EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Directorate-General XI
Luxembourg, 3.10.95
18-29 September 1995
1. Introduction
The verification visit was made as a result of concerns about the
resumption of French nuclear testing in French Polynesia. It
took place at very short notice, from 18-29 September, in
immediate response to the letters of Mr de Charette to
President Santer and Mr Barnier to Commissioner Bjerregaard dated
13 September 1995, confirming that the French
authorities were ready to welcome the experts of the
Commission for a verification visit to French Polynesia. Under
the terms of Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty the
purpose was to verify the operation and efficiency of the
environmental monitoring facilities installed by the competent
authorities.
The nuclear test sites are located at approximately 129
degrees W, 22 degrees S in the Pacific, thus lying towards the
eastern extremity of French Polynesia, of which the
capital, Papeete, is situated on the island of Tahiti, some 1200
km WNW; Pitcairn Island, the nearest territory of another Member
State (UK) lies some 800 km ESE.
The programme of the visit is given in Annex 1 and the
composition of the verification team and of the French
representation during the course of the visit is given in Annex
2.
2. Nature and Scope of the Environmental Monitoring
Provisions
Environmental surveillance in French Polynesia is carried out by
three separate organisations:
These organizations run laboratories and fixed monitoring
equipment and collect a range of samples of marine and
terrestrial foodstuffs, seawater and plankton.
OPRI operates:
All of the above locations are on Tahiti where in addition milk
and seawater samples are collected regularly on behalf of OPRI
by the Laboratoire d'Etude et de Surveillance (LESE) located at
Mahina. (Other environmental samples from
locations in French Polynesia are collected for the purposes of
specific monitoring campaigns.) Additionally mobile daily
aerosol monitoring equipment and a 6-monthly integrating gamma
dosemeter are operated on the atoll of Rangiro which is some 300
km NNE of Tahiti and about equidistant from Tahiti and Mururoa.
IPSN operates the LESE laboratory at Mahina. In addition to
operating a high-volume air sampler at Mahina (one sample over
a 10-day period but overnight operation only) LESE carries out
a regular sampling programme in the framework of the
Institute's worldwide network of foodstuffs sampling.
Further, a roughly equivalent number of biological samples along
with samples of sea-water are provided to IPSN by DIRCEN
independent of the latter's monitoring programme (see below).
Given the large distances and low population densities
involved, a few locations are taken to be representative of the
total area, typically (for 1993-94):
DIRCEN operates high volume air sampling, rain-water
collection and gamma dose-rate monitoring stations at Faaa and
at Mururoa. Biological samples in various archipelagos,
pelagic fish, and seawater from within the 12 mile limit of
territorial waters and seawater and sediments from the Mururoa
lagoon are taken and analysed in the Mururoa laboratory. No
positive information was received on any monitoring programme for
Fangataufa and no comprehensive overview of the DIRCEN sampling
programme was provided.
3. Installations Visited
The Commission's verification team visited most of the
installations installed by OPRI and IPSN. Access to the
facilities of DIRCEN at Mururoa and Fangataufa was not, or only
partially, granted.
For OPRI, all of the above-mentioned stations except Faaa, were
visited. The equipment is similar to that installed in OPRI
facilities in France. RESERVATIONS were entered with respect to
the fact that not all rainwater is sampled at
Mahina and as regards facilities at Rangiroa and at Vaina in that
they had only been installed immediately prior to the
verification visit. An ANOMALY was uncovered regarding the water
sample for the first 3-month period in 1995 which had not been
sent to OPRI and could not be traced.
APPRECIATION, the environmental surveillance is satisfactory from
the health point of view.
For IPSN, the verification of the local sampling agent's
activities at Rangiroa showed these to be satisfactory. A
RESERVATION was entered as regards the high volume air
samplers at Mahina which were used for overnight operation only;
continuous operation would be preferred. The LESE
laboratory at Mahina was found to be appropriate to the
detection limits required for the estimation of population
exposure. The archiving system is adequate but could be made
more accessible. Sampling collection procedures are
satisfactory.
APPRECIATION, satisfactory for the purpose of estimation of
population exposure.
For DIRCEN, high volume air sampling for atmospheric aerosols,
rainwater collection equipment and gamma doserate measurement
equipment are installed at Mururoa as is an apparently well-
equipped laboratory but verification was not permitted. Full
access was given to the vessel MARARA owned by DIRCEN but with
a civilian crew; it is used for sampling and conditioning, where
appropriate, sea-water at various depths, plankton, pelagic and
lagoon fish and crustacea and for collecting
terrestrial samples. The vessel is currently in dock at
Tahiti for programmed maintenance and engine replacement but this
did not affect the scheduled cruise programme for 1995. The
sampling equipment was shown and described but more
detailed technical questions could not be answered.
APPRECIATION, not possible due to limited access.
OVERALL APPRECIATION
The results of verification at OPRI and IPSN facilities are
satisfactory. Access was given to only part of the DIRCEN
facilities and where access was provided verification was denied.
It is the Commission's view that DIRCEN facilities are an
integral part of the environmental monitoring in French
Polynesia, in particular, since they permit a more accurate
evaluation of the source term of environmental contamination.
4. Access limited or refused
Access was limited or refused in respect of:
Additionally, no fresh information on these installations was
offered in the course of discussion.
5. Other issues addressed at Mururoa
Apart from environmental monitoring issues in the framework of
the verification visit, the Commission team also asked a
number of questions in particular with regard to the possible
dangerous character of the nuclear tests and possible
additional safety measures taken. Such questions pertained to
geological and hydrological aspects, long-term prospects,
exposures from atmospheric testing, follow-up of possible health
effects, restoration prospects, etc.
Information requested by the team on these matters was
generally denied and information provided did not go beyond that
previously available from the documentation received.
6. Conclusions
Verification activities outwith military establishments were
generally satisfactory and gave rise to no major observations
with regard to the reliable operation and the efficiency of the
facilities and the adequacy of the monitoring programmes.
However, verification of those facilities which were visited at
Mururoa was not allowed and access to the environmental
monitoring facilities at Fangataufa was totally denied.
Access was also denied to the facilities at Faa. Because of this
it is impossible to give an unreserved view on the
efficiency and adequacy of the overall surveillance system in
place.
Information requested, at Mururoa, by the team on a range of
matters was generally denied and did not go beyond that
previously available from the documentation received.
Annexe I - Programme completed by Team
Annexe II
Verification Team and Accompanying French Representatives
Please note:
Greenpeace has typed up the report as sending you the original
would immediately reveal the source of the leaked document. This
version of the report is EXACTLY the same wording as the
original.
SUMMARY REPORT OF VERIFICATION VISIT TO FRENCH POLYNESIA UNDER
THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 35 OF THE EURATOM TREATY
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Commission Verification Team:
A. Janssens (Team Leader) DG XI/C/1
M. Herzeele DG XI/C/1
I. Hall DG XI/C/1
Accompanying French Representatives:
M. Jean-Francois Lecomte (Secretariat du CTI) Chef de
Delegation
M. Jean Blanc (OPRI)
M. Daniel Robeau (IPSN)
French Representatives met on the spot:
Le General Vericel