Updates from the Conference on Disarmament

Greenpeace CTBT Updates
Updates from the Conference on Disarmament
24 May 1996

There are just five weeks of negotiations remaining if the CTBT is to be completed on schedule by the end of June.

It is now widely expected that the 'Chairman's text' of a draft CTBT will be presented next week. The actual content of the Chairman's text remains to be seen, because of disagreement that persists on a number of key issues. It is clear though, that the Chairman will need to present 'compromise' formulations that are likely to gain the broadest support and form the basis of consensus compromises in the remaining weeks of the Conference. Below, some guesses at possible 'compromises' are indicated.

There was little progress of note in the formal negotiations of the CTBT text in the ad hoc Committee on the Nuclear Test Ban, despite the restructuring of the negotiating process initiated last week (see Update No. 9). Most delegates described the discussions as 'reiterating established positions' rather than 'negotiations'.

Away from the negotiations, reports continue to mount that China's preparations for a nuclear test are nearing completion and that a blast could be imminent.

For this and future 'CTBT updates' relevant issues raised in Plenary meetings will be incorporated in the relevant section on progress in the negotiations, so there will be no summary of Plenary speeches.

Progress on Negotiations and Key Issues

1. Scope

In the formal discussions, there was no specific progress to report on Scope. In the ad hoc Committee discussion on Scope, there were very few speakers, and those that spoke merely reiterated existing positions.

There are, however, some indications emerging from discussions amongst the five nuclear weapons powers (P-5) that China may support the Australian formulation on scope for the 'Scope' article, but ONLY provided that there is a special provision included in the treaty to provide for peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs). In other words, China still insists that PNEs should not be prohibited outright by a CTBT. Opposition to a special treatment for PNEs is strong.

India has given no indication that it is prepared to withdraw its Scope proposal in favour of the text suggested by Australia.

Pakistan has indicated it may support the Australian formulation for Scope, provided that 5 key elements are specifically included in the Preamble.

Possible CTBT draft outcome:

1. It would appear that the Chairman's draft almost certainly will be based on the Australian Scope proposal.

2. It is possible - although highly undesirable - that a separate article may include a special provision for PNEs.

2. Preamble

In the formal discussions, there was no significant progress was made on the Preamble. The ad hoc Committee discussion on Preamble yielded no shift in positions.

Pakistan has withdrawn its proposal for a separate 'Purposes and Objectives' article for the treaty, and instead has now proposed to include this as a section of the Preamble. It considers this essential to place the CTBT in a disarmament context and to provide reassurance regarding the Scope of the CTBT. The five points it identifies under purposes and objectives are: (1) prevent the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems; (2) prevent the development of new kinds of nuclear weapons and systems; (3) contribute to the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects; (4) promote the realisation of nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific time-frame; (5) promote international peace and security.

Possible CTBT draft outcome:

1. In order for the CTBT to address both disarmament and non-proliferation and to reassure those delegations concerns about Scope, the Preamble will need to include some sort of reference to the five topics raised by Pakistan (and in similar forms by other delegations earlier). However, it is highly unlikely that there will be any reference to elimination of nuclear weapons 'within a specific time-frame'. It is possible that the qualitative development and new weapons development references may be included but presented in such a way that it is 'recognized' that this will be the effect of a CTBT.

2. The section on 'Review' of the CTBT, is likely to be formulated in such a way that the review will be of the treaty in its entirety (i.e. including the Preamble).

3. Verification

There was no significant progress to report on this issue. Pakistan indicated in its Plenary speech, that it could accept the introduction of data generated by national technical means (NTMs), however it would insist that the information would need to be sourced and that it would be evaluated by the International Data Centre (IDC) prior to being considered. Pakistan also stated that regardless of whether the information was generated by the International Monitoring System (IMS) or NTMs, explicit approval for an On-Site Inspection (OSI) would be needed by the Executive Council before it could be launched (the 'green light' procedure).

Indications are emerging that India and China are also more flexible on the use of NTMs, but perhaps with similar concerns and restrictions as identified by Pakistan.

Possible draft CTBT outcome:

1. The IMS will be based around the four networks as elaborated earlier. The IDC is likely to provide a standard screening service for IMS data, with individual states being allowed to request either raw, unprocessed data or customised assessments.

2. It is quite likely that OSI will be based on a two-tier system by which an on-site inspection could be triggered by IMS data unless the Executive Council objects (i.e. the 'red light' procedure) and by non- IMS data (i.e. based on national technical means) only on the basis of prior approval from the Executive Council ('green light'). The procedures to be followed will balance the need for speed and effectiveness for OSI with controls to prevent abuses.

4. Entry-into-Force

No progress has been made on this issue. The fundamental - and critical - division remains whether the five declared nuclear powers and the three threshold states should be explicitly required to ratify before the treaty could enter into force, or whether a more flexible system should be provided for in the treaty (i.e. by requiring ratification by a simple number of States or by providing for some sort of waiver).

A possible compromise on EIF remains unclear.

5. Adoption of the CTBT

Most attention is now centred on the tabling of a formal 'Chairman's text' - a "clean" (i.e. unbracketed) treaty text. It is expected that this will be tabled in the coming week.

Once the text is presented, it will be sent back to capitals for their consideration. In the interim, the ad hoc Committee will focus on two issues: (1) the Preparatory Commission, which will be responsible for work prior to the Entry-into-Force of the treaty, including the preparation of the IMS and IDC; and (2) a discussion on working arrangements for the remaining weeks of this part of the session.

Intensive negotiations on the CTBT text are expected to resume in real earnest as of June 3rd.