Nuclear Safety and the G7
- A Contradiction in Terms?

As a result various emergency "assistance" programmes were established in 1991 starting with the European Union's programme on the Kozloduy reactors in Bulgaria.

The heads of states of both the G7 and the European Union have for a number of years been making strong statements of concern over nuclear risk.[Table 1] In April The Nuclear Safety meeting of the G7 and Russia will discuss various nuclear safety and nuclear security issues.

The 1992 Munich G7 meeting called for a definite programme of action. This resulted in an analysis jointly undertaken by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the World Bank.

The study, presented at the G7 meeting in Tokyo in 1993, looked at the investment options for reducing nuclear risk in countries with the so called "high risk reactors", the RBMKs (15 operational) and the VVER 440-230 (11 operational). Consequently, the report looked at Armenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine and developed three main risk scenarios: `Low', `Medium', and `High'. The scenarios looked at various rates of phase out for the "dangerous reactors" and various degrees of investment in new and existing nuclear power plants. The main findings of the report were:

It would have been technically feasible to replace all the "High Risk" nuclear plants with alternative supplies and improve nuclear safety in each of the countries concerned, by the mid 1990s.

The `Low Risk Nuclear Scenario', which involved the most rapid phase out of the "high risk" reactors, also had the lowest investment cost of the three, amounting to a total investment cost of approximately $18 billion, between 1993-2000 ($2.3 billion per annum). In contrast, the `Medium' and `High' scenarios, which involved the upgrading of existing reactors and the completion of new facilities, would have cost $24 and $25 billion respectively.

Nuclear Assistance Programmes

	Project completed	Project Underway	Financing Decided	Firm Commitment	Interest, Proposals	total MECU
Operational Safety improvements	29.85	294.98	27.38	22.26	2.83	377.29
Near-term safety improvements	13.59	234.72	47.79	5.75	1.04	302.89
Enhancing Regulatory Regimes	34.53	69.16	29.63	16.58	0.00	149.90
Energy Strategy Studies	0.89	1.13	0.00	0.00	0.25	2.26
Long-term Upgrading of NPPs	12.17	33.51	19.18	3.51	0.30	68.68
Radiation Protection	12.13	8.91	7.03	1.37	0.80	30.25
Waste Management	2.68	27.79	16.53	0.03	1.10	48.13
Others	3.93	26.67	2.23	1.61	0.04	34.49
Total.	109.79	696.87	149.76	51.09	6.37	1013.88

Summary of Western Assistance on Nuclear Safety projects.- Source, NUSAC News, February 1996.

Dangerous reactors still operating

"Many Soviet designed reactors operating in the successor states to the Soviet Union pose significant safety risks because of inherent design deficiencies, deteriorating economies, political turmoil and weak regulatory oversight. As a class, these reactors continue to experience serious incidents, raising the spectre of another accident akin to Chernobyl"1

The report concludes that the four worst nuclear power stations in the region are: Chernobyl (Ukraine), Kozloduy (Bulgaria), Kola (Russia) and Iganalina (Lithuania). [Table 2]

The only, `high risk' reactors (RBMK-Chernobyl type- or VVER 440- 230 models) that have been shut-down since 1986 are:
i) Chernobyl unit 2, which suffered a fire in 1991. However, according to plant officials it will be restarted in 1996.
ii) Medzamor (Armenia) units 1 and 2. These were shut-down in 1989 due to local opposition. However, unit 2 was restarted in October 1995 and it is reported that unit 1 will be restarted in 1997.

It is clear that the current approach for reducing nuclear risk has failed. There have been no permanent closures of what Western agencies describe as the "High Risk Reactors".

In most cases we are no closer to the closure of "high risk" reactors than we were in 1991. The main reason for this has been insufficient investment into alternative energy sources.

Throughout CEE and the Former Soviet Union there is a massive potential for renewable energies and in particular energy efficiency.

Throughout the region there has been a decrease in electricity production over the past years. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the decline in industrial demand owing to the changing economic situation and secondly, because of payment problems concerning fossil fuel importation. In some cases, this situation has led to massive decreases in electricity production. In Between 1990 and 1995, there was a decrease from 224 TWh to 144 Twh in Ukraine. This 80 Twh decrease is greater than that produced by the whole of the nuclear industry in the country (71 Twh in 1995). In other words, if fossil fuel supplies were guaranteed all the nuclear capacity could be replaced with existing, unused supply.

One of the most important issues is energy intensity - or the amount of energy that countries use for the production of materials. Historically, countries in the former Soviet Union paid very little, if anything, for fuel supplied by Russia. Consequently, there was little or no incentive for either energy saving or efficiency. Today however, Russia charges world market prices for the fuel. As a result, the bills countries have to pay for fossil fuel (particularly gas) are enormous. In Ukraine the annual bill is between $1-2 billion. However, in comparison with the European Union, Ukraine uses more than four times as much primary energy per unit of Gross National Product. Clearly, this is in part due to the significant heavy industry in Ukraine, but is in the main caused by lack of energy efficiency.

Energy Efficiency Potentials

At a cost of $0.03/Kwh about 14 Twh could be saved. This is more than the Chernobyl station produced in 1995.

Within a five year period Demand Side Management and Load Management at seven industrial sites, can save nearly 2GW (two large scale nuclear power plants) at a cost of $US 905 million.

While other sources show:

Experts from the Ukrainian Institute of Energy Saving Problems have shown that energy saving can reach 65% of total demand. Of this; 80% can be achieved in the industrial sector, with 30% of this at no or low cost measures.

A study undertaken for the European Commissions TACIS programme showed that at almost zero costs, 5-10% of the total power consumption can be achieved in 1-2 years.

Next Steps

• An international co-ordination unit to assist with the phase out of nuclear power in the region needs to be established. This would ensure that all lending from International Financial Institutions (World Bank, EBRD, European Investment Bank etc.) and bi-lateral initiatives, would incorporate loan conditional agreements to the phasing out of nuclear power.

• Priority for loans and grant should be given to demand and supply side efficiency.

• All loans for the completion and upgrading of nuclear power plants should be abandoned.

Summary of G7 Communiques 1992-1995 on Nuclear Safety

Germany 1992

"the safety of Soviet Designed nuclear power plants gives cause for great concern... The new States concerned in the former Soviet Union and the countries of central and Eastern Europe must give high priority to eliminating this danger".

"A special effort should be made to improve the safety of these plants. We offer the states concerned our support".

Japan 1993

"We welcome the progress made in the nuclear safety programme agreed at the Munich Summit... We invite the World Bank, together with the IEA, to continue the dialogue with each of the countries concerned, and working with other lending institutions including the EBRD and the EIB, to support them in developing longer term energy strategies. Our aim is to agree as quickly as possible on a framework for co-ordinated action by all those involved following a country by country approach. We will review the progress make in 1994".

Italy 1994

"We welcome the progress made in the nuclear safety programme, agreed by the Munich and Tokyo summits, concerning [nuclear safety] the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union".

"An effective framework for co-ordinated action is now in place. The World Bank, working with other lending institutions including the EBRD and the EIB, and with the IEA, is helping countries develop long term energy strategies....The IFIs are invited according to their mandate to make full use of their lending possibilities for this purpose".

"We remain committed to the existing international initiatives to promote an early closure of high risk reactors. The closing down of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant is an urgent priority".

Canada 1995

"We welcome progress to date in improving levels of nuclear safety in the countries in central and Eastern and the Newly Independent States. We congratulate President Kuchma of Ukraine on his decision to close the Chernobyl nuclear power plant by the year 2000".

Safety Levels at "Most Dangerous" Reactors

Source: United States Department of Energy, Office of Energy Intelligence, Most Dangerous Reactors, a world-wide compendium of reactor risk assessment. May 1995

1 Department of Energy, Office of Energy Intelligence, Most Dangerous Rectors a world-wide compendium of reactor risk assessment, May 1995.
2 Implementing DSM In Ukraine's Restructured Power Sector. David Wolcott, Chief of Party, Hagler Bailly Consulting, INC, Vladimir Dukov, Director National Energy Efficiency Centre, Ukraine Ministry of Energy and Power, Presented at the Fourth International Energy Efficiency and DSM Conference, Berlin, 11th October 1995.