Greenpeace Update on CTBT Negotiations
from the Conference on Disarmament
1st August 1996

Little is being reported of the outcomes of the ongoing informal negotiations being conducted by Amb. Jaap Ramaker -- the Chair of the ad hoc Committee on the Nuclear Test Ban -- indicating that substantive breakthroughs have yet to be attained.

However, Thursday's Plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament gave some further insight into some delegation's national positions. The United States, China, Pakistan, New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Japan, Switzerland, Colombia, Iran, Sri Lanka and Brazil made formal statements (summaries below). On specific matters of detail, the key-note speeches on Thursday were those of the United States, China and Pakistan.

During the course of this week, it was notable that an increasing majority of delegations are indicating support to the text of the draft treaty proposed by Ambassador Ramaker at the end of June. On Monday, 20 states reportedly indicated support of the text during a meeting of the Committee negotiating the test-ban. Spain, Slovakia, and New Zealand did so on Wednesday. A number of the states who spoke on Thursday, either indicated or reiterated in the public session that they accept the Chairman's text as drafted. Few, if any, of these countries think that the Chairman's text is ideal -- they support it because they are concerned that if negotiations reopen, then the entire treaty could be greatly weakened, if not lost entirely.

The strongest and most common concern amongst the supporters of the existing draft text, is the inflexibility of the provisions concerning the Entry-into-Force (article XIV) of the treaty. Supporters of a CTBT are stressing that there is an especial responsibility to ensure that the rigid requirements of this article are met falls squarely on the shoulders of those that have insisted on the formula: the United Kingdom, Russia and China, strongly supported by Pakistan.

Despite the specific concerns on the text which were expressed in Thursday's Plenary, it seems that the emerging view of the majority of delegations is that there should not be renegotiation of the text proposed by Ambassador Ramaker at the end of June. At best, minor adjustments are possible, but broad renegotiation could scuttle the treaty. Some concerns expressed by China and Pakistan, for example, could be accommodated outside of the text of the treaty itself.

India is being profiled by some as the big problem. But if conclusion of the treaty is not possible, it will be at least as much a result of the inflexibility on the part of the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) - the United States on On-Site Inspection; China as the only NWS not to accept the draft treaty text as yet; the United Kingdom, Russia and China on Entry-into-Force; and all NWS positions on nuclear disarmament.

Summaries of Plenary Statements

JOHN HOLUM (United States) stated that, on 26 July, the United States President called on all Conference participants to forward the Chairman's text without change to the Assembly for approval and opening for signature. The US view is that the result of a further negotiation on the text is to weaken or lose the treaty.

Holum did acknowledge that throughout the 1980s his Government had not been ready to move swiftly on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, but that the US was finally ready for a CTBT.

The US statement rejected the claim that the draft did not contribute to nuclear disarmament because it did not contain a commitment to a specific time when nuclear disarmament would be completed. But the US could only say that the draft treaty was CONSISTENT with the nuclear disarmament process, rather than further it.

Similar to the stance taken by China later, the US emphasized the 'concessions' it had already made, and that it could scarcely be expected to do more. Holum's speech even dredged up the US dropping of the almost universally criticised 10-year opt-out proposal as a noble act ! It is abundantly clear that the US obsession with details of the verification package related to on-site inspection (OSI) is the real basis for their not wanting negotiations to resume. This concern must have been reinforced by the Chinese comments on this subject, in particular.

In summary, the US considers that is has made a difficult decision -- to accept the treaty as drafted.

SHA ZUKANG (China) maintained that China had shown flexibility and a willingness to compromise on almost all important issues in the treaty.

However, while a quick conclusion would be desirable, China considered that the basic objective of negotiations should be to conclude a treaty that could stand the test of time.

China's had two serious concerns with the Chairman's text. First, the possibility of the use of human intelligence or espionage information to trigger on-site inspections through the allowance of the use of "national technical means" (NTMs). Second, China considered that the requirement for a 'simple majority' vote for on-site inspection (OSI) is susceptible to abuse, and that the a minimum requirement should be for an on-site inspection request be approved by a fixed 30 affirmative votes out of its 51 members when NTMs were involved.

It remains to be seen what agreement could be reached on decision-making for OSI, but the question of NTMs could be resolved outside of the treaty text.

MUNIR AKRAM (Pakistan) essentially reiterated the concerns of China on verification involving on-site inspection -- the use of NTMs and the voting requirement. Pakistan endorsed the specific demands of China on both issues.

In addition, Pakistan reiterated its demand that the entry- into-force provisions remain unchanged.

LUCY DUNCAN (New Zealand) informed the Conference of its firm protest against China's conduct of a nuclear test on 29 July, she continued. It had condemned the test and had conveyed to China its expectation that it would go further than its new moratorium on nuclear testing and join other countries in bringing to a prompt conclusion the negotiations on a test-ban treaty.

RICHARD STARR (Australia) stressed that, in some respects, the text did not match Australia's preferred positions, notably in its entry-into-force formula. Australia, however, is confident that the treaty would have significant value even prior to its entry into force.

Australia supports the text test-ban treaty text as it is. Australia regretted China's 29 July nuclear test, and expressed the hope that test would be the last conducted by any State, ever. Australia supported New Zealand's position that China should support the successful conclusion of the test-ban treaty negotiations.

ALAIN GUILLAUME (Belgium) stated that Belgium could support the text of the draft treaty, even if it was not ideal.

Belgium stressed its concern on the Preamble on the question of nuclear disarmament and the provisions on entry into force. Belgium, however, was in favour of a test-ban treaty without delay, and today it accepted the compromise text.

Belgium regretted the recent Chinese nuclear test, and hoped that it would be the last ever conducted by any State.

HISAMI KUROKOCHI (Japan) repeated her Government's response to the Chinese test.

Japan has decided to accept the Chairman's proposed test-ban treaty text although it was not entirely satisfactory and appealed to other countries to accept the text as well, so that it could be opened for signature in September.

BERNARD JEANTY (Switzerland) also reiterated that his Government regretted the nuclear test conducted by China but welcomed the Chinese moratorium.

Switzerland supports the draft treaty text.

MARIA FRANCISCA ARIAS (Colombia) expressed concern on the Preamble especially, but stressed that it was ready to sign a treaty that would contribute to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

SIROUS NASSERI (Iran) referred to the Chemical Weapons Convention process to underline his country's concerns that striving to accommodate the interests of the NWS in a treaty negotiation may not mean that those countries join a treaty regime largely tailored for them.

Iran emphasized its concerns about inadequate guarantees on nuclear disarmament.

BERNARD A.B. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka), in a speech that apparently reflected a number of Indian concerns, emphasized deficiencies in the treaty, especially that the Preamble needed strengthening on nuclear disarmament and that the entry-into- force provisions were problematic.

GILBERTO VERGNE SABOIA (Brazil) stated that, despite the fact the draft treaty had many deficiencies, it would accept the Chairman's draft text as it is.

Brazil's concerns included the lack of any real commitment for nuclear disarmament; the absence of clear criteria regarding NTMs; and the financial burden when it remains unclear if the treaty would enter-into-force.

Simon Carroll monitors the CTBT negotiations in Geneva for Greenpeace and may be contacted at:

Hotel des Nations -- phone +41 (22) 734.30.03, fax: +41 (22) 734.38.84, Room 303;

Mobile phone: +41 (77) 68.33.74.