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Greenpeace Briefing on CTBT Negotiations
Special Update,
24th June 1996

There were two important developments arising from Monday's meeting of the ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban (NTB):

1. Presentation by the Chair of the NTB Committee, Amb. Ramaker, of a paper containing amendments to the Chairman's draft CTBT text [CD/NTB/WP.335] (the original Chairman's draft text was presented on May 28 [CD/NTB/WP.330]);

2. A joint declaration by 18 States, calling for the negotiations to be concluded by June 28.

1. Chairman's "Amendments Paper"

Instead of presenting a complete revised draft Chairman's text as some had expected, Ambassador Ramaker tabled a paper containing only Amendments to his original draft text. While this paper indicates progress in refining or agreeing certain provisions of the draft CTBT, it also highlights the failure to reach accord on several key provisions.

Most significantly, there has been no agreement yet on the formula for Entry-into-Force (EIF), nor on the decision-making procedure for triggering an On-Site Inspection (OSI). Neither of these two issues are therefore covered in the Amendments paper, and negotiations on these provisions continue, based on the provisions of the original Chairman's draft CTBT text.

    The Amendments paper included changes to:
  • the Preamble;
  • the Organisation, including the Executive Council composition and functions;
  • Verification;
  • some measures related to On-Site Inspection (OSI), including provisions related to frivolous or abusive OSI requests;
  • the Review of the CTBT, in particular as related to Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs);
  • the International Monitoring System (IMS) and the functions of the International Data Centre (IDC)
  • the detailed tables concerning the IMS stations.

    Below, the following issues are addressed:
  • Entry-into-Force (EIF);
  • On-Site Inspection (OSI);
  • Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs);
  • the Preamble.

1.1 Entry-into-Force (EIF)

The Amendment's paper contained nothing on Entry-into-Force, as there has been no agreement on this issue and it remains one of the two most divisive problems confronting completion of the CTBT.

The EIF provision included in the Chairman's draft CTBT, required ratification by ALL 37 States who had a primary seismic monitoring station or a radionuclide laboratory on their territory as part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) BEFORE the CTBT could enter into force -- with NO exceptions. This list of 37 was designed to include the five official Nuclear Weapon States and India, Pakistan and Israel.

The lack of any 'safety' provision for bringing the Treaty into force if any one country on the list of 37 fails to ratify, has created considerable concern that the Treaty might never enter into force, or at least could be considerably delayed. Effectively, all 37 countries have an open-ended veto on whether there will ever be a CTBT. Attention has increasingly focused on India, especially following its statement to the Plenary on Thursday (20 June), where it said that it "would not accept any language in the Treaty text which would affect our sovereign right to decide, in the light of our supreme national interest, whether we should or should not accede to such a treaty".

The solution to this problem is clear: ensure that no one country or group of countries could ever block entry into force. The best way to do this - and the "normal" mechanism used in multilateral treaties, is for a treaty to enter into force once a certain number of countries have ratified, while using political mechanisms (rather than legal ones) to ensure that states considered critical to the viability of the regime also join. Other common 'safety' mechanisms, include provisional entry into force or some form of waiver. The vast majority of participants in the CTBT negotiations favour such an approach.

However, four countries continue to resist any and all initiatives to introduce any flexibility into the EIF formula, that could allow the CTBT to come into force if one country listed does not ratify - these countries are: the UNITED KINGDOM, RUSSIA, CHINA, and PAKISTAN. Their stance on EIF brings into question whether or not these countries really want a CTBT at all.

Last week, Ambassador Ramaker presented a paper containing a new EIF proposal. This - rather complex - formula seeks to find a compromise from the irreconcilable positions of the two camps. Essentially, Ramaker's proposal would place 'a premium' on ratification by ALL 37 countries on the list (with no exceptions), by making this the 'fast track' for entry into force. However, there is a 'safety mechanism' whereby, after five years, the treaty can be brought into force anyway, either if a sufficient number of countries (75) ratify, or if a decision is reached to waive some of the EIF requirements.

There is an additional concession - any country particularly concerned about ratification by any one or more countries in the list of 37, can be exempted from the CTBT up until the original requirements of all 37 ratifications are met. This compromise proposal -- although eminently sensible - was not included as an amendment to the original proposal because it was rejected outright by the United Kingdom, Russia, China and Pakistan.

Evaluation:

The hard-line positions of the UNITED KINGDOM, RUSSIA, CHINA, and PAKISTAN, brings into question whether or not these countries really want a CTBT at all. Unless these countries modify their stance now, it may be impossible to agree a CTBT by the end of June. Ramaker's proposal from last week is the basis of a sensible compromise. This, or any other formula which would allow the treaty to enter into force without necessarily having ALL the NWS and ALL 'threshold' States having ratified, is the only way out that will ensure a CTBT enters into force.

Such an approach is also consistent with Greenpeace's objective to have a truly comprehensive test-ban treaty enter into force at the earliest opportunity.

1.2 On-Site Inspection (OSI)

Similarly, nothing is included in the Amendments Paper on the decision-making mechanism for triggering an OSI. The provisions included in the original Chairman's text thus still stand as the basis for negotiations, but are not acceptable to the United States on the one hand, and China, India and Pakistan (in particular) on the other.

Reportedly, over the weekend, informal and private discussions amongst the five Nuclear Weapon States have lead to a suggestion that an acceptable formula for the 'trigger' could be a three-fifths majority vote in favour of an OSI (i.e. a Green light procedure) of the Executive Council present and voting.

Evaluation: Such a compromise proposal should be acceptable in that it takes into account the concerns of the United States that procedural barriers should create a stumbling block for the initiation of an OSI, and those of other countries who do not want to be subjected to frivolous or abusive challenges for inspections.

1.3 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)

Last week, China has proposed including a new Article 2 on PNEs that Russia has supported, but that most countries rejected. The Chairman's compromise, included in the Amendments Paper was to incorporate elements of the Chinese proposal in the general Review article.

Evaluation:

It is a positive step that China's proposal for inclusion of a specific PNE article as Article 2 has not been taken up. The inclusion of the Chinese proposal in the review article as proposed in the Amendments Paper has some good and some bad aspects.

On the 'good' side, in addition to there being no separate article, it is made clear that there is also no exception to the Scope article (article 1) and that PNEs are completely prohibited. In addition, there is a two-step process: firstly, agreement in the Review Conference must be reached by consensus only, and then any proposal would have to go through the complex amendment procedure.

However, on the bad side, the explicit reference to PNEs and the 'automatic' nature of the review of PNEs at the Review Conference is unnecessary given the broad scope of the Review envisaged anyway. Moreover, the explicit reference to possible amendment of the CTBT to allow for PNEs is likely to encourage continued research into this area. Further amendments to this passage are highly desirable to reflect the opposition of almost all participants to any possibility of PNEs.

1.4 The Preamble

Some minor changes were made to the Preamble, apparently primarily aimed at amending or deleting passages with a view to recognising changes caused by, on the one hand, the Chinese opposition to prohibiting PNEs and, on the other, India's concerns.

Evaluation: These amendments do not appear to significantly alter the Preamble. By failing to add better disarmament language, the primary concerns of India (and others) are still unlikely to have been adequately addressed.

2. Declaration

The Declaration presented on Monday expressed the "deep concern" of a significant group of delegations that "there exist fundamental challenges to the successful conclusion by June 28" of the CTBT negotiations. The delegations called on all participants to "take the necessary political decisions" to enable the negotiations to reach conclusion and emphasised that "no one state or group of states should seek to thwart that conclusion". The delegations regretted that "many delegations have to date not been willing to make the compromises vital to success" and called upon all delegations for co-operation and compromise. They affirmed their commitment to work with the Chairman so as to ensure that the negotiations produce an effective CTBT by June 28.

The Declaration was signed by Chile, Switzerland, Canada, Austria, Poland, Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, New Zealand, Australia, Slovakia, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Italy, Japan, Spain, and Belgium.

Simon Carroll monitors the CTBT negotiations for Greenpeace and can be contacted at: +41.21.728.52.25 and mobile phone: +41.79.213.70.67 or via Greenpeace International (phone: +31.20.523.62.22 or at fax: +31.20.523.62.00.).