry to respond to spills during broken ice and other weather conditions,
and the small amount of oil that can be expected to be actually cleaned up
should be addressed in detail in the DEIS.
The
section on available containment and cleanup methods fails to adequately
describe the major limitations of any of the techniques.
Even in the most ideal conditions of flat calm seas, little or no wind and
precipitation and the ready availability of the all right equipment and fully
trained personnel within minutes or a few hours of an oil spill, it has been
demonstrated that less than 15% of all the oil spilled can be recovered, and
that recovery could be as low as 1% to 10%. It is fallacious to believe that in
the conditions present in the Arctic that any level of significant recovery of
oil from a spill can be achieved.
Section 8.6.1 on available containment and cleanup methods is a wish list
riddled with a litany of potential problems. For example, in-situ burning is
the response described for solid and broken ice conditions. However, given
in-situ burning must occur within 24 hours of a spill,[96] it seems like an unrealistic response in many situations.
For example, the leak detection limit for the pipeline is close to 100
barrels/4,200 gallons per day, meaning a leak of considerable size could go
undetected for quite some time, certainly a lot longer than 24 hours. This is
compounded by the fact that visual detection is difficult or impossible in the
dark, during storms, or under ice. In-situ burning also requires approval from
agencies, which means a number of steps must occur before a response can take
place. The leak must be detected, agencies must be notified, permission must
be granted, personnel and equipment must be mobilized, and then the weather
must be favorable enough so that the response doesn't jeopardize lives.
A closer look at past oil spill cleanup demonstrations in the Beaufort Sea show
severe limitations during broken ice conditions (see Attachment for details).[97] For example, small unsuccessful in-situ
burn tests from 1983 are still held up as demonstrations of industry
capability. Two burn tests were conducted in onshore pits with scattered ice.
In the first, a helicopter ignited a ten-foot wide pool of fresh oil, but only
half the oil -- 5.8 barrels -- burned. In the next, oil escaped when the fire
containment boom was submerged by the wind. In a third test, 500 feet of fire
containment boom were deployed in the lee of an offshore drilling island -- not
even on the exposed side like Northstar would be-- and it survived a mere 24
hours of moving, broken ice.[98] Exercises
have shown poor spill response even in calm conditions. Oranges used to
simulate oil for an exercise at ARCO's Stinson #1 rig in the Beaufort Sea
rapidly moved away from it. Although this drill occurred in open water with
little ice, the small bits of ice hampered the boom and most of the oranges
escaped when it was towed.[99]
The DEIS also fails to consider information included in a recent report carried
out for Alaska Clean Seas by S.L. Ross Environmental Research "Evaluation of
Cleanup Capabilities for Large Blowout Spills in the Alaskan Beaufort Sea
During Periods of Broken Ice". The report casts serious doubt on industry's
ability to clean up oil in broken ice conditions. The report outlines the
formidable challenges posed by ice, daylight hours, weather and location of
response equipment. It analyzes the effectiveness of countermeasures,
dispersants and in-situ burning, and finds that all three are wholly
ineffective at recovering oil on water or ice during broken ice conditions
experienced during fall freeze-up and spring break-up. Ross et al. (1998)
reports an estimated 15-day recovery for oil blowouts of 0.6-5.9% of the oil
during fall freeze-up and 4.4-18% of the crude during spring breakup broken ice
conditions, depending on extent of ice coverage.[100]
The abject failure of the DEIS to adequately address oil spills is witnessed by
its failure to describe a response to both pipelines ruptured at once. In this
case, response to the oil spill may be delayed due explosive vapors and
increased mixing of the oil and more rapid mousse formation would be
anticipated due to the turbulence of gas escaping from the nearby pipeline.[101]
The DEIS points out, correctly, the danger of rapid mousse formation but then
does not explain the difficulty of cleaning up mousse - mechanical removal is
impossible especially in broken ice conditions; dispersants are ineffective
against mousse and, the water content prevents it from burning. As well, there
is a "significant increase in the bulk volume of the oil (usually up to 4-fold
increase), greatly expanding the amount of oily material that must be dealt
with".[102] Furthermore, mousse can spread
widely into the environment and has a severe impact on a range of wildlife.
In-situ burning is the response described for solid and broken ice conditions.
However, given in-situ burning must occur within 24 hours of a spill,[103] it is an unrealistic response in many
situations. For example, the leak detection limit for the pipeline is close to
100 barrels/4,200 gallons per day, meaning a leak of considerable size could go
undetected for a long time, certainly a lot longer than 24 hours. In fact it
is possible that thousands of gallons of oil may be spilled prior to being
detected. While the DEIS assumes that leaks could be detected by drilling a
series of holes through the ice every two months, it is more likely that the
spill not be detected until the spring, so oil could continue spilling at a
rate below the threshold depth below the ice for months.
The DEIS acknowledges that oil spill response actions could be delayed or
hindered for over 50% of the year due to broken ice, unstable ice, rough seas
or high wind conditions. In effect this means for over half the time of
BP-XA's Northstar operation would have no adequate oil spill response
available.
Fog and blowing snow could also slow the rate of response to oil spills. The
DEIS should include information about the prevalence of such conditions.[104] At Barter Island and Barrow, fog was
reported to obstruct vision 16-17% of the time, and exceeds 25% of the time
during the months of May to September in Barter Island.[105] Blowing snow was found to obstruct vision 10-22% of
the time in Barter Island during October to April, and 7-16% of the time in
Barrow during these months. Perhaps more revealing as to the difficulties
these weather conditions pose, on average over the course of a year, 22-26% of
all weather observations for Barter Island and Barrow recorded obstructions to
vision. Prudhoe Bay may vary from these figures, but the coast typically has
even more fog than the Deadhorse airport where that weather station is
located.
Specifically, mechanical spill response activities could be restricted up to
one third of the year (4 months) as a result of these broken ice conditions.[106] The DEIS concludes that the only oil
spill response available is to try and remove as much oil as possible from the
water by burning. It is admitted that this must occur within 24 hours of the
oil spill. This in itself is a significant issue: it is easily possible that
adverse weather for 24 hours would prevent any response including burning.
The DEIS suggests that in-situ burning could be used under conditions of ice
floes, high winds, strong currents and large waves.[107] This is presumably because it is the only alternative:
"During periods of broken and unstable ice, in situ burning may be the only
active cleanup response available due to safety concerns for personnel and
equipment."[108] However, more fundamental
is the reason that burning is suggested which is clearly because mechanical
response would not be challenging at best and has never been truly field
proven. The DEIS puts it this way: "The State of Alaska does not usually
consider in-situ burning in open water a primary response strategy because
state guidelines require demonstrating response capability based on mechanical
response. However, in broken ice conditions, in situ burning may be a more
efficient method than physical containment and recovery."[109] In other words, the State's least preferred response
option has become the only possible response to oil spills in broken ice
conditions. State law requires planning for mechanical response to clean up
spills within 72 hours, clearly impossible in the case of Northstar.
The DEIS pays no attention, either to the practicality or efficacy of in-situ
burning, or to the wide range of problems associated with burning spilled oil
which include the generation of aerial pollution that would be dispersed over a
wide area and which would contain a wide range of toxic compounds resulting
from the partial combustion of hydrocarbons including the carcinogenic poly
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs).
A further issue is that of response to an oil spill in winter that would
require cleanup in darkness that may prove close to impossible. Nowhere is this
addressed. The only acknowledgment of the effects of darkness is the `reduction
of quality of visual resources if spill occurred when viewer sensitivity would
be low due to darkness and reduced level of outdoor activities'.[110] In other words, no one will be able to
see what's happening or care. Not only is this absurdly simplistic and short
sighted, but it highlights a far more serious omission in the DEIS: the report
utterly fails to assess the difficulties of cleanup in darkness, which would
significantly hamper or even render impossible any cleanup effort during the
winter.
It is suggested that no response may be possible: "If weather conditions
prevent response or endanger human life, or a response may cause more damage to
the environment than the spill, it is possible that no active cleanup
activities would be initiated. If no action were performed, natural and
biological processes would disperse and degrade the oil over time. Weathering
processes would continue to age the oil, leaving a thick tarry mat on the
tundra, shoreline, or sediments contacted by the oil spill."[111]
Traditional Knowledge addresses how the potential combination of severe weather
conditions such as sea state, fog, ice and winds may hinder effective spill
response.[112] However the DEIS fails to
take into account this valuable source of information. "Meaningful prediction
of the risk associated with the project requires use of data from similar
environments, with similar causes of pipeline damage. However, until there is a
long production record in offshore Arctic waters, non-Arctic and non-offshore
data is the best available statistical record."[113] Yet at the same time the DEIS acknowledges that "[i]ce
gouges and strudel scours present potential hazards which could cause pipeline
damage resulting in oil spills."[114]
In summary the DEIS utterly fails to address the adverse environmental effects
that either no cleanup would entail or the shortcomings of burning and ignores
the traditional knowledge which provides the necessary warnings.
Environmental impacts of oil spills are downplayed (including from the Exxon Valdez tanker terminal) and traditional knowledge is inadequately integrated into the analysis of spills.
The DEIS does not describe spill effects from a major blowout oil spill. The DEIS gives impacts of an oil spill "1,000 barrels or more," which greatly masks the size of a potential blowout spill. BP-XA's oil spill contingency plan gives a well blowout volume for response planning standard as 177,900 barrels (7,471,800 gallons) over 15 days, and MMS's regulations require response scenarios for a blowout lasting at least 30 days.[115] While the chance of a blowout may be low, the DEIS still must consider the potential catastrophic effects because these effects to migratory birds, marine mammals, fish, invertebrates, and wilderness shorelines would be far greater than are described in the DEIS.
The DEIS calls most oil spill impacts minor. We disagree with the impact
levels listed for many types of oil spill impacts.[116] For example, a marine oil spill that spreads over 200
miles from the release site cannot be considered a minor impact. This would be
regionally significant and a major impact with respect to the Alaskan Beaufort
Sea coastal and marine environments. There could be regionally significant
losses of migratory birds, polar bears or ringed seals, bowhead whales, or
fish. Additionally, the effects on fish and wildlife habitats are
ignored while the emphasis is given only to discussion of population
level effects across the entire Alaskan Beaufort Sea. Significant
localized or regional effects are ignored. In particular, scientific
information on the effects of oil on bowhead whales and polar bears is
lacking.
The DEIS fails to adequately consider the possible impacts of oil spills on
bowhead whales, which is particularly egregious given the fact that the bowhead
is an endangered species, and is important to the diet and culture of North
Slope Inupiat communities. For example, the DEIS states on page 8-45 that if a
spill occurs on the seaward side of the barrier islands during the fall, a
season with the highest frequency of storms, that response could be delayed
until winter when ice thickness is sufficient enough to allow an on-ice
response. This is of great concern since bowhead whales migrate west across the
Beaufort in the fall, a time when response could be limited or impossible. This
is but one of many areas of concern where bowhead whales and other marine
mammals are concerned.
Threatened and endangered species in or near the project area are the
endangered bowhead whale, threatened Steller's eider, threatened spectacled
eider and the delisted Arctic peregrine falcon.[117] The DEIS acknowledges deficiencies in knowledge on
impacts on Steller's eiders, fails to adequately consider the possible impacts
of oil spills on bowhead whales, which is particularly egregious given the fact
that the bowhead is an endangered species, and is important to the culture of
North Slope Inupiat communities.
No pre-project sampling was done along the pipeline route, so there will be no
basis of comparing metal or hydrocarbon levels after development occurs. This
would make it impossible to assess impacts of a pipeline oil spill throughout
the area. This monitoring should occur prior to any approval of permits.
The potential persistence of spilled oil or other toxic substances ignored
existing studies conducted in the Beaufort Sea. As well, the discussion on the
existing chemical characteristics of the offshore sediments[118] ignores a major study of the persistence of trace
metals in shallow Arctic marine sediments that were contaminated by drilling
wastes.[119] This study contained reference
data for four shallow-water offshore island control sites, compared its finding
with data from other studies in the Beaufort Sea, and sampled discharge sites
in the central Beaufort Sea. The study found persistence of barium, chromium,
lead and zinc at some sample sites at all three locations sampled 2-4 years
after the drilling wastes were discharged. High levels of chromium, lead and
zinc were found at the Cross Island drill site, and high levels of lead at the
Alaska Island site. Spills and other contamination would pose greater effects
than described in the DEIS.
The DEIS acknowledges that birds are particularly susceptible to oil because it coats their feathers, destroying the insulating properties of the feathers, which may result in hypothermia or drowning due to loss of buoyancy and the toxicity of oil ingested from the preening of oiled feathers or from oil-contaminated food, and thus that survival of oiled birds is typically poor.[120] Potential effects of oil on spectacled eiders include direct mortality from oil toxicity, affecting lungs, adrenal gland, kidneys, liver, stomach and intestines, chronic physiological or behavioral changes, destruction of food organisms and habitat destruction. However despite all this, the DEIS acknowledges that potential effects of oil on Steller's eiders have not been studied[121] and thus is willing to countenance subjecting an endangered species to an unknown risk.
The DEIS states on page 8-45 that if a spill occurs on the seaward side of the barrier islands during the fall, a season with the highest frequency of storms, response could be delayed until winter when ice thickness is sufficient enough to allow an on-ice response. This is of significant concern since bowhead whales migrate west across the Beaufort in the fall, a time when response could be limited or impossible. This is but one of many areas of concern regarding bowhead whales and other marine mammals. Migrating bowhead whales can be injured or killed following a marine spill due to oiling of baleen, oil ingestion or contact with skin and eyes.[122] However, like the Steller's eider, lack of data on bowhead whales leads to difficulties in accurately predicting the effects of an oil spill on bowhead whales.[123] Some suggested impacts include, in addition to the above, adverse effects from inhalation of vapors, contaminated food sources and displacement from feeding areas, irritation of mucous membranes and respiratory tract and absorption of volatile hydrocarbons into the bloodstream, ulcer formation, severe skin inflammation, blood poisoning, damage to eyes from oil collected behind the eyes, serious impacts of oil and tar balls on the baleen and causing blockage between two parts of the bowhead stomach. "Because tar balls may persist in the marine environment for up to 4 years, bowhead whales would not have to be present during an oil release to be affected adversely. Impacts could continue for years."[124]
Oil can affect tundra by killing all vegetation or portions of the vegetative community, such as moss and lichens, and areas of oiled tundra often show a marked increase in thaw depth of the active layer under the contaminated area. Oiled tundra areas are impossible to clean up without further disturbance to the vegetative mat and the permafrost underneath.[125] Oil spills which reach freshwater lakes and ponds can kill the invertebrate fauna and plankton in the water, contaminate sediments and kill or injure emergent vegetation. Effects of oil on invertebrate populations can be long term, depending on the amount of oil contamination of the sediments.[126]
Impacts on plankton and marine invertebrates are described in the DEIS as minor,[127] despite observations that following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, benthic community suffered numerous dead and dying organisms and was reduced from 24 to 6 taxa.[128] Some members of the plankton community are particularly susceptible to extremely low levels of hydrocarbon concentration in the water. This statement ignores the sublethal impacts to the larval stages of non-planktonic adults such as fish which can comprise a large percentage of the plankton at certain times of the year. Such lethal effects include the development of genetic mutations in the adults which have been correlated to the exposure of larval stages to hydrocarbons. Similarly, effects of killing individual Beluga whales, seals and polar bears, marine and freshwater fish, individual waterfowl and shorebirds in onshore aquatic habitats are all described as minor,[129] even though oil spills `would have the potential to affect a large number of fish'[130] and kill hundreds of birds.[131] However, the DEIS downplays the impacts on marine wildlife, particularly fish where it quotes studies performed in Prince William sound after the Exxon Valdez spill which "failed to show statistically significant reduction in fish survival rates or diversity".[132] In fact it has been demonstrated that there have been a wide range of genetic mutations in the fish in Prince William Sound which can be directly attributed to their exposure to hydrocarbons from the spill.
This selective reporting of scientific papers to justify a view that the
impacts of oil spills can be short-lived does not instill confidence in the
ability of the agencies to provide a full objective assessment of impacts based
on published data. Other reports from the Exxon Valdez spill clearly
illustrate that there are long term impacts of the spill on the environment,
wildlife and indeed the communities living around the Sound.
With respect to bowhead whales, if oil moves into leads or ice-free areas
frequented by migrating bowheads, a large population of the population could be
affected[133] and if this occurred in the
spring migration, the oil would pose a great threat by putting nearly the
entire population at risk.[134] Yet, the
DEIS assessed this as a low probability due in part to the `low probability
that a spill would occur'.[135] Yet in view
of the unprecedented nature of the project, the assessment of such a
probability is necessarily guesswork. This is assessed as `impacts would be
minor'.[136]
Likewise, while acknowledging that an oil spill contacting Simpson Lagoon and
Gwydyr Bay could kill hundreds of spectacled eiders and the population would
not be expected to recover from this mortality,[137] the possibility of a large spill during the summer is
minimized by stating that `the risk of a large spill from a well blowout or
pipeline failure is considered a low probability event due to project design,
safety systems and leak detection.[138]
However basic risk analysis must heavily weight the possibility of such a
catastrophic event against the background of an unknown risk, however small.
The shortcomings in risk assessment are serious in light of the acknowledged
risk:
"Mortality of any biological resource as a result of an oil spill associated
with the project would be an irreversible loss. Birds, spectacled and Steller's
eiders in particular, are the most likely biological resources to experience
enough mortality to affect population numbers. Economic resources used to
respond to an oil spill would be irreversibly and irretrievably committed. And,
as acknowledged in the DEIS, "Permanent disturbance of subsistence lifestyles
would be an irreversible and irretrievable loss to Inupiat social and cultural
values."[139] The risk of this happening,
however small, is too great a burden to bear.
Thus the Federal agencies show a willingness to countenance all these effects on Stellers eiders, bowhead whales, tundra and other species where there is insufficient data to assess the risks in a situation where there are untried technologies in an unprecedented situation. The DEIS thus falls far short of its duties under NEPA and the ESA to critically assess these risks. Even NMFS in its letter of June 5, 1996 noted the need for a critical assessment of oil spill cleanup and prevention technology:
"Finally, NMFS is very aware of the problems associated with oil spill
prevention and cleanup in an Arctic environment. A critical assessment of the
technology available for both cleanup and prevention under both open water and
ice conditions must be included. Such information should also include seasonal
discussions of sensitive species, and habitat."
Yet in neither the DEIS nor the Biological Assessment (BA) required by section
7 of the Endangered Species Act appearing as Appendix B provide such a critical
assessment. Both are thus in violation of the ESA as well as NEPA.
The section "Impacts to the biological environment,"[140] is grossly inadequate. It fails to describe oil spill impacts in any detail for bowhead whales, polar bears, ringed and bearded seals, fishes, marine invertebrates, benthic sediments, under-ice algae, migratory birds, brown bears, caribou,[141] Arctic foxes, and other components of the marine and coastal ecosystems. The DEIS ignores substantial scientific information resulting from the extensive studies of the Exxon Valdez spill. In fact, not a single scientific reference cited for oil spill impacts pertain to Exxon Valdez studies of migratory birds or marine mammals,[142] even though there have been hundreds of such studies. For example, the book Marine Mammals and the Exxon Valdez, 1994 by T.R. Loughlin, was ignored even though it contains much evidence of toxic, reproductive, other physiological and behavioral effects on marine mammals.
Given the magnitude of concern about oil spill effects on bowhead whales, it
is unacceptable that the DEIS has less than one full page on this topic.[143] It ignores most of the relevant studies
that were discussed in the Biological Assessment, and ignores information on
the toxicity of spilled oil to marine mammals from Exxon Valdez studies.[144]
The DEIS does not discuss that polar bears are particularly sensitive to oil
spills because they search for food in the open leads or broken ice where oil
would accumulate and they would also be attracted to cleanup operations. There
is only a single paragraph on oil spill impacts to polar bears,[145] and it does not even cite major scientific papers
describing the toxic and thermoregulatory impacts of oil on this species. In a
specific instance, polar bears attempted to lick clean their oil-fouled thick
fur after exposure to an experimental oil spill.[146] Changes in thermoregulation and metabolism could have
led to hypothermia, stress and increased food requirements, but instead, two of
three bears died from toxic effects of oil ingested from concerted grooming.
High levels of hydrocarbons were absorbed and stored in the bear' blood,
brains, and other tissues. The DEIS has only paragraph on oil impacts to seals,
even though ringed seals are the primary food source of polar bears and toxic
effects of oil on harbor seals were a major effect of the Exxon Valdez spill.
The DEIS fails to document the many ways that the natural curiosity and a keen
sense of smell often places polar bears in harms way, such as being attracted
to drill rigs, garbage dumps, and contaminants. Polar bears have died from
eating a mixture of ethylene glycol and purple dye used for a runway marker
near Prudhoe Bay. Offshore structures can alter the sea ice habitat of polar
bears, such as warm water effluent keeping open water year-round that can
attract polar bears to seals. Interactions between polar bears and people tend
to be lethal for the bears. A young polar bear was shot by an oil industry
employee during the winter of 1968-69. During a five-year study in Canada,
four bears attracted to the rigs were shot, and in the Northwest Territories,
33 polar bears were documented as killed in oil and military areas over a
10-year period. In 1990, a bear that approached an offshore rig in Camden Bay
off the Arctic Refuge coast was killed.
The DEIS underestimates the number of bears that could be impacted by
development. The DEIS states "[t]he number of bears affected would be small
9tens of bears0 due to their low density, one bear per 39 to 77 square
miles."[147] Observations recorded in the
general area of the proposed Northstar development over the past two years
indicate a much higher incidence of polar bears. Seven bears alone were sighted
between Aug 1 and August 31 1998.[148]
In addition to these direct impacts on polar bears, there is the very real
concern that global climate change will change the character of the sea ice to
such an extent that the polar bear populations in the arctic will become
endangered.[149] Polar bears are depend on
the ice for hunting and climate models predict a drastic reduction in the sea
ice area if the current rate of greenhouse gas production continues. As the
burning of fossil fuels is a major cause of greenhouse gas emission, the
production of oil from the Northstar project will have a definite negative
indirect affect on polar bear populations in the Beaufort Sea.[150]
The section "Impacts to the biological environment,"[151] gives incorrect impact levels that viewed together
grossly underestimates the potential direct, indirect, and cumulative effects
of the Northstar project. The impact analysis methodology is inadequate and
arbitrary because there is not a meaningful set of impact analysis criteria. We
disagree with the DEIS analysis that the significance of biological effects
should rest solely on whether there are population-level effects for the entire
Beaufort Sea. Effects on many individuals, and local and regional effects on
populations and habitat quality are important ecologically, and in terms of
human values, and should be considered in the EIS.
It is impossible to make meaningful comments on the environmental impacts of
the proposed project as the DEIS does not provide suitable biological
definitions for the various levels of impacts (i.e. Negligible, Minor and
Substantial).
For example, the definition of negligible effects is inaccurate and confusing
due to use of the phrase, "are not measurable".[152] Impacts may not be measurable for a variety of reasons,
including inadequate scientific baseline or post-impact data collection, high
levels of temporal or spatial natural variability that confounds determination
of significant differences over time, or lack of understanding of species or
its habitat requirements. This definition should be changed as it is not
meaningful. The summary says the significance criteria will be identified with
the presentation of each individual analysis in chapters 5-10.[153] However, when you look at the later chapters, there
are not more specific definitions given, e.g. Chapter 5, physical environment
impacts says, "Terminology used in this chapter for impact intensity is that
described in Chapter 1 (section 1.7)".[154]
Without proper biological definitions of the levels of impacts the public is
unable to compare the impacts of the various alternatives in any meaningful
manner. Moreover, there are many direct and indirect impacts from the proposed
project that are underestimated or completely ignored. The following are some
examples of deficiencies in the assessment of biological impacts. This
discussion is in no way complete, it is intended to point out some key concerns
and the fact that much more work needs to be done in assessing the biological
impacts of this project.
Section 6.8, which addresses potential impacts to caribou from the Northstar
project, fails to acknowledge the findings of recent peer reviewed scientific
papers that detail the current impact oil field development has had on the
Central Arctic Caribou Herd (CAH). The intensity of oil field development , as
evidenced by the creeping expansion and increasing density of infrastructure
(roads, pipelines, pump stations) in the Prudhoe Bay and Kuparuk oil fields,
has altered the movement of parts of the CAH and displaced them from areas they
have used for generations. As field facilities proliferated in Kuparuk,
including construction of a new (Oliktok Rd), caribou showed increasing
avoidance of the field.[155] In 14 years
(1980-1993) of radio tracking 141 female caribou, not a single one of these
animals is known to have passed through the Prudhoe Bay oilfield in either
direction. Over the study period east-west movements by female caribou in the
area declined by 90% and overall occupation of the field area (660km2) declined
by 78% .[156]
Additional construction as proposed in the Northstar project will impact a
relatively undeveloped area of the Prudhoe Bay complex. This area is currently
some of the best remaining caribou habitat in the Prudhoe Bay complex. Adding
pipelines, roads and other oil development infrastructure will have both
significant direct and indirect affects on the CAH. These impacts are not
adequately addressed in the DEIS.
The DEIS does not properly define the "human environment" according to NEPA
regulations.[157] It includes all natural
aspects of the environment, as well as human and cultural components, not just
socio-economic factors, contrary to the DEIS analysis.
The DEIS failed to provide comprehensive analysis of 3 key issues required by
NEPA: unavoidable adverse environmental effects,[158] local short-term uses... vs long-term productivity[159] and irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources.[160]
For alternatives 4 and 5, the DEIS says the proposed activity might add only
negligible or minor increased negative impacts to caribou habitats.[161] Yet, there are already existing negative
effects on caribou and their habitats in the oil fields, as we described above
and in the section on cumulative effects. For alternative 2-3, the disturbance
from helicopters could be major because the pipeline inspections of the onshore
pipeline would not be next to an existing road. Also the effects of the 1,940
to 2,180 helicopter flights during construction and facilities installation
could be major.
The DEIS errs in stating that the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska and the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge "would not be affected by the project,"[162] even though the document elsewhere shows
that the shorelines of both these federal areas would likely be oiled by a
major spill.[163]
The entire section "Impacts to the biological environment,"[164] is grossly inadequate as it fails to describe oil spill impacts in any detail for bowhead whales, polar bears, ringed and bearded seals, fishes, marine invertebrates, benthic sediments, under-ice algae, migratory birds, brown bears, caribou, Arctic foxes, and other components of the marine and coastal ecosystems. The DEIS ignores substantial scientific information resulting from the extensive studies of the Exxon Valdez spill. In fact, not a single scientific reference cited for oil spill impacts pertain to Exxon Valdez studies of migratory birds or marine mammals,[165] even though there have been hundreds of such studies. For example, the book Marine Mammals and the Exxon Valdez, 1994 by T.R. Loughlin, was ignored even though it contains much evidence of toxic, reproductive, other physiological and behavioral effects on marine mammals.
Given the magnitude of concern about oil spill effects on bowhead whales, it
is outrageous that the DEIS has less than one full page on this topic.[166] It ignores most of the relevant studies
that were discussed in the Biological Assessment, and ignores information on
the toxicity of spilled oil to marine mammals from Exxon Valdez studies.[167]
The DEIS does not discuss that polar bears are particularly sensitive to oil
spills because they search for food in the open leads or broken ice where oil
would accumulate and they would also be attracted to cleanup operations. There
is only a single paragraph on oil spill impacts to polar bears,[168] and it does not even cite major scientific papers
describing the toxic and thermoregulatory impacts of oil on this species.[169] In a specific instance, polar bears
attempted to lick clean their oil-fouled thick fur after exposure to an
experimental oil spill.[170] Changes in
thermoregulation and metabolism could have led to hypothermia, stress and
increased food requirements, but instead, two of three bears died from toxic
effects of oil ingested from concerted grooming. High levels of hydrocarbons
were absorbed and stored in the bear's blood, brains, and other tissues. The
DEIS has only one paragraph on oil impacts to seals, even though ringed seals
are the primary food source of polar bears and toxic effects of oil on harbor
seals were a major effect of the Exxon Valdez spill.[171]
The DEIS fails to document the many ways that the natural curiosity and a keen
sense of smell often places polar bears in harms way, such as being attracted
to drill rigs, garbage dumps, and contaminants. Polar bears have died from
eating a mixture of ethylene glycol and purple dye used for a runway marker
near Prudhoe Bay.[172] Offshore structures
can alter the sea ice habitat of polar bears, such as warm water effluent
keeping water open year-round that can attract polar bears to seals.[173] Interactions between polar bears and
people can be lethal for the bears. A young polar bear was shot by an oil
industry employee during the winter of 1968-69, and in 1990 a bear that
approached an offshore rig in Camden Bay off the Arctic Refuge coast was
killed.[174] During a five-year study in
Canada, four bears attracted to the rigs were shot, and in the Northwest
Territories, 33 polar bears were documented as killed in oil and military areas
over a 10-year period.[175]
The DEIS greatly downplays the direct and cumulative effects of noise impacts to bowhead whales and needs major additional information to be adequate. For example, it inaccurately concludes "bowheads will tolerate high sound levels when no alternatives exists (for example in their migration route),"[176] without citing any scientific evidence, and fails to fully incorporate Traditional Knowledge and western scientific studies that have documented changes significant behavioral changes. The inclusion of some Traditional Knowledge is a step in the right direction, but there are still many statements along with it which inappropriately discount its merit. The Biological Assessment requires additional consideration of noise from the drilling island, icebreakers, and pile-driving, and evaluation of the cumulative effects of Northstar along with other concurrent development such as the Liberty development and ongoing exploratory activities (well drilling, seismic exploration, etc.).
The Biological Assessment concluded that risk of noise effects from ships
and boats would be low because the boats would be only used during mid-summer
to early fall when few whales are expected in the area.[177] However, mobilization of the rig and equipment by
local barge is scheduled to take place from September 7-30 on the single season
schedule.[178] Sea lift modules being
barged from Anchorage are scheduled to arrive by August 15 and be offloaded by
August 21-22,[179] but slight slippage in
this schedule due to weather could result in noise impacts to migrating bowhead
whales. And, if icebreakers were used for spill response and exercises and to
keep open water between West Dock and the drilling island, this noise would
likely coincide with the fall bowhead migration period, yet was not analyzed in
the DEIS or the Biological Assessment.
The impacts from pile driving required for installation of island slope
protection, described by the DEIS as "one of the greatest noise impacts to
bowhead whales,"[180] should be analyzed in
detail because even a short delay in the schedule could result in this massive
sound source occurring the bowhead migration. Instead, the DEIS merely
concludes that "impacts related to pile driving are not anticipated" because it
is "scheduled to be completed approximately two weeks prior to the fall
migration period in the vicinity of Seal Island,"[181] by August 31.[182]
Data is not presented for how far away from the island this sound source could
be heard, and even though bowheads aren't yet "in the vicinity" they still
could receive the sound if it is transmitted a long distance.
Although the Biological Assessment cites a scientific study finding that
"sounds from drilling on gravel islands have not been well characterized"[183] the DEIS concludes "noise levels from a
gravel island are expected to be low,"[184]
without substantiating this with more recent data. The Biological Assessment
noted that noise from exploratory drilling on gravel islands had been detected
at distances of 11 miles, but apparently no measurements were made to determine
noise levels at distances farther away.[185]
Yet, this information is needed in order to assess a major impact to the
bowhead whales in their nearby migration route. Was consideration given to
measuring the sound of drilling at the existing Endicott production island at
distances in 10 km increments out to at least 50 km to get some better
baseline?
There are other key areas where actual field measurements of sound source and
received levels are needed. For example, most of the monitoring studies for
seismic exploration have not conducted measurement at distances as far away as
bowheads are known to communicate with each other or to hear. In fact, most
studies except those conducted in the past few years did not include actual
field measurements at various intervals away from the sound source, but instead
took readings out to 1 km, then used a model to project out from there. The
DEIS should be revised to include the data from the 1997 seismic exploration
monitoring studies which clearly showed significant received sound levels at 30
miles away--the farthest distance that was measured.[186] But measurements at greater intervals are warranted.
Sound from seismic exploration can be detected out to 100 nautical miles.[187] One study showed that after a seismic
boat stopped operations at 65 miles away, there was in increase in call rates
of bowhead whales.[188] Traditional
Knowledge has documented that "pods of bowhead whales will begin to divert from
their migratory path at distances of 35 miles from an active seismic operation
and are displaced from their normal migratory path by as much as 30 miles."[189]
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the massive number of round-trip
helicopter flights required during island construction and module installation
were evaluated for effects on bowhead whales, subsistence, and migratory birds.
No information on noise levels was provided for this sound source. Most
flights (from 1,140 to 1,380 round-trips) are planned for the module
installation period from August 15 to November 30,[190] thereby overlapping with the bowhead whale migration
period and the subsistence harvest time, but this was not evident from the
impact analysis. This would be 152 to 184 round trip flights per day, or a
one-way flight every 4-15 minutes (assuming flights were around the clock).
Since "aircraft overflights can cause a rapid short-term response from
bowheads," it is probable that this intensity of helicopter flights will cause
a significant impact, not a "negligible biological impact as the DEIS
claims."[191]
We agree that seismic exploration and exploratory well drilling impacts should
be addressed in both the DEIS[192] and the
Biological Assessment because seismic exploratory activities may be carried out
in the future to further delineate the reservoir (as correctly explained by the
later document).[193]
We are concerned that the potential impacts of existing North Slope oil transportation and future impact from Northstar that may potentially affect the 42 proposed, threatened and endangered species and their habitats have not been analyzed. The DEIS only evaluates impacts to three of these species (the bowhead whale, Steller's eider and spectacled eider) and none of the others despite significant threats from oil spills along the tanker routes. Furthermore, the cumulative impacts chapter only dealt with the bowhead whale, where it inaccurately concluded, "cumulative impacts on bowhead whale populations are not expected."[194]
We are especially concerned about the western stock of the Steller sea lion
which moved from threatened to endangered status in 1997 (62 FR 24345) and
species that were recently listed in the lower 48 (including Upqua River
cutthroat trout, Central California coast coho salmon, Southern Oregon/Northern
California coast coho salmon, and Steelhead found in five evolutionary
significant units). The Steller sea lion has critical habitat areas throughout
areas that could be oiled by spills from tankers in Prince William Sound, and
along the tanker routes to the lower 48 and to Asia. Many of the endangered
species present in lower 48 coastal areas that could be affected by tanker
spills have very low populations. The Biological Assessment does not indicate
that new biological opinions have been done for the tanker transportation since
Steller sea lions were listed as endangered.[195] Out-dated or incomplete reviews are also used in the
Biological Assessment for many of the lower 48 species including the recently
listed species.[196]
We disagree with the basic premise of the analysis of tanker transportation
impacts on endangered species, "due to decreases in oil production there may
not be an increase in tanker trips even with the addition of Northstar
production. An oil spill from tanker traffic is considered a low probability
event, and it is concluded that the project is unlikely to adversely affect
these species."[197] First, this statement
is contradicted by the DEIS which states "at peak production, tanker trip
requirements would increase over current levels," and shows that most of the
oil would be produced during 4 peak years.[198] A total of 181 to 198 tankers would be needed to
accommodate the Northstar reservoir production,[199] if only that oil was loaded into such tankers. Second,
there is no evidence that the current baseline of potential impacts to
endangered species from North Slope oil tanker transportation to the west coast
and Asia (700 to 800 tanker trips per year)[200] has been considered by biological assessments or
opinions for all currently proposed or listed species under the Endangered
Species Act.
The conclusion that "shipment of Northstar oil is not likely to affect the
southern sea otter," is not supported by the evidence presented in the
Biological Assessment which indicates that major oil spills (31,250 to 1
million barrels) would affect a quarter to 50% of this sea otter population.[201] We do not consider exposure of 90% of
the southern sea otter population, nor mortality of half of the population to
be an insignificant effect, especially for an endangered species.
While the DEIS states that there have been 10 spills greater than 1,000 barrels
from tanker transportation in 1977 to 1992, this downplays the fact that many
of these spill have been much larger than 1,000 barrels (42,000 gallons) and
caused substantial biological impact. A total of 2,790,000 gallons spilled from
seven of these spills which each ranged from 210,000 to 630,000 gallons (see
Attachment).[202] Even a relatively small
spill can kill large numbers of birds or other wildlife. For example, 10,000
birds were killed or debilitated when a tanker barge spilled 616 barrels of oil
along the California coast in 1986.[203]
Furthermore, little information is provided in the DEIS about North Slope
production projections to substantiate the claim of a steady decline in oil
flow (in fact, no information about the current rate of oil flow is given, and
contradictory information about projection is provided with a range of 384,000
to 1.38 million barrels per day. [204]
The DEIS acknowledges the value of traditional knowledge and allows space for the reporting of this knowledge. The information on sea ice is particularly useful. But no definite answer to the question `Will you listen to and use the Traditional Knowledge of the environment coming from the people who have lived on the North Slope for a long time?' is given. The DEIS states correctly that many things which traditional knowledge has been saying for a long time have "proven the reliability of Inupiat Traditional Knowledge".[205] It and gives several examples where traditional knowledge that had been disputed or doubted by western scientists were eventually proven right. These included that bowheads are not afraid of ice and will swim in ice-covered waters; bowheads pass Point Barrow on a wide front, not confining themselves to the open leads; bowheads can break ice to breathe, bowheads are sensitive to manmade noise and some bowheads split from the main population during spring migration and go up the Russian coast.
The DEIS extracts and reports some traditional knowledge as it relates to
the Alaskan Beaufort Sea oil and gas developments, but makes little attempt to
act upon that knowledge. The traditional knowledge appears to be only used in
the context of the Northstar project getting advice on how best to develop the
project and not questioning the whether or not it goes ahead at all. In fact
it states[206] that "[t]he intent of these
observations and suggestions was to improve safety and avoid or minimize
impacts."
It is noteworthy that the DEIS admits that historically Traditional Knowledge
has not been addressed adequately in environmental assessments or impacts
statements - a failing which the communities of the North Slope, Greenpeace and
others have continually pointed out in comments to previous EISs. In fact the
residents pointed out that they have been providing testimony and written
comments on the same issues and concerns for the last 20 years. [207] See "Native Voices," Attachment, for
additional observations).[208] Yet, despite
the strong step forward, the scope of the Traditional Knowledge review seemed
to be very limited and appears to exaggerate the extent of new information
collected. For example, the DEIS says "agreement has not been reached between
the City and the lead and cooperating agencies on the terms of collecting
Traditional Knowledge in Kaktovik"[209] and
apparently not a single whaling captain was contacted in Kaktovik.[210] The DEIS also indicates a source of bias
in the methodology of data collection, in that BP-XA contributed questions,[211] and may have been directly involved in
some of the sessions on traditional knowledge.
There are several examples where the traditional knowledge is reported, but the
concerns are ignored. For example, a whaling captain remarked there is free
water moving underneath the ice, especially with a southwest wind and he warned
"He didn't want drilling because he knows the sea is rough and the current is
strong, it can do anything without even the help of the wind. The current is so
strong that it can damage anything."[212]
Further comments raise questions about the oil industry's ability to prevent
oil spills, and to clean up spilled oil in the Arctic, particularly in broken
ice.[213] Residents complained about
hydrocarbon fallout: Nuiqsut whaling captain observed pollution from oil
industry falling on tundra and waterways "there is air pollution by the [oil]
industry that forms and shifts every which way the wind turns. It's a yellow
smog that you can see this time of year [November] till spring." Another
Nuiqsut resident stated "There's a hydrocarbon fallout that is going on ...
I've seen it; it's just like smog out there. The cold weather sets in from the
air, and it keeps that hydrocarbon fumes coming out, and it falls out to the
tundra and the waterways." Yet this concern about North Slope sources of air
pollution is not addressed in the main section on air quality.
Other concerns noted recent changes in conditions which bring into question
some of the historical figures on which much of the Northstar construction is
based for example: residents noted "Unpredictable conditions during [late
summer and fall], particularly with respect to moving young ice." And there
were also reports of extreme occurrences which, again, do not appear to have
been taken into consideration in the planning for Northstar. A resident warned
water level comes up on southwest wind. Another resident described that rising
water can force water over the top of sea ice and flood river drainages.[214] And again: apparently stable ice can
break off from the mainland and float away. During the month of November in the
late 1980s, barges tied together were ripped from their concrete moorings at
West Dock and taken to Barter Island, to the east, by the movement of the
ice.[215] Furthermore: The force and speed
at which ice moves during the fall season, potentially causing override
situations, is of great concern among the Inupiat people. Polar ice pack
"crunches up" young ice with great force and speed. "This hazardous condition
typically results from a combination of storm, current, tide, and ice
conditions, particularly under a southwest wind, according to Thomas
Napageak."[216] One resident described an
incident when the force of the ice bent a steel H-beam in a garage located
50-100 ft inland, popping 1 inch bolts out of the cement.
If these considerations were truly taken into account, the permit would not be
granted for the Northstar project.
It is clear that subsistence is being put increasingly at risk by the ongoing
industrial development of the area with the Northstar project representing a
quantum shift in the spread of the industry which intends opening up large
areas of the offshore if this project Northstar project goes ahead. It was
acknowledged that any industrial developments will adversely impact the bowhead
whales causing them to divert offshore which makes hunting more hazardous.
One of the most important parts of an EIS is the analysis of indirect and cumulative effects because the full impact of a single project may not be apparent unless it is viewed in the context of trends of past and future developments. The DEIS takes a very narrow view of indirect and cumulative effects of other pending projects in the local vicinity, the effect of the unprecedented use of subsea oil pipelines to spur development of other offshore projects currently out of reach and result in greater industrialization both onshore and offshore, and by ignoring its contribution to global climate change.
Chapter 10 is grossly inadequate in its treatment of cumulative changes. It
is only 27 pages long, and one would assume that a thorough analysis of the
cumulative impacts of oil spills alone on the physical, biological and human
environment could fill an entire volume of the DEIS.
There are a number of instances where the cumulative impacts of oil development
are downplayed in the DEIS. For example, paragraph 2 on page 10-22 states that
"[e]xisting and reasonably foreseeable future oil and gas development would not
contribute to lethal effects to the whales, and cumulative impacts on bowhead
populations are not expected." This statement does not acknowledge the very
real risk of oil spills from development of Northstar or other offshore oil
development resulting from OCS Lease Sale 170 cited in other parts of the DEIS.
The statement works to sweep serious issues of cumulative impacts on bowhead
whales and subsistence under the rug.
With its conclusions focused on population level effects, as opposed to habitat
or behavioral changes in the bowhead whales, the DEIS also downplays the
importance of significant cumulative effects on bowhead whale migration that
are described.[217] Yet, the DEIS should
take this analysis a further step, since the Kuvlum and Hammerhead oil fields
would be located directly in the migratory path of the bowhead whales.
Reasonably foreseeable development of these fields could cause "multiple
disturbances" at "several offshore locations over multiple years that coincided
with the fall bowhead migration, the reaction of the species could result in a
migratory path deflection which may not become reestablished following such
disturbances,"[218] clearly a major
effect.
Although the DEIS recognizes that cumulative effects from various oil drilling
projects would occur, it narrowly circumscribes their significance. For
instance cumulative effects on loss of tundra habitat,[219] marine and coastal birds through loss of habitat,[220] the bowhead whale through noise impact[221] and a significant effect of increasing
the probability that oil spills will occur[222] are all listed. However in each case it is concluded
that the Northstar project represents a minor contribution to risk. Only the
Northstar Project contribution to the effect of seismic testing on bowhead
whales is considered significant `since project-specific impacts related to
noise effects on subsistence activities are considered significant'.[223] Yet by this logic it is likely that every
individual project will be considered minor, yet the net result will be
significant. This is a classic case of what the economist Garrett Hardin called
the `tragedy of the Commons".[224]
"The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to
all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as
possible on the commons...As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize
his gain...the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for
him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another.
But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing
a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that
compels him to increase his herd without limit in a world that is limited. Ruin
is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a
commons brings ruin to all."
The DEIS fails to discuss potential further expansion of the Northstar reservoir revealed with further delineation, or that other satellite fields in the vicinity of the Northstar field may be found that have not yet been described or located. At a press briefing reported by Alaska News Nightly,[225] the Northstar project manager indicated that more than the "main" Northstar reservoir may be exploited once the project is underway: "When we look at the reservoir and the reserves, there's around a 15-year lifespan... Out of a total of 7 wells, they hit pay dirt in 5 [exploratory wells]. These are the basis for our understanding of what's out there in terms of the reservoir. We haven't drilled any more wells since these appraisal wells back in the 80's. At this point in time we're merely focusing on developing the main Northstar reservoir. Not until we've fully drilled and appraised that, we'll see what's left."
While the DEIS usefully points out that Gwydyr Bay field development may be
facilitated with closer Northstar infrastructure,[226] it fails to describe or map the potential
infrastructure that could link up with Northstar or the proximity of other new
development in relation to that project. Perhaps more significantly, BP-XA has
proposed a development "test" project for at least part of the Gwydyr Bay
reservoir known as "Pete's Wicked" for which state permitting is currently
pending.[227] Three well sites within a
mile of the Northstar gravel mine and about 3 miles from the Alternative 1
onshore pipeline route are proposed. This proposed project is apparently not
undergoing Corps of Engineers Section 404 permit review because little gravel
fill or wetlands extraction is proposed.
The proposal involves a new onshore technology of putting flexible pipe on top
of 1' high wooden blocks sitting on the tundra for 2.5 miles and running it
through lakes for about 2 miles.[228] This
technique has not undergone public review to date. Additionally there would be
incremental industrial impacts such as increased helicopter and aircraft
traffic in the Northstar project vicinity because no roads are proposed, more
oil spills, and more freshwater consumption for ice roads.
It is unclear whether the Gwydyr Bay project discussed above comprises the entire future development of the Gwydyr Bay fields. The DEIS shows two reservoirs along the shore of Gwydyr Bay.[229] It is ironic that the cumulative impacts section lists Gwydyr Bay as a "potential future action," not even "reasonably foreseeable"[230] even though this project is being permitted simultaneously with Northstar. This calls into question the accuracy of those two categories.
Given the current boom of development on the North Slope referred to as "Oil
Nino" by the Division of Oil and Gas, we suggest that most should be listed as
"reasonably foreseeable" with the exception of the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge where further exploration or any development activity is prohibited by
law. Further analysis of past and pending leasing development rates, extent,
and intensity should be done to better understand future impacts.
All of the designated development units should be considered as reasonably
foreseeable oil and gas activities, because in order to retain the unit the
companies must conduct some further exploratory, delineation, or other
activities showing progress toward production. The DEIS is clearly out of date
with respect to proposed activities on many of the known fields. For example,
the Kuvlum and Hammerhead Units have been combined, and Chevron's 1998 plans
approved by MMS include further offshore seismic programs and call for the
design, permitting and construction of transportation facilities to the eastern
North Slope by 2003... critical to providing a receiving point for Kuvlum and
Hammerhead production.[231] But even by
1997, plans to conduct seismic studies in 1997-98 and drill delineation wells
in 2000 related to the Sandpiper Unit had been approved by MMS.[232] The Kuukpik Unit should be added to Table 10-1.
The information for the Arctic Refuge is misleading, inaccurate, and confuses
the reader about existing land use and management of this conservation system
unit. The Arctic National Wildlife Range was established in 1960 by President
Eisenhower, and expanded and renamed as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in
1980. It is wrong to imply that leasing is possible by saying "no lease sales
are planned," when the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA)
explicitly prohibits leasing or other development leading to production in the
refuge[233] and the coastal plain area is
withdrawn from the mineral leasing laws.[234] The Secretary of the Interior is not "in the process
of.... developing guidelines for oil and gas exploration activities".[235] The studies mandated by Congress in
section 1002 are complete and the refuge coastal plain is being managed to
protect its wilderness character and to achieve the refuge purposes of
conservation of fish, wildlife, and their habitats and its wilderness
character. Table 10-1 should be modified because no "reserves" are known for
the Arctic Refuge only "resources" because there has not been an oil discovery
there.
The tables of existing oil and gas facilities fail to include all exploration,
development, and production facilities on the North Slope.[236] They are inconvenient to use because totals for number
of wells, etc. are not provided. As well, these figures are inconsistent with
other numbers published elsewhere. The tables underestimate certain types of
facilities such as road miles, acreage of mines, total acreage of gravel fill
and extraction and exploratory wells and airstrips located outside the existing
oil field units.[237] Additionally, they do
not include the effects of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System which directly
affected 10,900 acres in the North Slope section from gravel fill and
extraction for the haul road, access pad, pipeline, gravel pits, construction
camps, etc..[238]
The total quantity of freshwater needed for ice roads and other purposes for
Northstar over its project life was not calculated. Total water use for the
project would range from 95.6 -124.1 million gallons.[239] The DEIS refers to a single water source, the Kuparuk
Deadarm mine site. Yet, BP-XA's request for temporary water use[240] shows that over 35 water sources are
already permitted, and proposes at least 6 additional water sources. There is
no information in the DEIS, or BP-XA's letter of request to the state,
indicating whether these sources contain adequate water quantities to protect
lake habitats over the long-term for this project in addition to other
exploration and development projects for which it may be used. Furthermore,
whether 15% removal of water from a site[241] can be sustained year after year for Northstar and
other projects without affecting the hydrology of shoreline wetlands or
downsteam habitats has not been addressed. Water withdrawals could indeed pose
significant direct or cumulative effects, not minor as listed in Table
5.3-6.
Air quality impacts are probably a major impact from existing North Slope
operations, but actual field monitoring of air emissions is not taking place in
order to make this assessment. Therefore, the effects of the Northstar project
cannot be accurately projected. For example, the Table 5.4-7 should be
clarified as to whether "actual emissions from BP-XA and ARCO operated
facilities" is based on measurement of these components from field monitoring
equipment, or if it is based on estimates of how much should be expected given
the operations of the various equipment for each field.
The inclusion of the maps showing existing North Slope oil and gas production
facilities is a good first step in portraying the magnitude of
industrialization. However, Fig. ES-4 should also include ARCO Alaska Inc.'s
Alpine project which is currently under construction and BP-XA's proposed
Liberty project. Fig. ES-4 should also include exploratory pads, airstrips,
gravel mine locations, and other sites. And a map showing the entire route of
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (including lower 48 and foreign ports) should
be included as these facilities are essential for the project. A map showing
past and current leases, as well as the boundaries of proposed state and
federal lease sale areas should also be included. This would show other areas
where there has been activity in the past or may be in the future.
The cumulative effects chapter fails to tabulate or map indirect effects, and
changes in habitat quality (beyond direct loss due to gravel fill or
extraction). One of the most rigorous attempts to evaluate some cumulative
effects of oil development on the North Slope was done by Walker et al. 1987,[242] who used a time series of aerial
photographs to measure direct and secondary effects. As an initial step in
consideration of cumulative wetlands and habitat degradation impacts, this
study could be updated showing all facilities, as well as secondary or
ancillary sites, facilities, and known events such as impondments, dust
shadowing, culvert failures and spill sites. This kind of trend analysis would
show rates of gravel fill and extraction, rates of construction of roads and
pipelines, number of drill pads and production sites, and distance between
roads, pipelines, and other facilities within each oil field and between oil
fields.
Alternatives 2-5 would all contribute to cumulative effects of offshore development in the Beaufort Sea and associated onshore impacts, by setting into motion the use of the new subsea oil pipeline technology which would allow areas not currently able to be exploited to come into production. The statement that "alternatives 4 and 5 would not contribute to cumulative impacts"[243] is simply not true as there would be a variety of land and water use changes resulting from those alternatives. Also there would be onshore impacts from pipelines on land connecting to the offshore fields.
The Northstar project will spur development of other known offshore fields
in the Beaufort Sea, including Kuukpik and Thetis Island and Flaxman Island
near to shore, and OCS fields further from shore (e.g. Sandpiper, Kuvlum,
Hammerhead). Alaska's Department of Natural Resources Director noted after
BP-XA became operator of the Sandpiper field located 7 miles offshore in the
OCS, "I think Sandpiper development is dependent on Northstar... From what I
know about Sandpiper it does not stand alone -- its part of a string of pearls.
With BP's influence it makes it easier for Sandpiper to be economic
(because)... BP is part owner of pipeline, facilities and a lot of Northstar
experience".[244] The Northstar project's
new technology is clearly influencing plans for other fields, as Murphy Oil
said this year it will "continue studies on equipment and pipeline options and
conceptual development plans as North Slope/ Beaufort Sea construction
technology evolves".[245]
The synergistic effect of various projects is clearly shown by the offshore
Hammerhead and Kuvlum fields. Chevron plans to continue its participation in
"a study with BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., the American Petroleum Institute
(API), and the Alaska Oil and Gas Association (AOGA) to review, update or
supplement API Standard RP2N for sub-sea buried pipelines in the Arctic
environment. This information will be necessary to design the pipelines which
would connect the Kuvlum and Hammerhead Units to on-shore infrastructure".[246] These studies being conducted by BP-XA
are directly related to the Northstar Pipeline, but obviously have broader
applications.
There are inextricable ties between offshore fields and onshore development and
therefore a full assessment of the onshore impacts of North Slope oil
development is needed in this DEIS. This cannot be avoided with the claim that
the onshore pipelines are already there, such as in Alternatives 4 or 5, or
that the new onshore pipelines are just a small increment of an existing
network.
But even with the Northstar project, the DEIS must consider the cumulative
effects of the new onshore pipelines, or the existing ones proposed to be tied
into in alternatives 4 and 5, on caribou habitat.
Nowhere is this relationship between onshore and offshore developments clearer
than in the future plans for the Kuvlum/ Hammerhead wherein Chevron says it
"hopes to prove up sufficient economic recoverable reserves in the Point
Thomson or Sourdough [primarily onshore] areas by 2003 to allow development of
infrastructure that could serve as the receiving point for Hammerhead and
Kuvlum production," (Chevron, Annual review and request for suspension of
operations, Kuvlum and Hammerhead Units, Beaufort Sea, Alaska, letter to MMS
dated April 2, 1998). So, even if the onshore development is put in place
prior to the development of offshore fields, it must be considered as a
cumulative effect of the Beaufort Sea development.
Climate change is a major cumulative impact resulting from oil development in the Alaskan Arctic which should be included in Chapter 10 of the DEIS and the Executive Summary.
The Arctic already suffers the impacts from global warming and climate
change perpetuated by the continued exploration, extraction, and consumption of
fossil fuels. The western Arctic is known as a global "hot spot" since it is
warming at a rate three to five times faster than the global average. This
warming trend has already caused a range of climate impacts in the area which
are consistent with the conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change. Scientific evidence gathered to date shows how this warming is
affecting the Arctic ecosystem, such as a reduction in the amount and thickness
of sea ice. This has ramifications for all ice-dependent species such as seals,
walrus, polar bears and whales, as well as the humans that depend on them for
subsistence. Therefore, this issue is of concern to Arctic communities and has
national and international significance.
Analysis of this topic should include, but not be limited to, the additional
greenhouse gas emissions that the Northstar project would add to those already
produced on the North Slope. It is also necessary to consider the emissions
from transportation, refining, and from consumption of the resulting petroleum
products. The producer should bear responsibility for the entire life cycle of
the product from its first exploration through to production, transport and
eventual end use. Such `cradle to the grave' responsibility is increasingly
being accepted as part of the way that responsible corporations should operate.
A complete assessment of the cumulative effects must also describe the past,
present, and reasonably foreseeable future emissions expected from onshore and
offshore North Slope oil field production, transportation, and consumption to
which the Northstar oil field will incrementally contribute in achieving the
project's "need"[247] because such analysis
has never been done.
The future ramifications for wildlife habitats and environmental changes from
global climate change, and the effects of such changes on the project itself,
such as threats to integrity of the facilities, increased difficulty in oil
spill response, etc. should also be covered by the DEIS.
Recent scientific evidence indicating that the existing North Slope oil fields
are a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions has been ignored.
Measurements taken downwind from 90% of the major oil field production
facilities in Prudhoe Bay found concentrations up to 45 ppm above ambient
levels (Brooks, S.B., T.L. Crawford, and W.C. Oechel. 1997. Measurement of
Carbon Dioxide emissions plumes from Prudhoe Bay, Alaska oil fields. J. Atmos.
Chem 27: 197-207). Brooks estimated yearly emissions based on the direct
measurements during their study to be 11.4 million metric tons (C) per year,
and they found that the monthly emissions were four times greater than the
total carbon emissions reported by the oil companies for the same time period,
and six times greater than the combustion emissions assumed by Jaffe et al in
J. Atmos. Chem. 20 (1995), 213-227, based on oil facility fuel consumption data
collected in 1989. Brooks et al. concludes that there "may exist large carbon
dioxide sources at the oil fields that are unrelated to the reported fuel
consumption rates." This study also speculates that if depressurization of
water retrieved with the extracted oil results in discharge of dissolved CO2,
then increasing emissions will be expected as water extraction increases with
aging of oil fields.
The Northstar project would result in new sources of greenhouse gas emissions
on the North Slope (from construction and operational vehicle and aircraft use,
drill rigs, production turbines, gas injection facilities, and other sources).
There would be further contributions from transportation of the oil in the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (including releases from the vehicles, pipeline,
pump stations, storage tanks, terminal facilities in Alaska and at lower 48 or
foreign destinations, and tankers). Next, greenhouse gases are released during
the refining process and transportation of the products, and by consumption of
the resulting petroleum products. The cumulative effects of greenhouse gas
emissions from Northstar in combination with all other reasonably foreseeable
onshore and offshore Alaska Arctic oil development projects should be analyzed
in the DEIS.
The effect of climate change on oil spill impacts and clean up has also been ignored. The discussion in Chapter 8 on oil spills did not take into account the relevant changes brought about by climate change impacts such as sea level rise, coastal inundation, melting permafrost and the increased frequency and severity of storms and how these would affect oil spill scenarios and cleanup efforts. For example, the consequences of changes such as noted by a Nuiqsuit resident that "there have been changes in ice formation patterns in recent years, indicating that the ice is not forming the way it used to and that animals (probably seals) are going farther out and following the ice to find food"[248] were ignored in the DEIS.
The warming trend in the Arctic is not simply resulting in less ice, but
anthropogenic climate change is creating a range of unpredictable events which
makes unreliable the historical data on which many of the conclusions about the
construction of Northstar rely.
For instance the findings in tables 4-3, 4-4 and 4-5 showing the oceanographic
design criteria and the wave and ice force considerations may be unreliable in
the light of this unpredictability. Current reports have the sea ice further
offshore than normal, and perhaps further than ever. The ice edge is at time of
writing about 200 miles further north than Camden Bay, on the coast of the
Arctic Wildlife Refuge. The increased impact of the weather on the sea state is
creating conditions which are nearly unprecedented for the region this time of
year Wave heights were reported to be 15 feet or more. Such differences in
trends of wave and ice forces raise questions whether the reconstruction of
Seal Island would be adequate to cope with unpredictable events and also raise
additional doubt on the long-term integrity of the proposed pipeline. Also the
issue of changes in permafrost and any potential changes that could affect
subsea and transition-zone pipeline integrity should be addressed.
One may also question whether the maximum strudel scour impacts noted on page
4-24 are indeed representative of what could be predicted over the coming
years. Strudel scouring would be of particular concern as it is related to the
melting of frozen water from rivers and therefore could be expected to occur
with increasing intensity in the warming Arctic.
There were a few descriptions in the DEIS of the changing climate and its
unpredictability in the traditional knowledge sections, but the implications of
this information were not integrated into the impact analysis. These included
a Nuiqsut resident who indicated that in recent years there have been climate
changes resulting in warmer temperatures Residents recently observed blue jays
for the first time in these northern areas. A whaling captain described fierce
southwest winds at night. According to the DEIS, "one Nuiqsut resident
mentioned that there have been changes in ice formation patterns in recent
years, indicating that the ice is not forming the way it used to and that
animals (probably seals) are going farther out and following the ice to find
food."[249]
Approval of the Northstar development project, as the first OCS production in the Beaufort Sea, is directly at odds with President Clinton's first steps to address climate change. In December, 1997, the U.S. signed an international treaty at Kyoto which included commitments to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels. Expanding oil development into sensitive Beaufort Sea waters counters any real gain we make in the nation to reduce our carbon emissions.
There is a parallel between the incremental contribution of greenhouse gases
from the Northstar project and its contribution in fulfilling its stated need.
The DEIS says the "need" is to "help satisfy the demand for domestic oil
resources... and to help prolong the economic viability of the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline System".[250] We disagree that
Northstar is necessary for meeting either of these needs as we have discussed
elsewhere in these comments, and believe that the domestic energy needs could
be better served by BP-XA investment in its solar business. Since the DEIS
contends that the contribution of oil from the Northstar project would play a
significant role in meeting the demand for domestic oil, then it follows to
also consider the cumulative effects of greenhouse gas emissions of the bigger
wheel in which Northstar is but a cog. Therefore, the contributions of
greenhouse gas emissions from all Alaska North Slope oil should be analyzed.
The scientific acknowledgment of climate change and its primary cause - the use
of fossil fuels - leads to the question of how much can be used and over what
time span in order to avoid "dangerous climate change" - using the definitions
of danger outlined by the UN Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases. The result of
calculating how much carbon is in currently known producing reserves of fossil
fuels against how much carbon the atmosphere can take before dangerous climate
change impacts occur shows that we can only afford to use a quarter of the
known reserves of fossil fuels and that this budget will be used up in 30-40
years. The corollary to this conclusion is that all states should be using
established known producing fossil fuels in decreasing amounts, while switching
investments away from new sources towards energy efficiency, conservation and
renewables. The Northstar project is the antithesis of this.
At the recent meeting of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCC) in
Kyoto, Japan (December 1997) the world's industrialized nations agreed to limit
emissions of greenhouse gases, in particular carbon dioxide (CO2)
which comes mainly from the use of fossil fuels - oil, gas and coal. In so
doing, these governments signaled the need to reduce reliance on fossil fuels
and switch to sources of renewable energy which do not threaten the climate.
Some oil companies, including British Petroleum, have acknowledged the climate
change threat and that precautionary action is required to protect the climate.
In the face of this threat, it is not common sense to open up new sources of
fossil fuels which will only increase the amounts of greenhouse gases to be
dumped into the atmosphere over the coming years. This will also prolong the
period of reliance on fossil fuels and divert valuable resources away from
research and development into sustainable energy sources.
This EIS does not provide sufficient environmental impact analysis for other new offshore production projects using different technologies or in different specific sites, and therefore is unsuitable for use in NEPA tiering. Future oil and gas development/ production options for the Alaskan Beaufort Sea described in Chapter 3 are not analyzed for environmental impact and should be removed from this EIS as they are beyond its scope.
We appreciate that the agencies tried to tackle the issue of what other
technology might be used in the future to produce and transport oil from the
Beaufort Sea -- as the Northstar project will set into motion other OCS
offshore development -- and to describe a decision-making process for
evaluating other proposals. The DEIS sets out the ambitious goal to "describe a
broad view of oil and gas technologies applicable to the development/
production activities in the Alaska Beaufort Sea environment to ... make this
information applicable to future proposed oil and gas development/ production
projects".[251] But it falls far short of
meeting this goal and for reasons outline below is unsuitable for future
tiering of NEPA documents, or to incorporate as a reference of "suitable"
technologies.
Chapter 3 contains descriptions of many new technologies, like the Northstar
subsea oil pipeline, that have never been used for oil production in Arctic
Ocean ice conditions. The discussion in the DEIS is extremely cursory and
fails to adequately point out the full risks of various options. It does not
adequately reveal the hypothetical nature of many of the options.
The flow chart "Selection of a development/ production location and structure
type for the Northstar Unit"[252] does not
provide clear standards for evaluating the various alternatives, nor have
engineering or environmental references to justify the choices. The entire
right half of this chart, "new offshore structures to be considered," is
extremely speculative. This flow chart is far too general or speculative to be
useful for future projects and site specific considerations would also need to
be taken into account.
It is also lacking key features, such as whether it is expected that a network
of offshore pipelines connecting up to each other between platforms will be
built, like in other offshore oil provinces worldwide. Might other subsea oil
pipelines be built from Northstar, for example, connecting up with Sandpiper or
a satellite accumulation, or from other structures such as Endicott or the
Badami dock? Various pipeline landfall locations have been mapped in MMS's OCS
lease sale documents, but site specific baseline studies have not been done nor
have alternative locations been evaluated with sufficient rigor. A
comprehensive analysis of alternatives (as well as the cumulative impact
section, which also ignored this topic) needs to deal with how decisions would
be made about suitability of pipeline landfall locations.
It would be more useful for the public to have more information about the
actual discussions that took place between the agencies and the applicant about
the options for Northstar. The flow chart doesn't give any sense of how the
pace of exploration and development, or proximity of oil fields might affect
the technology considered.
The DEIS also does not describe standards for evaluating whether the technology
could withstand ice forces, for example would the CIDS hold-up year after year
if located in the sheer zone? It does not describe a process for evaluating
site-specific differences in appropriateness of various technologies, in
relation to physical or biological factors, other than water depth. For
example, what would be the additional risk ecologically and to subsistence if
platforms or pipelines were placed directly in the fall migratory path of
bowhead whales?
We concur with the DEIS conclusions that gravel-filled causeways would have
"significant negative impacts to water circulation and fish movements"[253] and "impede water circulation patterns,
nearshore sediment transport, and interfere with coastal migration of fish".[254] Scientific references for this
information from the West Dock and Endicott monitoring programs should be
included in the EIS.[255] The DEIS says "a
gravel fill gravel causeway would only be acceptable only if enough breaches
were included to provide for water circulation and fish and boat passage,"[256] but it does not give standards or a
process for determining adequacy of breaching. Based the cumulative effects to
nearshore fish habitat (water temperature and salinity) caused by the West Dock
and Endicott causeways, there is ample scientific evidence to justify a clear
policy that no additional solid-fill gravel causeways be permitted.
Nowhere does this section discuss the potential push for docks that may be
desired for offloading modules or other facilities at landfall (that could
later be used as drilling platforms such as was done at West Dock). These also
have the potential for similarly harming fish habitat by altering water
circulation patterns in the nearshore estuarine waters depending on site
specific oceanographic features.
In general, the environmental impact analysis for the technological options is
paltry and fails to take into account site-specific factors that could rule out
various options completely. A fundamental flaw is that there is no standard
for evaluating the adequacy of site- specific baseline ecological, water
quality and other studies. This is critical, since the lease sale EIS's
explicitly state that site-specific information will be addressed at the
project development stage. Also in some locations or habitats, such as in the
bowhead whale feeding or migration route, prime polar bear denning habitats, or
the coast of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge no types of structures to
support offshore development would be acceptable.
The DEIS provides a misleading picture of the land management practices across
the North Slope. The sentence "The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has
responsibility for oil and gas leasing within federally designated wildlife
refuge such as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge"[257]is correct regarding the responsible agency, but implies
that the area is open to leasing. The EIS should clearly state that the Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 specifically prohibits oil and
gas leasing, and development leading to production in the entire Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge (sec. 1003), and also that the coastal plain lands are
withdrawn from operation of the mineral leasing laws (sec. 1002(i)). Under the
existing management plans, no support facilities for offshore oil exploration
or development are allowed in the refuge.
Chapter 3 understates the current boom of development planning by the oil
companies in the Beaufort Sea. The statement "the remaining offshore
reservoirs were explored, but not brought into production"[258] makes it sound like actions are not proceeding to bring
these fields into development. This is contrary to the work commitments made
in the unit agreements for these offshore fields.
Some other maps would help provide a better sense of where additional
exploration and development may occur. Besides listing the dates and acres
offered in past lease sales,[259] it would
be very useful to include two maps, one showing past lease sale areas offered,
and a second with the leases that were obtained by the oil companies. On the
lease map it would also be useful to show the lease blocks that received the
highest bids in each sale, as development pressure might be expected to be
higher in those locations.
We disagree with the conclusion "that much of this EIS be useable for future
oil and gas development by substituting project-specific information in Chapter
4 and reassessing impacts as needed for project-specific alternatives."
Evaluation of the technological risks and the environmental impacts for the
Northstar project proposal, alone, were not adequate as our comments pointed
out earlier. For the other technological options, the environmental impacts
were evaluated in insufficient detail.
The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program is intended to safeguard our waters from industrial pollution. We have some serious questions and concerns with the NPDES permit as it is written in the DEIS for the Northstar project. Pollution issues around the Northstar project are particularly important due to the unprecedented nature of the project (first offshore production facility in the arctic not connected to land via a causeway), and the use of the area for subsistence food gathering by the residence of the North Slope.
Before any permit is issued to British Petroleum there are a number of
questions that need to be addressed. This information is needed so that the
public can make reasonable comments on the permit. Critical baseline data
still needs to be gathered before any determination can be made. There needs
to be an accurate determination of the amount of rainfall that a re-constructed
seal island will receive in a year. The water discharge and reinjection
facilities are designed for a certain amount of rainfall, but there is little
data on just how much rainfall occurs in this area. The draft permit requires
monitoring, yet there is no pre-project data. Pre-construction and
pre-production ambient water quality data needs required.
Our greatest concerns are around the monitoring program. To allow for adequate
public oversight there needs to be regular monitoring of the water around the
reconstructed Seal Island. This monitoring should look for industrial
pollutants, sedimentation and water temperature. Due to the nature of the
project there will be significantly large mixing zones around the island and
they need to be monitored.
As this is the first off-shore arctic facility, and may be used as a "model"
for others we believe that it is crucial that as much information is gathered
as possible. Excess sedimentation will have negative impacts on the marine
life around the island, and increased water temperature will cause there to be
more open water in winter around the island which will attract marine mammals
and lead to harassment.
We strongly support the provisions listed on page 30 of the draft NPDES permit
that require monthly discharge reports. Monthly reports allow for concerned
members of the public to have a much better picture of the activities of
industry. Again as this is a critical area for subsistence food gathering for
residents of the North Slope every effort must be made to ensure that no
pollutants are discharged into the water.
If British Petroleum plans to have no discharge of any water from Seal Island
every effort must be made to ensure this is the case. Adequate storage area
must be constructed to allow for periods where the reinjection mechanism is out
of service.
We have concerns regarding British Petroleum's claim that they can safely
reinject produced materials and all other waste water back into the ground.
Have they completed the necessary tests to ensure that the geologic structures
under Seal Island can withstand and contain the millions of gallons of produced
material a year? Is there a possibility of these materials reaching the
surface?
British Petroleum and its contractors have a history of illegal hazardous
waste disposal on Alaska's North Slope. One of there contractors was recently
required to pay a huge penalty for illegal disposal practices on the Endicott
oil field. This illegal disposal only came to the publics attention because of
a concerned worker who was forced to "blow the whistle" on his employers after
having the contractor and British Petroleum ignore his concerns.[260] Adequate precautions and stipulations
need to be in place to ensure that this does not happen on the Northstar
project.
The public process for this project has been dramatically abbreviated due to the consolidation of permit review concurrent with the DEIS review.
This appears to be the public's only opportunity to comment on the
unprecedented and complex project even though a preferred alternative was not
given in the DEIS by the agencies.
While we greatly appreciate the additional 30 days extending the public comment
period, this remains a very short period, considering the scope and complexity
of the proposal. The size of the DEIS itself is some four volumes comprising 13
chapters with 10 appendices, together weighing some 15 pounds.
BP-XA submitted its final application to the Army Corps in March of this year,
close to three years after it submitted its original application to the Corps
in June of 1995. Likewise, the EIS team took two and one-half years to write
the DEIS. Also BP-XA did not submit its draft Oil Discharge Prevention and
Contingency Plan to the agencies until June 1, 1998 and material submissions
from BP-XA are still due at the date comments were due on this documents.
These comments reflect the facts that 1) this is a very complex and
unprecedented project, and 2) both BP and the EIS team took the time they felt
was necessary to develop the project and the DEIS. The public should also be
granted an adequate amount of time to thoroughly review this project without
being rushed or doing an incomplete job on incomplete information. It is
unreasonable to expect the public to make meaningful comment on such a large
document which took so long to prepare in such a short time, particularly when
material information is still outstanding.
For example, the design of the pipeline and the issues of strudel scour and ice
gouging cannot be properly evaluated without evaluating a number of technical
notes listed in Appendix E. Greenpeace has obtained copies of these technical
notes from the Joint Pipeline Office, but it has not yet been possible to
review all of them and therefore we have not incorporated that information into
our comments as thoroughly as we would have liked.
The State of Alaska recognized the complexity of the issues and the exstensive
ammount of time needed to adequately comment on the proposed Northstar project
and granted an extension of their public comment period until the 30th of
September.
Similarly, we have few comments on other Appendices or permits due to the short
time for review. BP-XA's Project Description fails to fulfill all the
requirements of a Development and Production Plan.
The MMS required document known as a "Development and Production Plan" is termed by the DEIS a "Project Description"[261] making it less clear that this is the public's last chance to comment on a significant document. Nowhere in Appendix A does it state that this document is intended for review as the Development and Production Plan: this is only in the public notice.
Moreover, the Corps should not grant the Northstar permit because it would not
be in the public interest. The Corps must consider a number of factors in the
DEIS in deciding whether the requested permit is in the public interest. 33
C.F.R. 320.2, 320.3. Each of these factors are relevant to the Northstar
permit. In these comments, we have shown specifically that the conservation,
economics, and aesthetics factors are present. Also, as with any oil
development on the North Slope, the wetlands, fish and wildlife, floodplain,
and land use values are implicated and relevant. Because of the off-shore and
on-shore location of the Northstar project, navigation, shore erosion and
accretion, and cultural values are relevant. And as we have specifically and
repeatedly stressed, the role of ongoing oil development in climate change
implicates "general environmental concerns," and energy and mineral needs
values. The Corps must therefore thoroughly consider each of these factors in
determining whether granting the Northstar permit is in the public interest.
An objective consideration of these factors can only lead the Corps to the
conclusion that it is not.
By Executive Order (EO) of February 11, 1994, President Clinton directed each Federal agency to "make achieving environmental justice part of its mission."
The EO requires each federal agency to finalize an environmental justice
strategy by February 11, 1995. The EO identifies subsistence consumption of
fish and wildlife as an environmental justice issue, and directs federal
agencies, "whenever practicable and appropriate," to "collect, maintain, and
analyze information on the consumption patterns of populations who principally
rely on fish and/or wildlife for subsistence. Federal agencies shall
communicate to the public the risks of those consumption patterns."[262] Further, the EO directs federal agencies
to "publish guidance reflecting the latest scientific information available
concerning methods for evaluating the human health risks associated with the
consumption of pollutant-bearing fish or wildlife. Agencies shall consider
such guidance in developing their policies and rules."[263]
The DEIS for the Northstar project fails to supply the requisite information
regarding human health risks associated with consuming pollutant-bearing fish
in the DEIS. Given the high consumption of fish and wildlife for subsistence
use by North Slope communities affected by proposed Northstar project, the DEIS
must identify the risks of this consumption, and communicate those risks to the
public, as the EO directs. There is an environmental justice aspect to this
proposed action.
The Northstar project has had and will continue to have adverse psychological effects on the people in the North Slope. The DEIS has not considered these impacts. Subsistence harvesters, depend on a clean and healthy North Slope environment. The DEIS asks these communities to accept further direct intrusion of the oil and gas industry directly into the ecosystem which provides their way of life. People who depend on this ecosystem are outraged at this prospect. Nowhere was this more clearly expressed than the recent public hearings for this project held on the North Slope. The DEIS must consider the high level of anxiety regarding impacts on social and cultural values and lifestyles which this proposed sale has generated.
Social and cultural impacts from the decision to proceed with an oil and
gas lease sale can come in many forms. In a recent analysis of the federal
offshore oil and gas program, two pre-eminent social scientists, with a great
deal of experience dealing with oil and gas programs, examined in detail the
impacts associated with the federal government's decisions to open lands for
oil and gas exploration, development and production. As the authors noted:[264]
In the physical or biological sciences, it may in fact be true that no impacts
take place until a project leads to concrete alterations of physical or
biological conditions. In the case of the human environment, by contrast,
observable and measurable impacts can take place as soon as there are changes
in social conditions -- which often means from the time of the earliest
announcements or rumors about a project (emphasis in original).[265]
These "planning phase" impacts "are shaped by a community's prior experience
and present interests." In general, they fall into six categories, all evident
in the Proposed Northstar project:
1) Biophysical/Health Systems (concerns about the potential for human and
environmental health degradation);
2) Cultural Systems (threats to indigenous/native cultures, i.e. "increased
dependence on money economies that can threaten subsistence activities and
threats to "mainstream" cultures, i.e., shock to individuals when government
officials fail to exhibit "appropriately neutral behaviors");
3) Social Systems (i.e., risk to the "highly-prized" "slow-paced, peaceful and
friendly community");
4) Economic Systems (i.e., risk to commercial fishermen and tourism);
5) Political/Legal Systems (i.e., lobbying and lawsuits which increase
alienation); and, finally,
6) Psychological Systems (i.e., threats to self-concepts and the degree to
which people view themselves as effective individuals)[266]
Nowhere does MMS give credence to these impacts of the "planning process." It
is simply not enough to assert that these impacts are "immaterial" or
"speculative." As Freudenberg and Gramling note, "[t]he notion that government
agencies respond to `real' risks and opportunities, while citizens are reacting
mainly to (implicitly erroneous) `perceptions,' may be popular in the
subcultures of the agencies in question, but it is simply one that cannot be
supported in the real world."[267]
The key is to realize that, to the degree to which our goal is an improved and
more balanced understanding of the ongoing debates -- as opposed to "success"
in promoting or opposing a given development project -- we need to do better. .
. In all too many cases, to date, agencies and project proponents have taken
advantage of the ambiguity of past terminology, insisting that they have seen
no need to deal with impacts that are "merely perceptual," being "anticipatory"
rather than real, or (purportedly) being so far in the future as to be "beyond
our control." . . . In empirical fact, as is becoming increasingly clear, these
impacts have often proved to be every bit as real, as quantifiable, as
predictable, and as significant, as the development-phase impacts that have
been officially acknowledged. Given that impacts do not cease to exist if they
are simply ignored, the failure to deal with the broader range of impacts has
effectively meant that, rather than dealing with risks, we have simply
transferred them, shifting them from the principal beneficiaries of development
"to local communities and residents who are little more than innocent
bystanders (quotations omitted, emphasis in original)."[268]
Please take this opportunity to recognize, consider and, if the project is
still to proceed, deal with these pre-project and project sale impacts to
ensure that the "best interest" of the affected communities is protected.
Sincerely,
_____________________
Dan Ritzman
Climate campaign
Greenpeace
Update
on the Torch Oil Spill, November 11, 1997, Santa Barbara County Board
Agenda by J. Patton
BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., August 14, 1998, letter from Peter T. Hanley
to Tom Chapple, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation.
ADEC's August 5, 1998 Preliminary Analysis of Oil Spill Response Capability
and Policy Options for Broken Ice Seas,
Miller, P.A., D. Smith, and P.K. Miller, 1993, Oil in Arctic Waters: The
Untold Story of Offshore Drilling in Alaska, Greenpeace, Anchorage
Alaska Division of Governmental Coordination, July 15, 1998, letter from
Glenn Gray to Peter Hanley, British Petroleum Exploration (Alaska) Inc. on
extension of request for additional information deadline; includes Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation memorandum dated July 17, 1998 request
for additional information on Northstar development area, Oil Discharge
Prevention and Contingency Plan.
BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc. 13 July 1998, Briefing Memo on Drake Field
Pipeline.
Alaska Division of Governmental Coordination, August 17, 1998, letter from
Glenn Gray to Northstar Reviewers on Northstar Development Project Status of
Information Request.
Koplow, D., and A. Martin. 1998. Fueling Global Warming: Federal Subsidies
To Oil In The United States. Greenpeace, USA.
Gibson, M.A., and S. Schullinger. 1998. Answers From the Ice Edge: The
consequences of climate change on life in the Bering and Chukchi seas.
Greenpeace, USA.
Hare, B. 1997. Fossil Fuels and Climate Protection: The Carbon Logic.
Greenpeace International.
The Center for Global Change and Arctic System Research. 1998. Implications
of Global Change in Alaska and the Bering Sea Region. Proceedings of a
Workshop. University of Alaska, Fairbanks 3-6 June 1997.
[1] SPN 98-3; also 63 FR 28375-28376 May 22,
1998.
[2] These include the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) draft 402 National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit and fact sheet (Appendices F&G), draft Part C, Safe Drinking
Water Act Underground Injection Control (UIC) permit and fact sheet (Appendix
J), and the Biological Assessment for species listed under the Endangered
Species Act (Appendix B).
[3] P.9-36.
[4] P. 3-52
[5] See attachment: BP briefing paper dated July
13, 1998
[6] P. ES-12
[7] See DEIS Appendices F,G,J
[8] See 30 CFR 250.34(b)(3)
[9] A total of 44 different letters of
authorization had been issued to oil companies (20 of these to BP) from 1993-
March 1998. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, March 27, 1999, Draft Report,
Beaufort Sea and adjacent northern coast of Alaska marine mammal monitoring
program: Incidental take of walrus and polar bears.
[10] U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, March
27, 1999, Draft Report, Beaufort Sea and adjacent Northern coast of Alaska
marine mammal monitoring program: Incidental take of walrus and polar bears,
Table 1. Summary of Letters of Authorization issued by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service for the Beaufort Sea; Table 2. Summary of marine mammal
sightings during LOA activities by year and activity.
[11] U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, March
27, 1999, Draft Report, Beaufort Sea and adjacent Northern coast of Alaska
marine mammal monitoring program: Incidental take of walrus and polar bears,
Appendix A, Detailed sighting information from LOA monitoring reports.
[12] U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 1995,
Habitat Conservation Strategy for Polar Bears in Alaska, Anchorage.
[13] MMS lease OCS-Y-0179, issued August 1,
1980 to Amoco Production Co. and MMS lease OCS-Y-0181, issued August 1, 1980 to
Shell Oil Company and Murphy Oil Corporation.
[14] Fig. 8-4b
[15] P.4-158
[16] P.4-39
[17] P.ES-42
[18] P.ES-96
[19] Section 9.8.1
[20] 4.7.2
[21] P.5.6-32
[22] P.ES-104. Emphasis added
[23] P. 5.3-17
[24] See Table 5.6-2 and p. 5.3-17
[25] P.5.3-45
[26] P.5.3-45. [emphasis added]
[27] P. 11-21.
[28] See Tables ES-9 (alt. 2), ES-10 (alt.
3), ES-12 (alt. 4), ES-13 (alt. 5)
[29] Pimlott, D. H., D. Brown and K.P. Sam,
1976, Oil Under the Ice, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Ottawa, p.10
[30] 60 FR 27546-27552
[31] MMS lease OCS-Y-0179, issued August 1,
1980 to Amoco Production Co. and MMS lease OCS-Y-0181, issued August 1, 1980 to
Shell Oil Company and Murphy Oil Corporation.
[32] 43 CFR Part 195.
[33] Appendix B, p.3-13
[34] Oil & Gas Journal, October 29, 1990,
"Corrosion causes most pipeline failures in Gulf of Mexico," Vol. 88(44),
online version.
[35] Fineberg, R. A., 1996. Pipeline in
Peril: A status report on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, Alaska Forum for
Environmental Responsibility, Valdez, p.2.23.
[36] See Attachment: Update on the Torch Oil
Spill, November 11, 1997, Santa Barbara County Board Agenda by J. Patton
[37] See Attachment: Update on the Torch Oil
Spill, November 11, 1997, Santa Barbara County Board Agenda by J. Patton
[38] Intec, November 1996, Pipelines Design
Basis, Technical Note TN331, p.4-6
[39] P.5.6-17
[40] Intec, November 1996, TN 331, pp. 3-36
and 3-37
[41] TN 415 - Intec, April 1997, Offshore
Pipeline Route Options Evaluation, Technical note TN830, Rev. 4, p.7.
[42] The extreme scour dimension was defined
as 90'; see Intec, March 18, 1997, Strudel Scour evaluation, Technical Note
TN415, Rev. 2, p.6
[43] Intec, March 1997, TN 415, Rev.2,
Calc.415-011, p.A2, H-660.2
[44] P.5.6-30
[45] January 3, 1997
[46] Intec, Nixon Geotech Ltd., Reissued first
draft, September 20, 1996, Geotechnical input to ice scour pipeline interaction
study for BPXA Northstar Pipelines, p.3.
[47] Calculation No. 410-002RW2 in Nixon
Geotech Ltd. September 20, 1996
[48] P.5.3-39
[49] Appendix A, 2.4-10
[50] P.2.4-10. Emphasis added
[51] P.5.3-45
[52] P. 8-32
[53] Table 5.6-2
[54] P. 3-50
[55] P.5.2-3
[56] P.5.2-5
[57] P.5.2-8
[58] P.5.3-39
[59] P. 2-16
[60] Table 5.6-2, continued
[61] See Ross et al. 1998
[62] P. 8-37
[63] P.10-27
[64] P. 10-27
[65] P.ES-97.
[66] P.ES-2
[67] Table 8-5.
[68] BP, June 1, 1998, Oil Discharge
Prevention and Contingency Plan, Northstar Operations, North Slope, Alaska,
p.1-20.
[69] ADEC, August 5, 1998, Preliminary
analysis of oil spill response capability and policy options for broken ice
seas, to support request for additional information for Northstar oil spill
contingency plan, Anchorage.
[70] P.8-36.
[71] ADEC 1998, p. 11.
[72] ADEC, 1998, p.11.
[7374] Reuters Business Report, June 6,
1989, "Canadian Arctic well blowout gives oil industry black mark," cited by
Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, Comments on Proposed rule allowing the taking
of marine mammals incidental to offshore oil and gas exploratory activities,
January 31, 1990, submitted to National Marine Fisheries Service, p.40.
[75] P.8-36.
[76] Skalle, P. and A. L. Podio, June 1998,
Trends extracted from 1200 Gulf Coast blowouts during 1960-1996, World
Oil, cited by ADEC 1998, p.12.
[77] MMS, 1998, Incidents associated with
oil and gas operations: Outer Continental Shelf 1995-1996, Herdon, VA, OCS
Report, MMS 98-0030, p.3.
[78] Offshore, April 1998, MMS going after
US Gulf safety violators, p.202.
[79] The Press Democrat, August 12, 1998,
Avila laments loss of ambience: Oil tarnished unique village.
[80] Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 6,
1998, Protests over Mobil oil spill spread to Nigeria's Ondo state. Business
Day (South Africa), February 27, 1998, Mobil Oil concludes plan for
compensation, p. 11.
[81] Houston Chronicle, January 25, 1998,
Cleanup to continue on 2 oil spills in Gulf:
Leaks from tanker, underwater
pipeline, p.A-36.
[82] U.P.I., January 23, 1998, Oil spill not
expected to reach land.
[83] J. Patton, November 11, 1997, "Update
on the Torch Oil Spill", Santa Barbara County
Board Agenda. The Daily News
of Los Angeles, September 30, 1997, Oil pipeline leaks 8-square-mile slick,
p.N4.
[84] Times-Picayune, May 20, 1997, Oil spill
may be much worse than original Texaco estimate, p.A1. Times-Picayune, May 23,
1997, Testing to reveal oil spill's effects, p.A1.
[85] Houston Chronicle, May 13, 1997, Crews
clean up oil spill, p.17.
[86] The Times-Picayune, September 25, 1996,
Shell companies fined in oil spill, p.C6
[87] International Herald Tribune, June 3,
1995, Sakhalin Town Has No One Left to Fight Oil Spill.
[88] P. ES-12
[89] Alaska Business Digest, July 3, 1998,
Alyeska's oil spill plan fails review, Vol. 1(29), p.1.
[90] BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., August
14, 1998, letter from Peter T. Hanley to Tom Chapple, Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation.
[91] ADEC's August 5, 1998 Preliminary
Analysis of Oil Spill Response Capability and Policy Options for Broken Ice
Seas, p. 23.
[92] Appendix B, p. 5-7
[93] Appendix B, p. 5-21.
[94] P.9-27 to 9-33.
[95] Pp.8-42
[96] Pp. 8-44
[97] Miller, P.A., D. Smith, and P.K.
Miller, 1993, Oil in Arctic Waters: The Untold Story of Offshore Drilling in
Alaska, Greenpeace, Anchorage, p. 79.
[98] Jason, N. H., ed. 1988. Alaska Arctic
Offshore Oil Spill Response Technology Workshop Proceedings, Anchorage, Alaska,
November 29 - December 1, 1988. Gaithersberg, MD: National Institute of Stands
and Technology: 53.
[99] Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation. 23 July 1990. Memorandum from Larry Katkin to Lynn Kent
concerning oil spill exercise Stinson #1, July 19, 1990.
[100] Executive Summary, p.2
[101] P.8-42
[102] S.L. Ross et al. 1998
[103] Page 8-44
[104] P.5.4-3
[105] Selkregg, 1976 in MMS, 1984, Diaper
Field Lease Offering (Sale 87), Final Environmental Impact Statement, Vol. 1,
Alaska OCS Region, p. III-13
[106] 8-45
[107] 8-45
[108] 8-48
[109] 8-44
[110] Table 8-10
[111] 8-44
[112] P.8-2
[113] P.8-37
[114] P.8-41
[115] See 30 CFR 254.26
[116] Table 8-8 and pp. 8-49 to 8-71
[117] P.6.9-1
[118] P.5.3-17.
[119] Synder-Conn, E., D. Densmore, C.
Moitoret, and J. Stroebele. 1990. Persistence of trace metals in shallow Arctic
marine sediments contaminated by drilling effluents. Oil & Chemical
Pollution 7: 225-247.
[120] 6.7-20
[121] 6.9-30
[122] 6.9-25
[123] 6.9-27
[124] 6.9-27/29
[125] 6.6-20
[126] 6.6-20
[127] Table 8-9
[128] 8-59
[129] Table 8-9
[130] 8-60
[131] 8-64
[132] 8-60
[133] 8-65
[134] 8-66
[135] 8-66
[136] 8-68
[137] 8-68
[138] 8-66
[139] 8-72
[140] Pp.8-58 to 8-67.
[141] See Cameron, R. D., E.A. Lenart, D.
J. Reed, K.R. Whitten, and W.T. Smith. 1995. Abundance and movements of caribou
in the oilfield complex near Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. Rangifer, 15(1): 3-7.
Smith, W.T., R. D. Cameron, and D. J. Reed. 1994. Distribution and movements
of caribou in relation to roads and pipelines, Kuparuk Development Area,
1978-90. Alaska Department of Fish & Game, Wildlife Technical Bulletin No.
12.
[142] 8-72 to 8-79.
[143] Parts of Pp. 8-65 and 8-66.
[144] Loughlin, 1994, Marine Mammals
and the Exxon Valdez, Academic Press, San Diego, 395 pp.
[145] P.8-61.
[146] Ortsland, N. A., F. R. Englehardt,
F. A. Juck, R. J. Hurst, and P. D. Watts. 1981. Effect of crude oil on polar
bears. Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada,
Environmental Studies No. 24, 268 pp.
[147] Pp. 5-61
[148] Greenpeace. 1998. Marine mammal Log
of the m/v Arctic Sunrise.
[149] Tynan, C. T., DeMaster, D. 1997.
Observations and Predictions of Arctic Climate Change: Potential Effects on
Marine Mammals. Arctic Vol. 50. No. 4. P. 308-322.
[150] This issue is explored in greater
detail in the section of the comments detailing global climate change
[151] Pp.8-58 to 8-67.
[152] P.1-25, sec.1.7
[153] P.1-25
[154] P.5.1-1
[155] Smith et al.
[156] Cameron et al.
[157] 40 CFR section 1508.14
[158] Sec. 102(2)(C)(ii)
[159] Sec. 102(2)(C)(iv)
[160] Sec. 102(2)(C)(v)
[161] Table ES-14, Terrestrial impact,
noise-related impact
[162] P.7.5-1.
[163] Fig.8-4b.
[164] Pp.8-58 to 8-67.
[165] 8-72 to 8-79.
[166] Parts of Pp. 8-65 and 8-66.
[167] Loughlin, 1994, Marine Mammals
and the Exxon Valdez, Academic Press, San Diego, 395 pp.
[168] P.8-61.
[169] For example, Engelhardt, F.R. 1985.
Effects of petroleum on marine mammals. Pp. 217-243 In: Petroleum effects in
the Arctic Environment, ed. by F.R. Engelhardt. Elsevier Applied Science,
NY.
Oritsland, N. A., F.R. Englehardt, F.A. Juck, R. J. Hurst, and P. D. Watts.
1981. Effect of crude oil on polar bears. Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development Canada, Environmental Studies No. 24, 268 pp.
[170] Oritsland, N. A., F.R. Englehardt,
F.A. Juck, R. J. Hurst, and P. D. Watts. 1981. Effect of crude oil on polar
bears. Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada,
Environmental Studies No. 24, 268 pp.
[171] Loughlin, 1994, Marine Mammals
and the Exxon Valdez, Academic Press, San Diego, 395 pp.
[172] Amstrup, S.C., C. Gardner, K. C.
Myers, and F. W. Oehme. 1989. Ethylene glycol (antifreeze) poisoning in a
free-ranging polar bear. Veterinary and Human Toxicology 31(4): 317-319.
[173] Stirling, I., 1988. Attraction of
polar bears Ursus maritimus to offshore drilling sites in the eastern Beaufort
Sea, Polar Record 24(148), pp.1-8.
[174] Brooks, J.W., J.C. Bartonek, D.R.
Klein, D.L. Spencer, and A.S. Thayer. 1971. Environmental influences of oil and
gas development in the Arctic Slope and Beaufort Sea. Washington, D.C., U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Service, Resource Publication 96, p.15. Anchorage Daily
News, 1 June 1990, Shooting penalty quashed: Arco not prosecuted in polar bear
death, p. C1.
[175] Stirling, I., 1988. Stenhouse, G.
B., L.J. Lee and K.G. Poole. 1988. Some characteristics of polar bears killed
during conflicts with humans in the Northwest Territories, 1976-86. Arctic
41(4): 275-278.
[176] P.9-12.
[177] Appendix B, p. 5-21.
[178] Table ES-7.
[179] Tables ES-7 and ES-8.
[180] P. 9-29.
[181] P. 9-29.
[182] Tables ES-7 and ES-8.
[183] Appendix B, P.5-9.
[184] P.9-12.
[185] Appendix B., Pp.5-9 to 5-10.
[186] LGL Ltd. Environmental Research
Associates and Greeneridge Sciences, Inc. 23 December 1997. Marine mammal and
acoustical monitoring of BPXA's seismic program in the Alaskan Beaufort Sea,
1997: 90 day report. For BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc. and National Marine
Fisheries Service.
[187] Clark, C. 1997. Summaries from the
session on high-energy seismic survey sounds and propagation, p.11 in: MBC
Applied Environmental Sciences, Arctic seismic synthesis and mitigating
measures workshop proceedings, Anchorage, OCS Study MMS 97-0014.
[188] Working Group 1- Zone of Influence of
seismic vessels, p. 67 in: MBC Applied Environmental Sciences, Arctic seismic
synthesis and mitigating measures workshop proceedings, Anchorage, OCS Study
MMS 97-0014.
[189] Signed statement by Whalers in
Working Group 1, March 6, 1997, Appendix C in: MBC Applied Environmental
Sciences, Arctic seismic synthesis and mitigating measures workshop
proceedings, Anchorage, OCS Study MMS 97-0014.
[190] Tables ES-7 and ES-8.
[191] P.9-33.
[192] P.9-11.
[193] Appendix B., p.5-3.
[194] P.10-22.
[195] Reference in Appendix B, p. 6-16, is
made to the OCS Sale 144 Final EIS from 1996.
[196] Reference is made to the MMS, May
1996, OCS Sale 144 Final EIS (p. IV-H-15) which merely incorporates by
reference an earlier document, Cook Inlet Planning Area Oil and Gas Lease Sale
149 DEIS (USDOI, MMS, Alaska OCS Region, 1995.
[197] Appendix B, 8-3.
[198] P.ES-2; Fig. 7.6-8.
[199] P.ES-2.
[200] P.ES-2.
[201] Appendix B, p.6-18.
[202] Miller, P.A., D. Smith, and P.K.
Miller, 1993, Oil in Arctic Waters: The Untold Story of Offshore Drilling in
Alaska, Greenpeace, Anchorage, p. 76.
[203] Page, G.W., H.R. Carter, and R.G.
Ford. 1990. Numbers of seabirds killed or debilitated in the 1986 Apex Houston
oil spill in central California. Studies in Avian Biology. No. 14.
[204] Tyson, 1996; p. 7.7-6
[205] 2-1
[206] 2-15
[207] P. 2-9. Not all hearings testimony or
public comment has apparently be used. Has the database of traditional
knowledge based on past OCS hearings described in this section (p.2-11) been
completed and will it be available to the interested public. Why weren't
comments on State offshore lease sales included? Were only certain quotes
selected for presentation in the DEIS and how were these decisions made? In
cases where "an observation... shared by several individuals...was
paraphrased," (p. 2-16) the original source material should be provided as a
footnote or Appendix. First, it is impossible to tell whether the full meaning
of the statements was captured by the paraphrase and gives less respect to the
original statements. Second, this technique makes it more difficult to assess
the completeness of the EIS analysis method. Third, a fuller understanding of a
topic may be gained by hearing many similar, but not identical observations
that show a pattern. Furthermore, there is no sense of the magnitude of times
that people may have explained their observations about oil spill risks, the
effects of noise on bowhead whales, the hazards of sea ice, at dozens of public
hearings and meetings concerning offshore oil development that have occurred
over the years.
[208] Miller, P.A., D. Smith, and P.K.
Miller, 1993, Oil in Arctic Waters: The Untold Story of Offshore Drilling in
Alaska, Greenpeace, Anchorage.
[209] P.2-12
[210] P.2-14
[211] P.2-15
[212] 5.2-5
[213] P.1-7
[214] P.5.2-4
[215] P.5.2-8
[216] P.5.2-10
[217] P.10-22
[218] P.10-22
[219] P.10-21
[220] P.10-21
[221] P.10-21
[222] P.10-24
[223] P.10-27
[224] (1968) 162 Science 1243.
[225] July 9, 1998
[226] Table ES-14
[227] Public Notice, Alaska Division of
Governmental Coordination, project AK9807-040G, July 31, 1998, Anchorage
Daily News
[228] "BP proposes development with no pad,
flexible pipeline," July 27-Aug. 30, 1998, Petroleum News Alaska, pp.
A5, A18.
[229] Fig. 10-2, Oil and gas reservoirs in
the Central and Eastern Arctic Slope and Alaskan Beaufort Sea (Vol. IV)
[230] Table 10-1
[231] Letter approval of the suspension of
production to P. Walker, Chevron USA, Inc. from J. Walker, MMS, 30 April
1998
[232] Second Unit Plan of Operation,
11/1/97-10/31/2000
[233] Section 1003
[234] Section 1002(i)
[235] P.10-17
[236] See Tables ES-5, 3-2, Table 10-1
[237] See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,
1987
[238] Pamplin 1979
[239] Using the given numbers for
quantities needed annually in Table 5.3-34
[240] Letter dated October 8, 1996
[241] Table 5.3-6
[242] Walker, D. A., P. J. Webber, E. F.
Binnian, K.R. Everett, N.D. Lederer, E. A. Nordstrand, and M. D. Walker. 6
November 1987. Cumulative impacts of oil fields on Northern Alaska Landscapes.
Science 238: 757-761.
[243] Table ES-14
[244] Petroleum News Alaska, May 25-
June 21, 1998, "BP becomes operator at Sandpiper, northwest of company's
Northstar unit: Former operator Murphy Oil said the agreement with BP is
expected to accelerate development of the offshore unit"
[245] First Semi-Annual Report, Second Unit
Plan of Operation, Sandpiper Unit, Murphy Oil, April 29, 1998 submitted to
MMS
[246] Chevron, Annual review and request
for suspension of operations, Kuvlum and Hammerhead Units, Beaufort Sea,
Alaska, letter to MMS dated April 2, 1998
[247] P.ES-1
[248] Pp.5.2-6
[249] 5.2-6
[250] P.ES-1
[251] p.1-5
[252] Fig. ES-5, Fig. 4-5
[253] P.ES-36
[254] P.4-23
[255] See Ross, B. 1988. Causeways in the
Alaskan Beaufort Sea, Environmental Protection Agency, Anchorage, Report EPA
910/9-88-218; Hale, D. A., M. J. Hameedi, L. E. Hachmeister, and W. J.
Stringer, 1989, Effects of the West Dock causeway on nearshore oceanographic
processes in the vicinity of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, NOAA, Ocean Assessments
Division, Alaska Office
[256] P.4-24
[257] P.3-2
[258] P.3-3
[259] Table 3-1, p.3-3
[260] Alaska Forum for Environmental
Responsibility. 1997. Poisoning the Well: Whistleblower Disclosures of Illegal
Hazardous Waste Disposal on Alaska's North Slope.
[261] Appendix A
[262] Executive Order 12898, §
4-401.
[263] Id. § 4-402
[264] Freudenburg, W. and R. Gramling,
1994,Oil in Troubled Waters: Perceptions, Politics and the Battle over
Offshore Drilling. State University of New York Press.
[265] Ibid., Page 119
[266] Ibid., Page 119-126
[267] Ibid., Page 141
[268] Ibid., Page 145