TWENTY YEARS PROTECTING THE OCEAN FROM WASTE DUMPING. Prepared for Greenpeace International by Rémi Parmentier Introduction: Twenty Years Against Dumping: Public Attention: Sub-seabed Disposal: Dumping Ban: The Oil Industry´s Preferential Treatment: Offshore Operational Discharges: Disposal of Disused Offshore Installations: Next Step; Land-Based Sources: Conclusion: Feasibility and Political Will:   TWENTY YEARS PROTECTING THE OCEAN FROM WASTE DUMPING.   Introduction: The Environment Ministers of the fifteen countries bordering the North-East Atlantic Ocean will meet at the Ministerial Conference of the OSPAR Commission in Portugal on July 22-24, 1998, to adopt new measures for the protection of the marine environment.[1] It is likely that the oil, nuclear and chemical industries and their acolytes who will also be present will try to discredit the environmentalists, claiming that Greenpeace et al are unrealistic in their demands. Yet, the Ministerial Conference in July, which will mark the twentieth anniversary of Greenpeace´s campaign against ocean dumping - one of the most persistent and consistent campaigns of the environmental organisation in its entire history - is also a reminder that each time the "dirty" industries have made such claims in the past, not only were they were proven wrong, but when forced to restrict or end their dumping practices, they have managed to do so, albeit, not necessarily with good grace. Greenpeace´s campaign against ocean dumping has been successful in changing the mind-sets of most governments and industries, with the notable exception, so far, of...the oil industry. However the land-based discharges and emissions from the nuclear and chemical industries continue and urgently need to be brought to an end.   Twenty Years Against Dumping: It was exactly twenty years ago that Greenpeace first encountered a vessel routinely and deliberately dumping wastes at sea. It was in July 1978, approximately 400 miles South West of Cornwall in an area that had been specified by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as the designated dumpsite of the Western European nuclear industry. The Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior found the Gem, a dumping vessel chartered annually by the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) to carry out the disposal of so-called low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes coming from medical and military establishments as well as - increasingly - that which was emanating from nuclear power plants. Since its early days, in the late 1940s, the nuclear industry had chosen the open ocean as a convenient place to dispose of its inconvenient wastes. The USA, the USSR, France, the UK, Germany, Sweden and other states used the sea as their dumpsite, both in the Pacific and the Atlantic, and they were determined to continue. The Oslo Convention was the first regional treaty to regulate the dumping of wastes at sea ever to be signed -- it was negotiated in 1972 by the countries bordering the North-East Atlantic. The nuclear industry successfully blocked efforts to include radioactive wastes within the auspices of the convention. Consequently, whereas the Oslo Convention regulated the dumping of sewage sludge, dredging spoils, and organohalogen compounds (among others) for almost twenty five years, the Contracting Parties had no right even to comment on the dumping of radioactive wastes, yet the NEA designated dumpsite for radioactive wastes was inside the area covered by the convention! A few months later in 1972 the London Dumping Convention was negotiated. This is a global treaty, and would, for the first time, regulate the dumping of wastes at sea worldwide. However, here, the discussions were less dominated by the Western European nuclear states, and, as a result, the dumping of so-called high-level radioactive wastes was banned. This was seen at the time as a step forward, but in fact, it did not achieve enough protection because the classification of radioactive wastes as high, medium, or low-level had been drawn-up under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for handling purposes (for the protection of workers). It had little to do with the radio-toxicity and the isotopic composition of radioactive wastes. Hence, among so-called low-level radioactive wastes, could also be found extremely radio-toxic and persistent isotopes such as plutonium and strontium. Dumping at sea was taking place out of sight. As result, it was out of everyone's minds. Other than those involved in the narrow circles in which ocean dumping operations were planned and executed, no-one had any real knowledge of what was going on out in the open ocean. It was virtually impossible to question operations of which no one had any real knowledge: Out of sight, out of mind... But from 1978 onward Greenpeace would campaign to make sure that ocean dumping became increasingly visible, and it would become more and more difficult for the nuclear industry to portray itself as a responsible industrial sector searching for the best all-round solutions to its waste stream, its number one problem.   Public Attention: At first, not much attention was paid to the encounter between Greenpeace and the Gem. Greenpeace was, at the time, a very small organisation that was not very well known.[2] In addition, electronic means of instant communication did not exist or were inaccessible. It took time to raise the profile of a new issue. Without the persistence of the members of Greenpeace in the years to come, it could all have ended as a mere anecdote: a rubber dinghy from the Rainbow Warrior sailed under the Gem´s dumping platform, and was smashed by a barrel said to contain radioactive wastes...Nothing else really happened, in the summer of 1978. Every summer, the Gem and other vessels continued to dump increasing quantities of radioactive wastes from the UK, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands.[3] Every summer, more Greenpeace ships were joining them. They played cat and mouse with each other until one gave up. Once, the dumpers used fire hoses to fill the environmentalists dinghies with water and jam their engines; so Greenpeace found pilots who could out-manoeuvre the power-hoses. The next year, the dumpers had built cages around the dumping platforms - Greenpeace used them to board the dumping vessels and occupy the discharge ramps... It could have gone on forever. Each time, in addition, the respective governments claimed that they were acting within the law, and that their operations were authorised by the London Dumping Convention, the international treaty of 1972. Their claim encouraged Greenpeace to look closer at this London Dumping Convention. Was dumping really given a seal of approval by the United Nations? If this was the case, was the decision based on sound science and transparency? Were the dumpers reporting adequately on their activities? In 1981, Greenpeace applied for "observer status" at the meetings of the Contracting Parties to the Convention, held annually in the headquarters of the UN´s International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in London. The aim was to question the rights of a few countries to use the global commons as their radioactive junk yard. At the same time, Greenpeace started addressing the problem of the continued dumping of chemical wastes at sea, which was taking place with little or no control in many areas, including the North and Mediterranean Seas. Greenpeace Germany´s first campaign tackled the dumping at sea of wastes from the manufacture of titanium dioxide, a white pigment used in a wide variety of industries including paint, food and pharmaceutical manufactures. They targeted the Kronos, a dumping vessel operated in the North Sea by Bayer AG, the German giant chemical company, they pursued it and exposed this case of deliberate pollution until land-based recycling alternatives were implemented. This campaign continued in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Spain, and elsewhere. Nowadays, the chemical industry proudly promotes the fact that they make a healthy profit recycling the wastes from titanium dioxide, but they omit to mention that without Greenpeace, they would, perhaps, still be dumping it at sea. As it turned out, the London Dumping Convention was doing little more than keeping a record of whatever information its Contracting Parties chose to tell it as to the quantities and sorts of wastes that were being dumped at sea. There was no thought of further restrictions on the rights of states to dump, and certainly none on the banning the dumping of radioactive and/or industrial wastes at sea. In a sense, the London Dumping Convention was providing a convenient legitimacy to the increasing number of countries wanting to use the sea as a garbage dump.[4] And when a member state did not want to co-operate in good faith, there was nothing they could do.[5]   Sub-seabed Disposal: In the early 1980s, it also became clear that the nuclear industry had never really accepted the prohibition under the London Dumping Convention to dump high-level radioactive wastes at sea and that they wished to overturn this decision. They recognised that radioactive waste dumping on the seabed was banned, because they had no choice. But at the same time, they claimed that dumping under the seabed was not banned. Under the auspices of a Sub-Seabed Disposal Working Group of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (the same people who were co-ordinating the dumping low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes in the North-East Atlantic) the UK, France, Japan, the US, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands spent millions of dollars annually to develop the sub-seabed disposal option for high-level radioactive wastes: equipped with drilling gear and/or suppository-shaped free-fall penetrators (containers which would penetrate the seabed like armour piercing bullets) ships from these countries would shoot the high-level wastes under the seabed. In the early 1980s, research cruises took place in the Caribbean (near Haiti and Cuba), the Eastern Atlantic (between the Canary Archipelago and Madeira Island) and the South Pacific in order to identify future dump sites and test the free fall penetrators. Of course, none of the bordering countries were informed, let alone consulted. A majority of countries, together with Greenpeace, pointed out that this irreversible method was irresponsible. The interpretation that the London Dumping Convention did not include dumping under the seabed was - at best - questionable. Similar to dumping on the seabed, but even more so, dumping under the seabed was impossible to monitor: in the event of leakage, the radioactive wastes would be irretrievable. The nuclear states feigned polite attention, but there was a lot at stake for the dumpers: if they could get away with it, the nuclear industry would have considered that it had met its pledge to "resolve" the nuclear waste issue before the turn of the century!   Dumping Ban: Greenpeace´s persistence began to pay off in the mid 1980s. In 1983, faced with evidence that radioactive waste dumping was increasing rather dramatically, the Contracting Parties to the London Dumping Convention adopted a resolution calling for a moratorium on the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea pending the outcome of a study by a panel of experts. Essentially the call was not binding at all. The six countries who had not voted in favour could have technically and legally continued dumping.[6] But the vote showed that ocean dumping had become too controversial. In the UK, Greenpeace managed to convince the National Union of Seamen (NUS) and elsewhere in Europe, the International Transport Federation (ITF), to call for a boycott by seamen and transport workers. As a result, the annual dumping programme was called off, and 1983 became the first year of the nuclear age with officially no radioactive waste dumping operation. Two years later, a panel of experts appointed and controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could not convince the Contracting Parties. Among other considerations, the Contracting Parties found that the panel was formed almost exclusively of partial experts who had direct interests in pursuing the ocean dumping approach. Therefore it was agreed that an intergovernmental panel of experts with wider terms of reference would be created, and that political, economic and social issues should be included within their deliberations. For the duration of the panel a moratorium would be instituted. [7] While the intergovernmental panel undertook its work, between 1988 and 1993, Greenpeace was able to prompt the Contracting Parties to the London Dumping Convention to focus more of its attention on the effects of incineration and the dumping of industrial wastes into the ocean. As was the case with the nuclear industry, the chemical industry had found it convenient to dispose of its wastes at sea, either by deliberate combustion in specially built vessels, or by straightforward dumping. Many of the toxic wastes, especially the organohalogens, persist in the marine environment and bioaccumulate in the food chain, with associated consequences for fisheries and other legitimate uses of the sea. When it had been agreed in 1978 that the deliberate incineration of toxic wastes at sea would be controlled under the London Dumping Convention,[8] it was to be considered as an interim method of disposal only: "Incineration at sea shall in no way be interpreted as discouraging progress towards environmentally better solutions including the development of new techniques".[9] But Ocean Combustion Services (OCS), a company established to build and operate specially-designed combustion vessels was investing extensively, and intended to expand this polluting practice. Perhaps even more importantly, the ocean dumping and incineration options were identified by Greenpeace and others as primary disincentives to clean technologies and clean production methodologies. Slowly, but surely, the Contracting Parties to the London Dumping Convention moved away from a philosophy that considered the oceans to be a sink for industrial wastes, to one that now considers that ocean dumping should be avoided, unless there is absolutely no other alternative. In other words, within a few years, the international community´s perception of ocean dumping evolved from considering the practice as part of the solution to it becoming part of the problem. This evolution was exemplified by the adoption of resolutions calling for a phase out of the incineration at sea of noxious liquid wastes (1988), and the phasing out of the dumping of industrial wastes at sea (1990).[10] In 1992, in the light of this evolution and in anticipation of the outcome of the intergovernmental panel of experts on radioactive wastes the following year, Greenpeace was able to propose to the contracting Parties that the name of the convention, known until then as the London Dumping Convention, should be changed in recognition of the shift away from ocean dumping. The proposal was agreed unanimously, and the word "Dumping" was dropped from the title.[11] Finally, in 1993, the intergovernmental panel of experts on radioactive wastes disposal at sea concluded almost a decade of work. In their "Final and Comprehensive Statement", the experts recognised that ocean dumping differed from other available options for radioactive waste management. They pointed out "the diffusibility of the waste radionuclides in sea water which could result in transboundary transfer of these radioactive materials" as well as the "comparative difficulty of monitoring radioactive waste packages dumped at sea". For the intergovernmental experts, "the consideration of these characteristics, together with the relative difficulty of retrieval, [was] a necessary part of any assessment of the sea disposal option". Like Greenpeace, the overwhelming majority of contracting Parties concluded that this statement (arising from the most detailed international assessment ever made of any radioactive waste disposal option) provided a very strong basis on which to ban the dumping of radioactive wastes permanently, in full compliance with Article XV(2) of the London Convention.[12] To conclude a decade of controversy, in November of 1993, the Contracting Parties to the London Convention adopted unanimously amendments banning the dumping of industrial wastes at sea (effective 1st January, 1996) and their incineration at sea, and by majority vote the dumping of radioactive wastes.[13] The three amendments became legally binding on Contracting Parties to the London Convention and the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) on 20 February, 1994; in other words, they are law in virtually the entire world.   The Oil Industry´s Preferential Treatment: Throughout the controversy over the dumping of radioactive and industrial waste dumping at sea, the representatives of the oil industry had remained very discreet. Under the umbrella organisation of the E&P Forum, the pressure group funded by the offshore industry, they attend all the meetings of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the London Convention, and regional conventions such as the North-East Atlantic´s OSPAR Convention, the Mediterranean's Barcelona Convention, and so forth. Offshore Operational Discharges: As with (and in some respect more than) other "dirty" industries, the offshore industry discharges significant quantities of liquid and gaseous wastes into the environment, both to air and water. And, of course, their installations must be disposed of once they have aged and been decommissioned. But they have managed to evade the ever tighter restrictions that have been applied to other sectors. Greenpeace and others often speak of the preferential treatment enjoyed by the offshore industry, and this not an overstatement. For example, the London Convention stipulates that "the disposal of wastes or other matter directly arising from, or related to the exploration, exploitation and associated off-shore processing of seabed mineral resources will not be covered by the provisions of this Convention".[14] In plain language, this means that from an offshore installation - regardless of science, impacts, and the restrictions to which other industries are subject - you may dump whatever you please, and in whatever quantities ![15] For a treaty that pledges to base its decisions on "sound science" this preferential treatment for the offshore industry is awkward, to say the least: besides political considerations, nothing can justify that the dumping of wastes which is banned from moving objects (ships) should be permitted if it takes place from fixed platforms. Obviously, the cumulative effects and therefore the concentrations in sediments and marine life caused by dumping from a fixed platform are higher. For many years, the exemption contained in Article III.1(c ) of the London Convention, 1972 was widely recognised as being an anachronism. When the Contracting Parties set out to draft and negotiate the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention which was intended to bring the Convention into line with contemporary environmental policy, there was apparently broad support to rectify the situation. The negotiation of the 1996 Protocol took several years, and initially there were no forceful voices against bringing the offshore industry into line as proposed by the delegations from the Netherlands, Denmark and other countries. However, at the Special Meeting of Contracting Parties in November 1996 convened to adopt and sign the Protocol, a number of countries which had virtually never taken part in the work of the London Convention, and which were, for the most part, not even contracting Parties, turned up and threatened not to adhere to the new Protocol if it covered the discharges of the offshore industry! And instead of sticking to their principles, the majority agreed to another exemption clause reinstating the discriminatory regime. Article 1.3 of the 1996 Protocol states, absurdly, that: "The disposal or storage of wastes or other matter directly arising from, or related to the exploration, exploitation and associated off-shore processing of seabed mineral resources is not covered by the provisions of this Protocol".[16] Although it may have considered that it "won" in this instance, the offshore industry has placed itself in a situation that may have - in the long run - far reaching consequences: whereas they like to portray themselves as a high performance, "high-tech", industry, they have demonstrated that they use and promote the lowest standards of environmental protection, and that they have no intention to improve. Yet, whether their policies will be deemed acceptable for much longer is an open question. Disposal of Disused Offshore Installations: The current controversy over the dumping of decommissioned offshore installations cannot be seen in isolation. Accustomed to this permissive attitude on behalf of the regulators, the offshore industry has thought that nothing would prevent them from dumping their redundant, decommissioned offshore installations at sea. The Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 had established that all offshore installations would be removed from the marine environment with a view to preventing hazards to shipping and to future legitimate uses of the sea. But instead of taking this requirement seriously and planning ahead for the dismantling of their installations on shore, the oil companies spent their revenues elsewhere, and made plans to dump or abandon the disused platforms which they found most inconvenient to bring ashore. They actively lobbied the IMO and obtained the "right" to abandon, in the marine environment, platforms located in more than 75 metres of water or with topsides weighing more than 4,000 tonnes in air. Officially, the offshore industry favours a "case-by-case" approach. In practice, this means: abandonment or dumping ("toppling") whenever they wish. In some circumstances, the case for toppling can even be created by the operator´s own deliberate "laisser-faire" or poor house-keeping.[17] Whilst campaigning against the dumping at sea of radioactive and industrial wastes, and against ocean incineration, Greenpeace has consistently urged governments to address this issue. At meetings of the IMO, the London Convention, OSPAR and the Barcelona Convention, Greenpeace representatives witnessed how the oil industry pressure group, the E&P Forum, was building and maintaining a web of support for its own short-term interests. But, rightly or wrongly, this was seen by Greenpeace an issue for the future. Consequently, when the plan to dump the Brent Spar (a former oil storage buoy from the early times of oil exploitation in the 1970s when the oil fields were not yet connected to land by pipe-lines) at sea came to Greenpeace´s attention at the end of 1994, it was seen as a warning light. Unless opposition was expressed to this first dump, the oil industry would consider that it was politically acceptable to dump disused offshore installations.[18] More than a hundred could follow. Besides this issue of precedence, Greenpeace and others question the "case-by-case" approach because it hinders the development of an "integrated removal strategy" by which shipyards and the recycling market could be prepared in optimum conditions. It is also striking that whenever confronted with new technical challenges (exploration and exploitation in ever deeper waters, and in hostile environments such as the Arctic) to find and extract more oil and gas, the offshore industry always meets them, but when it comes to cleaning up after itself, it is prepared to use technical problems as an excuse, and declare itself unable to meet the demand. For Greenpeace and others, in this respect, the issue of the removal of offshore installations therefore raises a wider issue of corporate responsibility. The events surrounding the occupation of the Brent Spar are still in everyone's minds, including the long controversy that followed. In January, 1998, Shell finally recognised that, having considered the matter thoroughly, the Best Practical Environmental Option was the re-use of the installation as a quay extension near Stavanger in Norway. From Shell's short-list of seven options, ocean dumping came out worst from every point of view (including CO2 emissions) except, perhaps, cost. [19] On 9 June, 1995, in the middle of the Brent Spar controversy, and while Greenpeace volunteers were standing on top of Shell´s installation as it was being towed into the North-East Atlantic, the Environment Ministers of the countries bordering the North Sea stated, notwithstanding reservations from the UK and Norway that they were "aware that an increasing number of offshore installations in the North Sea are approaching the time of their decommissioning. Even if the offshore installations are emptied of noxious and hazardous materials, they might still if dumped or left at sea, pose a threat to the marine environment. Disposal of such installations on land by recycling recyclable materials and by ensuring safe and controlled disposal of unavoidable residues would be in accordance with generally agreed principles of waste management policy".[20] In line with this thorough statement which summarised what the Brent Spar controversy was about, the North Sea Environment Ministers agreed "that decommissioned offshore installations shall either be reused or be disposed of on land", and they "invite[d] OSPAR to implement this agreement". As a result, three weeks later, the OSPAR Commission adopted by vote, notwithstanding reservations from Norway and the UK, "a moratorium on the disposal at sea of decommissioned offshore installations until the Oslo Commission or a Commission in its succession has adopted a Decision on the disposal of offshore installations with a view to banning the disposal of such installations at sea"[21] This decision entered into force on 4 August, 1995.[22] Shell had halted the Brent Spar dumping operation on 20 June, 1995. The offshore industry, as well as the UK and Norway, immediately claimed that this decision was insignificant, because the UK and Norway who licence the vast majority of offshore installations in the North Sea had not accepted it. Legally speaking, they were, of course, correct, but the political reality was different. It was very difficult in those circumstances for anyone to dump anything. And - as a matter of fact - since this decision was adopted, 17 installations have been brought ashore,[23] the Brent Spar will also soon be brought ashore (bringing the total to 18), and none have been dumped at sea. In 1996, a long process of negotiations was begun in an attempt to reach a consensus as to which installations could be exempted from the ban which, de facto, has been in place since 1995. Since the launch of its campaign against the dumping of the Brent Spar, Greenpeace has recognised that there are reasons to leave in-situ some 22 large concrete gravity based structures. This position is unchanged. Similarly, at the end of 1996, the European Commission published a study it had commissioned from a prestigious Dutch engineering firm, which reported that - in addition to these 22 concrete platforms - additional studies were required for only seven large steel installations.[24] A prior justification procedure has been drafted with a view to addressing this kind of problem. On the other hand, the offshore industry, supported by the UK and Norwegian administrations, have tried to derail this process hoping to re-open the ocean dumping option almost entirely. The most recent of those extravagant proposals appeared in May 1998 in a memorandum prepared by Alan Simcock, a UK civil servant acting as Chair of the OSPAR Commission. Mr. Simcock´s proposal was to allow the dumping of not less than 102 steel installations! This was presented by the author as a genuine attempt to reach a consensus. But, as he should have expected, the majority of Mr. Simcock´s colleagues told him that his proposal was not very helpful... In response, Greenpeace invited Mr. Seim, an engineer who worked for Aker Seipem, the firm that had conducted the dismantling of the Odin platform in Norway to give a presentation at OSPAR . Mr. Seim was able to explain that much had been learned from recent experience, and that the engineering industry was able to make a safe and very profitable business from land-based dismantling. According to the engineering industry, there is no technical, safety, environmental or economic reason to prevent the dismantling ashore of all steel installations.[25] The OSPAR Environment Ministers, at their Ministerial Conference near Lisbon in July, 1998 will clearly have the final say. One would trust that the ministers will honour the policies that they or their predecessors had agreed in 1995. It is to be expected that they will be aware that the public would not understand why - three years after the start of the Brent Spar controversy - the offshore industry should be allowed to rid itself of its decommissioned offshore installations by dumping them at sea. But the controversy on ocean dumping of decommissioned offshore installations has reminded us of there will always be a need to remain vigilant. Virtually every month, Greenpeace comes across plans, here or there, to re-open the ocean dumping option - on the seabed, or under it; in the abyssal plains, or in coastal environments. It is high time that the oil industry stopped trying to undermine the international ocean dumping regulatory systems. This is certainly a test case of their ability to live up to their claim to become more "green".   Next Step; Land-Based Sources: Ocean dumping raises another issue of precedence. It is likely that with hindsight, these twenty years of controversy over ocean dumping will also be remembered as having been crucial in establishing the principle that the oceans are not a rubbish tip for industrial wastes. The international community must now be better prepared and more determined to prevent marine pollution from land-based sources. It is estimated that approximately 75 to 85 % of all marine pollution inputs come from land-based activities. Point and diffuse sources in the river basins and catchment areas, discharges into estuaries and coastal waters represent the major sources of pollution of the marine environment.[26] Given the time and effort that were necessary to ban waste dumping at sea, this is in a sense quite discouraging. Yet, the countries bordering the North Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Baltic have now all agreed to work towards the cessation of the discharge and emission of toxic substances that are persistent and liable to bioaccumulate in the marine environment.[27] And it is now expected that the OSPAR Ministerial Conference of July, 1998 will agree to "make every endeavour to move towards the cessation of discharges, emissions and losses of hazardous substances by 2020".[28] Those who say that despite these fine words, a lot needs to be done for this objective to become reality are right. But the adoption of this target brings us closer. Slowly but surely, "zero discharge", once the dream of only a handful of environmentalists is becoming the new paradigm. The same is also true of the current controversy on the continued discharge of radioactive wastes from nuclear reprocessing facilities.[29] Environmental damage from these discharges is now beyond doubt.[30] At their meeting in Portugal in the month of July, the Environment Ministers will have to choose between letting the nuclear reprocessing plants "discharge as usual" (or, rather, increase their discharges), or agree to "continuously reducing anthropogenic discharges, emissions and losses of radioactive substances, with the ultimate aim of achieving concentrations in the marine environment near background values for naturally occurring substances and close to zero for man made radioactive substances" and to "make every endeavour to move towards the target of the cessation of discharges, emissions and losses of radioactive substances"[31]. The delegation from Norway has also proposed that in the Sintra Statement which the environment ministers will sign in July, they undertake to "make every endeavour to reach the target of cessation of such discharges as quickly as possible"[32]   Conclusion: Feasibility and Political Will: In July at the OSPAR Ministerial Conference, Greenpeace can expect to be under attack from those who wish to continue to dump and discharge their wastes into the ocean, who will urge the ministers to be "realistic" and let them off the hook. This has always been the case: when - exactly twenty years ago - Greenpeace proposed for the first time that the nuclear and chemical industries should stop taking ships out to sea to dump or burn their wastes, industry claimed that these environmental requirements were impossible to meet. Yet, twenty years later, what Greenpeace proposed then, has now become international policy. In 1998, for our children, going back to the age of ocean dumping would be inconceivable. The same will be true, sooner or later, of land-based discharges. Why not start sooner?   Amsterdam, June, 1998     Rémi Parmentier is a member of Greenpeace International. He has campaigned to ban ocean dumping since 1978. He is the spokesperson of his organisation at meetings of the IMO, the London Convention, the OSPAR Commission, the Ministerial North Sea Conference, the Barcelona Convention, among others.   [1] The OSPAR Commission is the intergovernmental organisation regulating marine pollution in the North-East Atlantic will be held in Sintra, near Lisbon. The countries that are members of OSPAR are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK as well as the European Commission. The ban on the dumping of decommissioned offshore installations is supported by all the members, but some - led by the UK and Norway - would like to include a very wide list of exemptions which is unacceptable to the majority. The OSPAR Ministerial Conference will also decide whether to ban radioactive waste discharges and phase out the discharge, emission and losses of toxic substances, such as organohalogens, that are persistent in the environment and accumulate in the food chain. [2] At the time, Greenpeace only had small offices in five countries, and the Rainbow Warrior had been bought in Europe only a few months before. It was not until a year later, in 1979, that the umbrella organisation Greenpeace International was formed. [3] In the summer of 1982, the largest dumping operation ever undertaken officially took place at the NEA dumpsite; four ships were involved in dumping 10,000 tonnes of wastes representing nearly 130,000 curies of radioactivity. [4] For example, both Japan and the USA announced in 1979 their intention to initiate new programmes of radioactive waste dumping at sea. Japan had been planning to dump up to 100,000 curies per year into a Pacific Ocean site 600 miles North of the Northern Marianas (the Curie is a unit which is very nearly equal to the rate of disintegration of one gramme of radium).. In 1982, the US also considered a plan to scuttle ageing nuclear submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. These dumping programmes would have involved the dumping of as many as 100 decommissioned nuclear submarines, each representing 50,000 curies of radioactive wastes. In addition, the US Department of Energy has maintained hopes to be able to find ways to dump at sea thousands of cubic metres of radioactively contaminated soils dating back to the early years of their nuclear weapons programmes in the 1940s, the so-called Manhattan Project which preceded the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although they had not dumped since the 1960s, France, Germany and others, such as Italy, were also hoping to resume ocean dumping in the early 1980s, as they faced ever increasing amounts of radioactive wastes generated by their nuclear power programmes. France and the UK also wanted to dispose of their decommissioned nuclear submarines at sea. [5] In 1991 and 1992, Greenpeace revealed that the USSR had secretly been dumping low level radioactive waste as well high level radioactive waste in the Kara and Barents Seas, and the Sea of Japan (Ref. Report of the 15th Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the London Convention, 1992, and "Necessary Correction to IAEA´s Inventory of Radioactive Wastes in the Marine Environment: Soviet/Russian Dumping Activities", submitted to the 15th Consultative Meeting of the London Convention, 1992, Doc. LDC 15/INF.18). [6] The resolution was adopted by 19 votes in favour, six against, and five abstentions. Japan, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland, the UK and the USA voted against, while Brazil, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece and the USSR abstained. [7] The 1985 resolution was adopted by 26 votes in favour, 5 against, and 7 abstentions. [8] Amendment to Annex I of the London Dumping Convention, adopted by the 3rd Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties, entered into force on 11 March, 1979. [9] Regulation 2.2 of the 1978 Addendum to Annex I of the London Dumping Convention. [10] Resolution LDC.35(11) Status of Incineration of Noxious Liquid Wastes at Sea, and Resolution LDC.43(13) Phasing Out Disposal of Industrial Waste. [11] "Calling the Convention by Its Name", Doc LDC 15/5 submitted by Greenpeace International. [12] Article XV(2): "Amendments to the Annexes will be based on scientific or technical considerations". [13] Resolution LC.49(16) Concerning Phasing Out Sea Disposal of Industrial Waste, Resolution LC.50(16) Concerning Incineration at Sea, and Resolution LC.51(16) Concerning Disposal at Sea of Radioactive Wastes and Other Radioactive Matter. France, the UK, Belgium, and China abstained on Resolution LC.51(16) but later accepted it. The Russian Federation also abstained, and has not accepted that resolution, although they announced in November 1997 at the annual meeting of the London Convention, that they would "lift their reservation very soon". Notwithstanding their reservation, the Russian Federation has not dumped radioactive wastes at sea to the best of our knowledge since October 1993. [14] Article III.1(c ) of the London Convention, 1972. [15]This Article was originally introduced because in the early 1970s there was high expectation that the exploitation of polymetallic modules would represent an important industrial sector for the future. However, the offshore oil and gas industry is the only one that has benefited - very much! -- from it. Some countries, of course, do apply some restrictions nationally or regionally, but they are clearly a minority: Until 1995, for example, the UK only had one part time inspector for the hundreds of platforms located in the UK sector of the North Sea. And this inspector had to rely on the helicopters of the oil companies to go and "inspect"! [16] Article 1.3 of the 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, Doc. LC/SM 1/6. The power and strength of the oil industry within the IMO is partly explained by the funding mechanism of this UN Specialised Agency which is largely reliant upon the super-tanker industry (on the funding of IMO, see Rémi Parmentier in The UNESCO Courier, July 1998). [17] It has informally and verbally been reported that the operators in at least one oil field in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea are suspected to be deliberately creating conditions (by poor maintenance and allowing the installation to fall into a dangerous state of disrepair) on which to build a case that the only solution is to dump. [18] Correspondence between Shell UK and the UK Government of the time, dated from 1994 and published in the Spring of 1997 has shown that the UK Government had a particular interest with the Brent Spar as setting a precedent that would re-open the ocean dumping route for the bulky wastes of the offshore and other industries (See Greenpeace International´s submission to the 1997 Meeting of the OSPAR Committee on Programmes and Measures, PRAM, May 1997). [19] Shell´s press release of 29 January, 1998. [20] Paragraph 54 of the 4th Ministerial Declaration for the Protection of the North Sea, 9 June, 1995. [21] Operative Paragraph 1 of OSCOM Decision 95/1 on the Disposal of Offshore Installations. [22] The OSPAR Commission can adopt decisions that are legally binding on all the member states who have accepted them. In the case of OSCOM 95/1, with their reservations, the UK and Norway are not legally bound. [23] Including several that were candidates for ocean dumping originally, such as Esso´s Odin platform in the Norwegian sector. [24] "A Technical Review of the Disposal Methods of Decommissioning and Disposing of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations", Contract No. B4-3040/SS/000259/MAR/D1, Prepared for the European Commission DG XI and DG XVII. [25] At a meeting of Heads of Delegations of the OSPAR Commission held on 8 June 1998, the offshore industry´s pressure group E&P Forum issued a paper called "Clarification of Inaccuracies in the Presentation by Mr. R.H. Seim of Aker Sipem", in an attempt to discredit Mr. Seim, and give the impression that Aker Saimpem JV disagreed with their consultant.. But a close examination of this paper shows that Aker Saipem did not disagree with the testimony delivered by Greenpeace: in their conclusion, Aker Saipem carefully state "IN OUR CLIENTS VIEW the Odin platform, because of its limited facilities and lightweight, was more typical of jackets in 75 m water than its 103 m actual water depth" (emphasis added).. Aker´s client is, of course, the oil company ESSO...and, for all their revenues, Aker very much depend on the oil industry. Ref.Document HOD(3) 98/2/NGO.1, presented by the E&P Forum. [26] The rest of marine pollution inputs come from so-called operational discharges from shipping, and from deliberate dumping. [27] Ref. Paragraph 17 of the 4th Ministerial Declaration for the Protection of the North Sea, Articles 1 and 5 of the 1996 Syracuse Protocol to the Barcelona Convention, and the Helsinki Commission's Decision of March, 1998. [28] Draft OSPAR Strategy for Hazardous Substances. [29] The three nuclear reprocessing facilities in the OSPAR region, La Hague (France), Sellafield (UK) and Dounreay (UK) represent well over 90 % of all radioactive waste inputs in the region´s marine environment, and their combined releases are by far the largest in the world. [30] Ref. Greenpeace International submissions on sampling programmes in the vicinity of the La Hague and Sellafield reprocessing facilities, OSPAR Commission, 1997 and 1998. [31] Draft OSPAR Strategy for Radioactive Substances. [32] Working Document No 7 from the OSPAR Meeting of Heads of Delegations of 9-10 June, 1998.