Greenpeace CTBT Updates
Updates from the Conference on Disarmament
9th June 1996
An important address at Thursday's Plenary meeting was the
statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang of China in which he set
out his country's current position on scope and peaceful nuclear
explosions, entry-into-force, aspects of the preamble and the
trigger mechanism for on-site inspections.
Meanwhile, the work of the ad hoc Committee on the Nuclear
Test Ban has proceeded largely through a new mechanism of
'Moderator Groups' dealing with the major outstanding issues
such as composition of the Executive Council, international
monitoring system and international data centre, preamble and
review, entry into force and on-site inspections. Depending on
the issue, work has variously utilised the Chairman's draft CTBT
text and also the Rolling Text.
The five Nuclear Weapon States continue with their private
discussions on the major issues, but have not yet reached
agreement amongst themselves.
1. Scope
The only significant new development on scope this week came
on Thursday in China's statement to the Plenary, where they
suggested a compromise related to so-called 'peaceful nuclear
explosions' (PNEs). China had been discussing the proposal
informally for some time, but had not made any formal proposal.
Although variously interpreted as major development, the
statement did NOT commit China to the true zero-yield option,
originally formulated by Australia and included in the Chairman's
draft CTBT text.
China’s indication that it could accept a temporary ban on
PNEs provided that a specific provision is included in the treaty
to require the possibility of permitting these in future, is to
be considered by a Review Conference of the Parties (provision
is made for a first conference to review the treaty ten years
after it enters-into-force, with further review conferences at
ten-yearly intervals thereafter).
It is important to note that China stated that only AFTER
consensus was reached on its proposal for reviewing PNEs,
would China be in a position to "favourably consider" the
Australian proposal on scope.
While China's proposal is regarded by many as a 'face-saver',
opposition to a specific reference to PNEs in the review remains
strong, especially in the absence of a formal commitment yet to
the Australian scope proposal. As review article in the
Chairman's draft CTBT text, would allow any aspect of the treaty
to be raised at a review conference, there seems to be no need
for a specific provision for PNEs for China, and by including
such a provision, PNEs would be given a too prominent status in
the treaty.
2. Preamble and Review
The Moderator Group's discussion on Preamble and Review has
seen vehement exchanges on the use of the Chairman's draft
CTBT text and the Rolling Text.
2.1 Preamble
China, Pakistan and India are reportedly unhappy with the
extent to which disarmament issues are reflected in the
Chairman's draft text. Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski of
Poland also mentioned in Thursday's Plenary that the
Chairman's draft CTBT text could be improved by
"...Preamble language that is perhaps less timid about the
non-proliferation content of the CTBT".
China has indicated on Thursday that it agrees to withdraw
its proposal for an article on negative security
assurances, but "insists" that this idea be reflected in
the Preamble.
2.2 Review
Reportedly, there is a lack of willingness to discuss the
provisions of the review article until there is more
clarity in what will be included in the preamble.
As noted above, China's proposal in Plenary was to have a
special provision included in the review on the question of
PNEs. However, the exact nature of the provision it is
proposing remains unclear. From China's speech, it would
appear to be proposing that a decision on PNEs would be
taken by consensus and that some details on developing
procedures for PNEs would need to be incorporated.
3. Verification
The Moderator Group discussions on the international monitoring
system and the international data centre (IMS/IDC) are being
based on the Chairman's text with minor details being worked
upon.
The triggering mechanism for on-site inspection (OSI), especially
the role of national technical means (NTMs) of verification
remain problematic. Although Pakistan, India and China have
accepted that technical data obtained through NTMs can be
introduced in support of an OSI, they wish to see agreement
needed by a two-thirds majority of the Executive Council before
an OSI could be initiated. The United States is equally opposed
to having to get a simple majority go-ahead from the Executive
Could before initiating an OSI. Something along the lines of the
provisions contained in the Chairman's draft CTBT text appear to
be an appropriate middle-way.
Some outstanding difficulties remain with the provisions on
managed access and overflights which could result in further
weakening from the Chairman's draft CTBT text.
4. Entry-into-Force
This remains a deeply problematic issue. The United Kingdom,
Russia and China continue to insist that whatever formula is
used, there needs to be an explicit requirement for ratification
by all 5 nuclear weapons states and the three 'threshold states'
before the treaty can enter-into-force. Other countries, are
concerned about having the treaty "held hostage" to the
ratification of a state or group of states and also in formally
recognising threshold states as such in an international
instrument. These countries still favour a simple numerical
formula.
With the basic provisions remaining deeply divided, the 37 states
identified in the Chairman's draft text continues to be explored
in the hope of some compromise. Three suggestions have been
made to get around the problem of the treaty being held hostage:
1. a waiver provision, whereby even if one or more of the 37
states did not ratify within a given time-frame, those
States which have ratified could bring the treaty into
force anyway;
2. a provisional entry into force for those Parties who have
ratified after a certain interval (necessary for the
establishment of the IMS/IDC etc.);
3. a "positive conference" of the Parties, again after a
period has elapsed after the treaty is opened for
signature, which would discuss and decide on measures to
help enable the treaty to enter into force (but without the
possibility of amending the EIF provisions to allow the
treaty to enter-into-force).
China and Russia strongly oppose a waiver provision, and the
provisional entry into force has no gained much support. The
third option appears to offer some hope for a compromise, but
still leaves the problem of having the treaty's entry-into-force
being blocked by one or more of the 37 states listed in the
Chairman's draft.
5. Adoption of the CTBT
Support appears to be growing for a determined effort to conclude
the CTBT by the end of June - something that appears now to be
eminently achievable. China's speech also indicated its support
for completion of the CTBT by the end of June (a position that
had been stated previously outside of the formal negotiations).
With work on the composition of the Executive Council
continuing
to address details of the number and distribution of seats, the
key outstanding problems appear to remain:
China's position on scope (incl. PNEs);
the division between the USA on the one-hand, and Pakistan,
China and India on the other, on the triggering of an on-
site inspection;
managed access and overflights;
entry-into-force.
This latter issue is the one where agreement seems furthest away.
Away from the Conference a number of events that could impact
on the concluding weeks of work include: China's latest nuclear
test - its 44th (and just one fewer than the United Kingdom)
which has provoked protests around the world; whether or not
the United States will proceed to conduct the first of its 'sub-
critical experiments' and the vote of confidence in the new Indian
government.
Simon Carroll monitors the CTBT negotiations for Greenpeace
and can be contacted at phone:
+41.21.728.52.25
or via
Greenpeace International at phone: +31.20.523.62.79 or at fax:
+31.20.523.62.00.
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