Greenpeace Briefing on CTBT Negotiations
Special Update,
21st June 1996

There were three developments of special significance emerging from Thursday's meetings in Geneva. These were:

1. a statement by India to the Plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament;

2. a discussion in the open-ended Bureau meeting of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) proposal presented by China on 18 June;

3. the presentation to the open-ended Bureau meeting of a new proposal on Entry-into-Force (EIF) from the Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on the Nuclear Test Ban (Ambassador Jaap Ramaker).

Although some delegates considered that Ambassador Ramaker might introduce a revised Chairman's text this week, this no longer appears likely. Expectation is growing that this new text will be introduced Monday.

1. Statement by India

In its speech, India was highly critical of what it sees as weaknesses in the present draft treaty, particularly with respect to nuclear disarmament and entry-into-force. However, India did NOT give a final position on whether it would sign a CTBT or not, merely that it could not be expected to accept the current package and that it "cannot subscribe to it in its present form". India gave no indication that it would 'walk-out' of the negotiations.

The main thrust of the speech was that "India cannot accept any restraints on its [nuclear] capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons". India frequently referred to the continued reliance on nuclear weapons by the Nuclear Weapon States, ongoing nuclear weapons co-operation, and the resources being spent on R&D and refinement and further development of arsenals. India noted that the Nuclear Weapon States had worked so that the CTBT seems to be "shaped more by [their] technological preferences... rather than the imperatives of nuclear disarmament".

India appeared to dismiss the notion of taking up its concerns on nuclear disarmament by strengthening the Preamble (i.e. "Weak and woefully inadequate preambular references to nuclear disarmament such as those contained in Working Paper 330 cannot meet our concerns. We are only too aware that non-binding references in other treaties have been treated with complete disregard."). However, the possibility of strengthening the Preamble is left open. In this respect, it is interesting to note that some of the same themes concerning nuclear disarmament were also taken up by Iran later in the Plenary, although in a somewhat less emphatic manner. Thus Iran specifically pointed to more precise and stronger provisions of the Preamble as being a possible solution to its concerns.

Ambassador Ghose also addressed the question of Entry-into-Force and the emphasis placed by some countries (United Kingdom, China, Russia and Pakistan) on India's ratification as a prerequisite for EIF. India said that it "would not accept any language in the Treaty text which would affect our sovereign right to decide, in the light of our supreme national interest, whether we should or should not accede to such a treaty".

Evaluation:

While India's statement reinforces the already strong concerns about whether or India will ultimately sign and ratify the CTBT, it does not seem to erect any fundamental barriers to completion of the CTBT per se. A final decision on signature of the CTBT by India would not appear to have been taken yet by New Delhi. India will continue to participate in the talks, and strengthening of the Preambular references to disarmament could go some way towards addressing India's concerns. The need to have a CTBT that WILL enter into force quickly and as broadly as possible, reiterates the importance of an EIF provision that is flexible and cannot be held hostage by the failure of one State or group of States to sign and ratify the Treaty.

2. Entry-into-Force (EIF)

The 'Moderator' on EIF (Amb. de Icaza of Mexico) submitted his report on the afternoon of June 18th. This did not highlight one EIF option that might attain consensus, but presented a range of options that essentially provided for everything from a simple requirement of ratification by any 65 States, to a range of lists with or without waivers or some means of seeking to achieve EIF even if the EIF requirements had not been met.

At the open-ended Bureau meeting on Thursday afternoon, Ambassador Ramaker presented a paper containing a new EIF proposal. This - extremely complex - formula takes elements from a number of the competing proposals identified by the Moderator on June 18th and combines them.

The proposal consists of several stages and is quite complex. My understanding is that the proposal is as follows:

1. After at least two years has elapsed from the treaty being made open for signature, it may enter into force provided that it has been ratified by the 37 States having the primary seismic stations or radionuclide laboratories as originally proposed in the Chair's draft CTBT text (this includes the 5 NWS and Pakistan, India, and Israel).

2. However, after five years have elapsed and if all members of the 37 have not yet ratified, new possibilities for EIF are provided. Namely:

(a) that if a total of 75 States have ratified, the CTBT could automatically enter into force;

(b) one or more States which have ratified may call for a conference on EIF. This conference can decide by two-thirds of those States who have ratified to allow the CTBT to enter into force, even if the requirements in '1' and '2(a)' have not been met. In this situation, a State that has already ratified but voted against EIF at the conference, or a State that ratifies after the conference, can opt out with a national declaration, until some or all of the 37 States identified in '1' have ratified.

Russia and the United Kingdom were highly critical of the proposal and did not wish to discuss it. Other countries believe that, while not ideal, it may be a workable compromise, perhaps with a few refinements.

Evaluation:

This proposal would allow the treaty to enter into force without all the NWS and threshold States having ratified. While it places a premium on the membership of the 5 NWS and the three 'threshold' States, it would not allow any of these to 'hold the treaty hostage'. As such, it is consistent with Greenpeace's objective, that is to have a truly comprehensive test-ban treaty enter into force at the earliest opportunity.

3. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)

The open-ended Bureau meeting also discussed the Chinese proposal for a new Article 2 on PNEs that it had presented on Tuesday (see earlier update for details).

China's proposal reportedly received support from Russia and, to a lesser extent, from Iran. Western delegations and Mexico were opposed to the proposal with varying degrees of firmness, quite a few saying that any inclusion of a specific reference to PNEs in the treaty was unnecessary or dangerous. Some countries, including Germany, held out the prospect of a amended text being included within the Article on Review. China insisted that there be a specific reference to PNEs in the Treaty as a condition of its signing the CTBT, but appears to be flexible on wording and location of the provision.

Evaluation: China's proposal for inclusion of a specific PNE article as Article 2 and with the 'automatic' review provision it included, appears to be unacceptable to almost everyone. Apart from China, Russia and to some extent Iran, the preferred option remains that the issue is not addressed at all, or that China takes the issue up as a declaration separate from the Treaty. A reluctant compromise by some countries, may be to concede inclusion of a much amended proposal in the Review Article, but only as a last resort in order to ensure that China joins the Treaty.

Simon Carroll monitors the CTBT negotiations for Greenpeace and can be contacted at:

+41.21.728.52.25 or mobile phone: +41.79.213.70.67

or via Greenpeace International phone:

+31.20.523.62.22 or fax: +31.20.523.62.00.