Greenpeace Briefing on CTBT Negotiations
Entry-into-Force,
2nd July 1996

Entry-into-Force of the treaty has emerged as possibly the most contentious issue in the last few weeks of the Conference. One group of countries, such as the United Kingdom, Russia, China and Pakistan, have insisted that all 5 Nuclear Weapon States as well as Israel, Pakistan and India must ratify before the treaty could take effect (the United Kingdom and Russia have been especially insistent on this and have reportedly actively lobbied other States in the closing days of the Conference). On the other hand, India has firmly indicated that it could not accept such a requirement as a condition of entry-into-force, and went so far as to remove its International Monitoring System (IMS) stations from the appropriate lists when possession of certain IMS stations was linked to EIF.

The middle ground -- shared by many delegations -- has been that while it is best that all 5 Nuclear Weapon States as well as Israel, Pakistan and India ratify the treaty, the treaty's eventual entry into force should not be held hostage to a decision by one or more of these countries to join. These countries - with intermittent support from the United States - have called for some measure that would allow the treaty to enter into force even if the formal requirements are not met. This would involve, for example, a 'waiver' or an option for 'provisional entry into force' to be included in the EIF article.

1. Revised EIF Formula

The new EIF formula included in the Chairman's revised draft of 28 June is based on a combination of membership of the Conference on Disarmament and on nuclear technology-related capability. Before the treaty can take effect, the treaty must be ratified by all the States listed in Annex 2 of the treaty (see below). No exceptions are provided for.

A proposal for a 'positive conference' to be held in order to consider and decide on measures to accelerate the ratification process in order to facility early entry-into-force has been incorporated. The first such Conference can take place three years after the treaty is opened for signature and then can be repeated annually until such time as the treaty enters into force. However, this provision does not provide for any decision to be taken to amend the requirements for EIF, or any provisional EIF of the treaty.

The complete list of countries required for ratification is: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam, Zaire.

2. Negotiating History and Options

As the concerns over EIF came to a head earlier in the negotiations, in addition to the "positive conference" concept, two other suggestions were been made to get around the problem of the treaty being held hostage (see also CTBT Update No. 12, 9 June):

• 1. a "waiver" provision, whereby even if one or more of the required States did not ratify within a given time-frame, those States which have ratified could bring the treaty into force anyway;
• 2. a "provisional" entry into force for those Parties who have ratified, pending ratification by all those on the list. However, the United Kingdom, Russia and China, objected strenuously to both these options and the only agreement that could be reached by all was on the idea of a "positive conference" of the Parties.

In agreeing that such a Conference could be held, it was explicitly recognized that this could only discuss and decide on measures to help accelerate the ratification process to enable the treaty to enter into force. The positive Conference would not have the possibility of waiving the EIF provisions to allow the treaty to enter-into-force or allowing provisional EIF. It should be noted that the Amendment procedure of the treaty can only be used AFTER the treaty has entered into force, so this offers no solution.

3. The Positive Conference

Although the "positive" Conference cannot take decisions to get around the blockage caused by a failure to ratify by one or more countries included in the EIF list (and thus is insufficient to address the fundamental concern), it still is a useful contribution to the treaty.

By providing an explicit platform for multilateral discussion of and decisions on initiatives to speed-up the ratification process, the need for ratification by key countries can be addressed in a structured fashion. This can be contrasted with the CWC, for example, which has no formal mechanism to deal with the reality that it is still struggling to get the requisite number of ratifications five years after being opened for signature. The CTBT ratification discussions themselves, as well as any decisions agreed to (the requirement is for consensus), will have a significant political impact.

The fundamental obstacle remains, however, if the EIF formula remains as it is, the "positive" Conference offers no solution to allow the treaty to enter into force until such time as all the listed countries ratify.

4. Comment

The position of the United Kingdom and Russia (especially) are difficult to fathom. Together with the United States, these countries are the depositaries of the NPT, which entered into force with only three of the five Nuclear Weapon States (France and China did not join the NPT until much later). Despite the treaty's manifold weaknesses and that of the regime it helped foster (especially on specific progress towards nuclear disarmament), the NPT's swelling membership did help build an international norm against nuclear non-proliferation in a way that could never have been achieved had the treaty not entered into force for many years.

The EIF formula included in the final draft CTBT, creates the possibility that the treaty may not enter into force for many years, if ever. If the concern is really related to India's nuclear capability and the possibility for it to test, surely this is best addressed through bringing a CTBT into force as soon as possible with a broad a membership as possible ? The positions of the United Kingdom and Russia on this point must surely beg the question of whether or not they really do want a CTBT, or whether they just wish to blame a 'failure' to secure one on someone else...

Simon Carroll monitors the CTBT negotiations for Greenpeace and can be contacted at Greenpeace International
(phone: +31.20.523.62.22 and fax: +31.20.523.62.00.).