Shell's handling of the crisis in Ogoni has been short-sighted. Instead of generating an atmosphere of co-operation, the company has chosen to conduct an exercise in damage limitation.
In 1993, the Year of the Indigenous Peoples, Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni decided to seek international support for their campaign. Addressing the third General Assembly of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), Ken Saro-Wiwa accused Shell of 'waging an ecological war against the Ogoni'93. Shell became alarmed over the attention paid to the Ogoni's plight.
Internal documents have come to light which reveal that meetings took place in The Hague and London in February 1993. These documents expose Shell's real concerns: that local opposition of its operations in Nigeria could no longer be controlled and were turning into, or had the potential to turn into, an international PR nightmare94:
'The problem is not restricted to Nigeria; it has been thrust into UK sitting rooms through the TV programme 'The Heat of the Moment'95 and the information has spread, most recently in the Netherlands and Australia. International networking ... is at work and gives rise to the possibility that internationally organized protest could develop.'
The minutes then go on to propose action items which contradict Shell's official line that its commitment to protect the Ogoni environment has been established over many years.
The proposals include: reducing the incidence of operational spills; reducing flaring as a high priority; a need to work with consultants and the Nigerian government to monitor air and water quality, and improve understanding 'so a sense of realism can be given to growing accusations'; reassess present methods of negotiation and levels of payment for land; review the possibility of introducing employment programmes; and for Public Affairs staff to 'ensure that the quality and levels of staff are of a professional standard suitable to undertake these sensitive activities.'
Moreover, the document goes on to advise 'SPDC and SIPC PA departments to keep each other more closely informed to ensure that movements of key players, what they say and to whom is more effectively monitored to avoid unpleasant surprises and adversely affect the reputation of the Group as a whole.'96 [Author's own emphasis] As to what lengths Shell will go to 'preserve the reputation of the Group' remains to be seen, as does its commitment to deal with the pollution of Ogoni.
In 1993, the company published a briefing paper entitled Tensions in Nigeria which stated that97:
'SPDC has a programme of continuing improvement to facilities and environmental performance, and of community assistance in infrastructure, health, agriculture and education ... This commitment is not cosmetic or token _ it is something which has been established over many years.' [Author's own emphasis]
Later that year Shell informed Greenpeace that in 199298:
'... SPDC put in place a five year Environmental Plan designed to enhance the company's environmental performance ...
Greenpeace and other organizations have asked Shell to release this Five Year Environmental Plan, as well as the Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) it claims to have undertaken since 1982. Neither have been forthcoming.
However, recently The Body Shop International secured access to two EIAs through an independent consultant99. But despite a belief held by many that EIAs are considered public property, The Body Shop's consultant could review only two impact assessments which could not be removed from Shell's office in the Hague. Both impact assessments were for pipelines and had been undertaken by a consulting arm of a Nigerian university. Furthermore, the studies seem to have been conducted after the pipelines were put into operation, therefore, not true EIAs which are conducted before construction takes place.
In general, the consultant found that the assessments were unfocused, littered with statements that there 'will be significant impacts' without demonstrating how significant the impacts would be. Furthermore, he went on to add100:
'The documents are lengthy, generally poorly constructed and therefore it is difficult to envisage how they could either assist the Nigerian Planning Authorities in determining authorisation of the development, or enable SPDC employees in Nigeria to better manage their (potential) environmental impacts. And:
'Both documents refer to Shell's Oil Spill Contingency Plan as a major mitigative measure, but there is no clear indication that an effective contingency plan, customised to account for specific local environmental sensitivities, in fact exists. And:
'Finally, but perhaps most importantly, there is little evidence that SPDC have been involved in the EIA process, that they acknowledge the potential impacts of their pipeline operations and that they have taken ownership of the mitigation measures necessary to minimise potential impacts.'
The report from the Body Shop's consultant concludes that the assessments undertaken for the two pipelines 'indicate clearly that Shell will face some difficulties with regard to the expectations of the local communities', but more importantly101:
[ that the studies] '... lack a focused assessment of significant impacts and do not lend themselves to aiding either the planning authorities or Shell in putting the levers in place to effectively manage the environmental implications of SPDC's operations.' [Author's own emphasis]