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Special Update, 28 May 1996
Chairman's CTBT Text
Greenpeace CTBT Updates
Updates from the Conference on Disarmament
This update describes briefly some of the key features of the draft CTBT text presented this afternoon by the Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on the Nuclear Test Ban, H.E. Mr. Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands. A more complete update - including
reactions of various delegations to the text - will be issued at
the end of the week.
The Chairman has proposed a treaty that would ban ALL nuclear explosions completely - including so-called peaceful nuclear explosions - and that is firmly rooted in the context of systematic and progressive further efforts to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons and constrain the further development
of the weapons which exist already.
The verification networks are as expected, with some of the details being changed to take into account concerns of, for example, Russia. A reasonable compromise is put forward on the question of On-Site Inspections, that would allow the introduction of non-International Monitoring System Data in
support of a request for an inspection. The International Data
Centre may provide raw data or specialised assessments for States Parties.
Entry-into-Force would be based on ratification of a specific 37 identified States on whose territories the primary seismic monitoring stations or radionuclide laboratories are located. There is no waiver clause for this provision.
In the view of Greenpeace, this text creates a suitable
basis for working towards completing the treaty by the end of
June, and - as such - it should be welcomed.
1. Scope
The Scope article (Article I) provides for a complete prohibition
on nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion,
as originally proposed by Australia and supported by many
delegations. This Scope article provides for a zero-yield CTBT,
and would encompass a ban on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs).
- The article states:
- 1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear
explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear
explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
- 2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain
from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in
the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or
any other nuclear explosion.
It should be noted that there is no special provision for PNEs in any other article.
2. Preamble
The Preamble includes clear references to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In addition, it
refers to continued reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons; the restrictions that will be imposed by a zero-yield CTBT on further developments in nuclear weapons; and an affirmation of the zero-yield CTBT concept itself.
The Preamble reads, 'inter alia':
CONVINCED that the present international situation
provides an opportunity to take further effective measures
towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation
of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and declaring their
intention to take such measures,
STRESSING therefore the need for continued systematic
and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally,
with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control,
CONVINCED that the cessation of all nuclear weapon
test explosions, by constraining the development and
qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the
development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons,
constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation in all its aspects,
RECOGNISING that an end to all such nuclear explosions
will thus constitute a meaningful step in the realisation
of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament,
AFFIRMING that this Treaty seeks to achieve the
discontinuance of all nuclear weapon test explosions and
all other nuclear explosions for all time,
In addition, Article VIII of the draft CTBT provides that every
10 years a conference shall be held to review the operation and
effectiveness of the CTBT. These reviews are to include the
Preamble, in order to ensure that its object and purpose are
being realised.
3. Verification
The International Monitoring System (IMS) will be based around
the four networks: seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and
infrasound. The International Data Centre (IDC) is to provide raw
or processed data to States Parties. It shall provide standard
screened event bulletins, based on standardised characterisation
parameters. Additional national screening criteria may be applied
on the request of a State Party. (Article IV(B) and Protocol,
Part I)
The On-Site Inspection (SO) regime provides for consideration
of information amassed from both the IMS and from non-IMS
sources, where the latter is 'relevant technical information
obtained by any national technical means of verification in a
manner consistent with generally recognised principles of
international law'. Regardless of the source of the information
supporting a request, a decision is required of the Executive
Council within 72 hours on whether an SO is to be initiated.
This decision may be taken by a simple majority decision of the
Executive Council.
After 30 days of the SO has elapsed, it may be terminated by a
simple majority vote of the Executive Council.
4. Entry-into-Force
The Chairman's text proposes that Entry-into-Force would be based on ratification of a specific 37 identified States on whose
territories the primary seismic monitoring stations or
radionuclide laboratories are located. This appears to be based
on a very recent compromise proposal from Canada.
This list includes all the 5 declared Nuclear Weapon States and
the 3 threshold States.
These States are:
- Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Central Africa Republic, China, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire,
Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, India, Iran, Israel,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mongolia, Niger, Norway,
Pakistan, Paraguay, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, Turkmensistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United
States of America.
There is no waiver clause for this provision or a provision that
would allow entry-into-force if any one member of the list of 37
fails to ratify.
____________________
Simon Carroll monitors the CTBT negotiations for Greenpeace and can be contacted at: +41.21.728.52.25.
or via Greenpeace
International at phone +31.20.523.62.22 or fax +31.20.523.62.00.
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