Greenpeace Briefing on CTBT Negotiations
Special Update,
25th June 1996

The main developments of the day were:

the strongly-worded speech by PAKISTAN in which it highlighted why it considers it essential that all 5 NWS and India, Pakistan and Israel must ratify the treaty before it can enter-into-force;

movement on Entry-into-Force by the UNITED STATES and, possibly, also CHINA;

a new compromise proposal by CANADA, amending the Chairman's revised Review article as it relates to PNEs.

1. Ad Hoc Committee

1.1 Entry-into-Force

The UNITED STATES indicated that it could accept a number of proposals on EIF - a simple number including the 5 Nuclear Weapons States; a formula with a simple waiver; a formula with a complex waiver. Most importantly, the UNITED STATES stressed that it could NOT support the formula contained in the original Chairman's text which explicitly required a list of 37 countries (now 39 after the Chairman's Amendments) including the 5 NWS and Israel, Pakistan and India to ratify before the treaty could enter-into-force. This was explicitly related to the Indian speech from June 20, and confirms that the UNITED STATES does not want to see the Treaty's entry-into-force to be held hostage by a failure of one or more of the 'threshold' States to ratify.

Reportedly Ambassador Sha of CHINA indicated to journalists that CHINA could "reluctantly" accept the complex EIF proposal presented by Ambassador Ramaker on June 20. This would be a major shift in position, although no such statement was made to the ad hoc Committee itself.

PAKISTAN, the UNITED KINGDOM and RUSSIA have not changed their positions, continuing to insist on a rigid formula requiring all 5 NWS and Pakistan, India and Israel to ratify before the treaty could enter-into-force.

In its Plenary speech, INDONESIA indicated that, while it was aware of the need for all nuclear weapon and nuclear capable states to become Parties in order for the CTBT to be effective, a mechanism should be developed OUTSIDE of the treaty to deal with this to prevent the treaty being "taken hostage by a small number of states".

1.2 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

CANADA, in a statement supported by EGYPT, SOUTH AFRICA, JAPAN, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND and ARGENTINA, reiterated its "deeply-held opposition" to PNEs and expressed its deep regret at the inclusion in the Chairman's Amendments of PNEs in the Review article of the CTBT.

Apart from Canada's general opposition to PNEs, three fundamental problems were identified with the Chairman's amended Review article. That it presumes that the Review Conference SHALL consider the possibility of permitting PNEs in 10 years time; that the Review Conference will 'automatically' consider PNEs "unless it decides otherwise" without defining how this could be decided; and, most importantly, its reference to obligations of States Parties under other international instruments that create uncertainty and perhaps even a legal loophole for States could conduct PNEs. Mindful of the insistence of China and the short time left to conclude the CTBT, rather than insist on deletion of the entire reference to PNEs, Canada "reluctantly" proposed amendments to the Review Article to take into account its main concerns. With Canada's changes, the relevant section would now read:

On the basis of a request from any State Party, the Review Conference shall decide by consensus whether to consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference so decides, it shall direct the Conference to commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions. Any such proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General by any State Party and dealt with in accordance of the provisions of Article II of this Treaty.

The significance of these changes is that: a State must make a specific request for PNEs to be addressed by the Review Conference; PNEs will only be addressed by the Review Conference if the Conference agrees by consensus; and any amendment must then be formally submitted by a State and go through the formal (and complex) amendment procedure [art. VII].

CHINA did not respond to this proposal.

It would preferable that the CTBT contained no explicit reference to the possibility of PNEs whatsoever. Given the lack of support for China's proposal, the earlier Canadian suggestion that it should be sufficient for CHINA to make a declaration outside of the Treaty seems more appropriate. However, the Canadian amendments would reduce the emphasis given to PNEs and the hurdles to their consideration by the Review Conference are not inconsiderable. In addition, the formal amendment procedure would require a decision to convene an Amendment Conference (something which can only be convened if a majority of the States Parties agree to hold such a Conference within 30 days of being notified of a proposal). Amendments can then only be adopted by a majority vote in support the amendment AND provided that NO State casts a negative vote against the amendment.

In its Plenary statement, INDONESIA reiterated its opposition to allowing PNEs under the CTBT. Pointing to the lack of necessity for any specific mention of PNEs, it indicated that any State Party can put forward any relevant issue to the Review Conference.

1.3 On-Site Inspection

CHINA essentially reiterated its concerns, including the timelines for OSI, the use of National Technical Means (NTMs), and the voting on triggering an OSI.

The UNITED STATES reiterated many of its concerns also. For example, on NTMs, it proposed amendments which would reinstate the original wording of the Chairman's draft, to replace the amended version which was more sensitive to the concerns expressed by China, India and Pakistan. It proposed that an OSI request could be based on any relevant information, including that obtained by NTMs. It reiterated its view that a decision on OSI should be taken by a simple majority of members of the Executive Council present and voting. New proposals include a provision for a "quorum" of two- thirds of the Executive Council to be present for a decision to be made; and a proposal that, for an OSI request, the State requesting an OSI and the State sought to be inspected may vote on the decision if they are members of the Executive Council.

In its Plenary speech PAKISTAN stated its position on OSI as requiring a minimum two-thirds majority vote to trigger an OSI; that NTMs can only be used with severe restraints and conditions; and that security concerns not related to the CTBT must be respected.

INDONESIA, in its Plenary speech, indicated that while it agreed that OSI should be based solely on IMS data, that a compromise could lie in a simple majority vote for an OSI requested purely on IMS data and in a two-thirds majority vote for a request based on NTMs and not corroborated by the IMS. It also stressed that decisions should be taken collectively, that initiating an inspection should be done expeditiously so that time-sensitive data would not be lost, and that it considered that concerns about possible abuse had been taken care of adequately.

1.4 Preamble

BRAZIL, CUBA, INDONESIA, IRAN, KENYA, MEXICO, MONGOLIA, PAKISTAN, PERU, SRI LANKA, NIGERIA, MYANMAR and VENEZUELA proposed a number of additions to the Preamble, mainly concerning references to ending the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, further steps towards nuclear disarmament, and describing elements of the Preamble as 'purposes and objectives' of the CTBT. Reference was also made to the aspirations of the Parties to the PTBT to end all nuclear test explosions and the desire to end radioactive contamination.

The discussion on preventing environmental contamination was raised again in connection with the proposal referring to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), with Germany objecting to the phrase used, reportedly "because Greenpeace will use this to protest about peaceful uses of nuclear energy". It was suggested to refer back to the original proposal from the Rolling Text on environment, but France continues to oppose this.

In its Plenary statement, PAKISTAN referred to its proposal for a 'purposes and objectives' section to be included in the Preamble, and urged that this be considered again as a way to address the “shortcoming's" of the Scope article and to respond to the aspiration for nuclear disarmament.

In its Plenary statement, INDONESIA stressed that the preambular part of the treaty should at the least encompass two fundamental objectives: to curb any form of nuclear weapons proliferation in all its aspects, and to serve as a basis for the pursuit of the objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons. It also suggested that a solemn declaration by the nuclear weapon states not to engage in the further, qualitative improvement of their nuclear weapons and that this could help ratification.

2. Plenary Presentations

In addition to the points noted in the various sections above, INDONESIA described the "CTBT constitutes the litmus test for the willingness of states to halt the nuclear arms race and to pursue nuclear disarmament". It described the situation now as "we are now racing against time" and called for increased flexibility on critical issues. It questioned whether "the maintenance of [the NWS] individual and strategic postures as well as their status as NWS has taken precedence over their commitment to total abstention from nuclear weapon tests." It also stressed the importance of meeting the deadline of the end of June.

In addition to the points noted above, PAKISTAN highlighted what it saw as the limitations of the CTBT likely to emerge from the negotiations. These included: the continuation of sub-critical and laboratory tests and the possibility to use these to improve existing nuclear weapons; the possibility of conducting very low-yield tests or hydronuclear tests in breach of the treaty because of the verification limitations; the lack of commitment from the NWS to halt qualitative improvement and make specific disarmament commitments; the possible abuse of OSIs; and NTMs. The actual recent conduct of the negotiations - with the 5 NWS meeting in private - was also cause for concern. It expressed, however, that it would NOT give up on the treaty, and that it would NOT say 'no' to the CTBT. This is because it saw a CTBT banning all nuclear explosions as being to valuable to lose both from a perspective of constraining further development of nuclear weapons and preventing non-proliferation. It expressed that it was 'extremely disturbed' by India's declaration that it could not sign unless its concerns were met - describing this as premature and as a possible 'death-knell' for the treaty. It expressed opposition to a role of the UN Security Council in enforcement of compliance with the CTBT.

3. Other Issues

Declaration - at least two more countries, in addition to the 18 listed yesterday, have signed on to the declaration urging compromise so that the CTBT can be completed on schedule. These are: IRELAND, FINLAND.

Simon Carroll monitors the CTBT negotiations for Greenpeace and can be contacted at:

+41.21.728.52.25 and mobile phone: +41.79.213.70.67

or

via Greenpeace International (phone: +31.20.523.62.22 and fax: +31.20.523.62.00.).