Greenpeace Briefing on CTBT Negotiations
Special Update,
30th June 1996

This update summarizes developments on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament at the end of the second part of its 1996 session. It includes key passages from the revised Chairman's text of a CTBT (CD/NTB/WP.330/Rev.1) and considers the procedure to be followed now and at the opening of the third part of the 1996 session on 29 July.

In particular, the following components of the revised Chairman's text are considered below:-

• Scope;
• Preamble and Review;
• Verification (including On-Site Inspection);
• Entry-into-Force.

1. Scope

The provisions on the scope of the CTBT are presented in Article I entitled 'Basic Obligations'. This article remains unchanged from the Chairman's draft text (CD/NTB/WP.330), and encapsulates the "zero-yield" CTBT option -- banning all nuclear explosions whether for military or peaceful purposes and irrespective of the size of the detonation -- through the original Australian proposal. This is the 'heart' of a CTBT, and with this article the treaty would bring an end to all nuclear testing.

In full, the Article reads as follows:

ARTICLE I: BASIC OBLIGATIONS

1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

Despite concerns expressed at the limited scope of the prohibition (i.e. because it does not address activities like laboratory testing), no-one has recommended specific changes to this article, but have tended to concentrate on the Preamble.

2. Preamble and Review

The Preamble and provisions for the Review of the CTBT were changed from those presented in the original Chairman's draft text of 28 May.

In the Preamble, the changes essentially reflect those included in the Amendments to the Chairman's draft text (CD/NTB/WP.335). The Preamble includes: a 'declaration' of the intention to take further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament; an expression of the need for 'continued systematic and progressive efforts' to reduce nuclear weapons, including the goal of their elimination; a recognition that a ban on nuclear weapon test explosion and other nuclear explosions (i.e. including PNEs) will constrain 'the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons' and end 'the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons'; an acknowledgement that the CTBT will be a meaningful step towards nuclear disarmament; a reference to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT); and to the need for universality of adherence to a CTBT. In addition, it includes a -- weak --reference to the environmental protection obtained from prohibiting nuclear testing (stronger references to the environment were blocked by Germany and France).

In the Review article (Article VIII), changes are included from the Chairman's Amendments which emphasize the Preamble in the context of the Review of the CTBT. The Review is thus required to consider if 'the objectives and purposes in the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized'. This goes some way in incorporating the concerns of - for example - India and Pakistan.

In addition, upon China's insistence and other's acquiesence, a reference is included relating to Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs). The reference to PNEs included in the Chairman's Amendments has been altered to reflect the changes proposed by Canada and supported by many States. These explicitly require that for PNEs to be considered, a State Party has to propose their review (i.e. a review of PNEs is no longer automatic) and that the Conference has to agree to the proposal for a review by consensus. Any subsequent proposed amendment to the treaty would require application of the formal amendment procedure.

On PNEs, the relevant section of the Review article would now read:

On the basis of a request from any State Party, the Review Conference shall decide by consensus whether to consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference so decides, it shall direct the Conference to commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions. Any such proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General by any State Party and dealt with in accordance of the provisions of Article VII of this Treaty.

Lastly, it should be noted that while there will be an annual Conference of the Parties, the Review Conferences shall take place only every ten years, provided that a preceding Conference of the Parties so decides.

3. Verification

The verification 'package' consists of the International Monitoring System (IMS), the International Data Centre (IDC) and national initiatives, together with the related administrative and decision-making provisions, assigned tasks and procedures of the Treaty.

The IMS consists of the four monitoring networks (seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide and infrasound). Some technical changes have been made (including the addition of Italy and New Zealand to the list of radionuclide laboratories). The main development though relates to the previous link between IMS stations and the entry-into-force provisions (no longer a component of the revised draft CTBT), and the consequent withdrawal by India of all its IMS stations. These are now reflected by "to be determined" in the lists annexed to the IMS protocol to the treaty.

The IDC will produce standard reports based on IMS data. These will include: unscreened data lists and bulletins; standard screened event bulletins; summaries; and special in-depth studies for individual States Parties.

With respect to On-Site Inspections (OSI), the Chairman's text addresses the use of national technical means of verification (NTMs) and the decision-making procedure to be followed. An OSI request may be based on: IMS data; 'any relevant technical information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law'; or any combination of the two. Decisions on initiating and continuing an OSI are required to be taken by a simple majority vote of all members of the 51 state Executive Council.

4. Entry-into-Force

The Entry-into-Force provisions are completely different to those of the earlier version of the Chairman's draft Treaty. Instead of being based upon IMS-related criteria, the new EIF formula is based on a combination of membership of the Conference on Disarmament and on nuclear technology-related capability.

Very unfortunately any State whose ratification is required for the Treaty to take effect has a complete veto on if and when the Treaty might enter-into-force. No exceptions are provided for. The 'new' EIF criterion is that the Treaty shall enter-into-force 180 days after the deposit of all countries listed in Annex 3 of the treaty with no exceptions. This list includes the five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Israel, Pakistan and India. The complete list is:

Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam, Zaire.

5. Process

The third part of the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament begins on July 29, and the decision on what to do with the Chairman's text will be taken there. Between now and the end of July therefore, it is essential that any remaining differences of opinion on the draft CTBT provisions be resolved between members of the Conference on Disarmament.

The process to be followed is, first, the adoption of a treaty text by the ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, second, the adoption of the text by the entire Conference on Disarmament, and the subsequent forwarding of the text to the United Nations Secretary-General in New York. Then the draft treaty will be put to the United Nations General Assembly for endorsement, before being opened up for signature at the outset of the 51st session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Even when the draft Chairman's text was laid down on Friday there was dissent and discussion as to whether or not the negotiations were over. The reality is that unless the Conference on Disarmament reconvenes on July 29 with ALL issues resolved, the fate of the treaty is in doubt.

Simon Carroll monitors the CTBT negotiations for Greenpeace and can be contacted at:

++41.21.728.52.25 until 2 June,

or via Greenpeace International (phone: +31.20.523.62.22 and fax: +31.20.523.62.00.).