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The
Biosafety Protocol
by Luke
Anderson August 2001
The
Biosafety Protocol is an agreement which is designed to regulate
the international trade, handling and uses of any genetically
engineered organism ‘that may have adverse effects on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity,
taking also into account risks to human health.’ (1)
A.
History of the Biosafety Protocol
B. Key provisions of the Biosafety Protocol
C. Ratification of the Biosafety Protocol
D.
Relationship between the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO
Conclusion
References
A.
History of the Biosafety Protocol
The
origins of the Biosafety Protocol are to be found in the UN
Convention on Biological Diversity, which was signed by over
150 governments at the Rio "Earth Summit" in 1992, and which
came into force in December 1993.
In
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), it was acknowledged
that releases of genetically engineered organisms (referred
to in the CBD as ‘Living Modified Organisms’) may have adverse
effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity. All countries that signed up to the CBD were expected
to:
a)
"Establish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control
the risks associated with the use and release of living modified
organisms resulting from biotechnology which are likely to
have adverse environmental impacts…taking also into account
the risks to human health." (2)
and
b)
"Consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting
out appropriate procedures… in the field of the safe transfer,
handling and use of any living modified organism resulting
from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity." (3)
To
this end, the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment
Programme set up an Expert Panel to consider the terms of
reference, scope and elements of a possible ‘Biosafety Protocol’.
The Panel concluded that a legally binding instrument was
needed as no other effective international biosafety agreements
were in existence, and in 1995, a formal working group was
established to develop a draft protocol.
This
working group met over the next four years, and then in February
1999, representatives from over 135 countries attended a meeting
in Cartagena, Colombia, where it was expected that an agreement
on a Biosafety Protocol would finally be reached. However,
despite consensus among the vast majority of delegates present
at the meeting, the negotiations collapsed because of a small
group of grain-exporting countries, led by the US, and including
Canada, Australia, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay.
The
tortuous process of reaching agreement
These
countries, which formed a powerful negotiating block called
the Miami Group, feared that a strong protocol would disrupt
their export markets. They tried, therefore, to force an agreement
in which most genetically engineered organisms (including
all those destined for use as food for humans and livestock)
would actually be excluded from the protocol.
They
also wanted any protocol to be subordinate to the rulings
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This move was vigorously
opposed, as a treaty specifically designed to protect biodiversity
would become meaningless if it were subordinate to the WTO,
which has consistently ruled against environmental protection
in favour of ‘free trade’.
The
US and its allies "came to the negotiations without any clear
will to move forward" said the then EU Environment Commissioner
Ritt Bjerregaard. "They wanted an agreement without any genuine
environmental credibility. It would have excluded agricultural
commodities, resulting in a liberalising of trade without
proper protection of developing countries." (4)
In
marked contrast to the position of the Miami Group, nearly
all the countries of the ‘Third World’ called for a strong
protocol, based on the precautionary principle, in which their
right to say no to imports of genetically engineered organisms
would be protected.
Because
most Third World countries have tropical environments, which
are rich in biological diversity, they are especially vulnerable
to genetic pollution. Most of the plants we now grow as food
crops originally came from the tropics – this means that when
crops are grown in tropical countries they are much more likely
to have related plants in the wild with which they can cross-pollinate.
In Central and South America, for example, there are hundreds
of indigenous varieties of tomato, and yet genetically engineered
‘FlavrSavr’ tomatoes were reportedly field-tested in countries
there without the knowledge or consent of the authorities.
(5)
Commenting
on the urgent need for a protocol, Tewolde Berhan Gebre Egziabher
(the head of the Ethiopian delegation who was also the spokesperson
for the largest negotiating group of over 100 countries, called
the ‘Like-Minded Group, which included most of the Third World
and also China) had this to say: "All technologies involve
risk. Since genetic engineering manipulates the basis of life,
the risks involved are more frightening than any other developed
so far. It is therefore essential for those of us who are
the poorest of the world, and thus most vulnerable, to require
a regime which assigns liability and ensures redress. We feel
it is unjust of the richest of the world to expect us to bear
the risks of their experimentation."(6)
Following
the collapse of the biosafety negotiations in Colombia, consultations
with delegates at a meeting of the Convention on Biological
Diversity in July 1999 confirmed that there was still the
political will among most countries to reach agreement on
a protocol. Informal talks were then held in September, and
preparations made for a new round of biosafety negotiations
which would take place in Montreal in January 2000.
Attempts
to subordinate biosafety to the WTO
One
more obstacle presented itself, however, at the meeting of
the World Trade Organisation in Seattle in November. Canada,
the US and Japan attempted to set up a ‘biotechnology working
group’ within the WTO. If this attempt had been successful,
it could have seriously undermined a Biosafety Protocol by
shifting the debate on genetically engineered organisms from
the Convention on Biological Diversity, where biosafety is
a priority, to the WTO, where ‘free trade’ considerations
overshadow all else.
Fortunately,
the biotechnology working group was opposed from the start.
When, for example, it emerged that Commissioner Pascal Lamy
(the lead trade negotiator for the EU) had voiced support
for the working party without consulting EU member states,
Environment Ministers from Denmark, the UK, Belgium, France
and Italy immediately issued a press advisory strongly objecting
to Lamy's position. (7)
In
the end, the attempt to set up a biotechnology working group
within the WTO had actually backfired – most countries left
Seattle angry at this poorly disguised attempt to subvert
nearly seven years of biosafety negotiations, and were strengthened
in their resolve to reach agreement on a protocol.
Agreement
finally reached in Montreal
Finally,
at 4am on the 29th of January 2000, after four
days and nights of intense negotiations in Montreal, 133 countries
reached agreement on a Biosafety Protocol. Under this Protocol,
all countries are legally bound to ensure that any development,
handling, transport, use, and release of genetically engineered
organisms is undertaken in a manner that prevents or reduces
the risks to biological diversity, taking also into account
risks to human health. (8)
The
precautionary principle is at the heart of this agreement.
This means that countries have the right to ban or restrict
the import and use of genetically engineered organisms when
there is a lack of scientific knowledge or consensus regarding
their safety. Considering the power of those countries that
had made every effort to weaken the Protocol, it is stronger
than many people had expected. Many compromises were made,
however, in order for an agreement to be reached. In the words
of Rafe Pomerance, the deputy chief of the US delegation:
"We were just too important, too big …to be ignored." (9)
January
2000 Biosafety Protocol Negotiations
B.
Key provisions of the Biosafety Protocol
B.1
Advanced Informed Agreement
Under
a procedure known as ‘advance informed agreement’ (AIA), before
countries are allowed to export any genetically engineered
organisms that are destined for ‘intentional introduction
into the environment’, they must first obtain the importing
country's explicit consent. Once the importing country has
been informed of the proposed export, it has 270 days to decide
whether or not to allow the shipment to proceed. (10)
Importing
countries are required under the Biosafety Protocol to take
all measures necessary to prevent genetically engineered organisms
(GEOs) from causing any adverse effects on biological diversity,
taking also into account risks to human health. (11)
To this end, an importing country can demand that the exporter
carry out, and bear the cost of, any further risk assessments
that are needed to help the importing country to make a decision.
(12)
In
order to avoid or minimise any harm to biodiversity or human
health, an importing country may place conditions on the import
of a GEO, or refuse to allow it, if there is lack of scientific
certainty regarding the extent of any potential adverse effects.
(13) And, if an importing country decides
to approve the import of a GEO, it may review and change this
decision at any time in the light of new scientific information.
(14)
Exclusions
from AIA requirements
The
‘Like-minded Group’ of Third World countries wanted all
genetically engineered organisms to be included under this
AIA procedure. However, the Miami Group of exporting countries
managed to force a compromise under which the AIA only applies
to the first import of any GEO intended for direct
release into the environment, and under which the majority
of GEOs are actually excluded from the scope of the AIA. This
includes:
a)
All GEOs that are commodities (i.e. those intended for food,
feed and processing). (15)
b)
GEOs that are destined for ‘contained use’ (e.g. GEOs used
in laboratories etc.). (16)
c)
GEOs that are pharmaceuticals for humans, if the pharmaceuticals
are addressed by other ‘relevant international agreements
or organisations’. (17)
d)
Exports of GEO’s that are ‘in transit’ (i.e. passing through
a territory of a country on route to another). (18)
Commodities
The
Miami Group had obvious reasons for wanting commodities to
be excluded from the scope of the AIA procedure, as commodities
currently comprise more than 90% of these countries’ exports
of GEOs. Nearly all other countries, however, argued that
any distinction made between a GEO destined for ‘intentional
introduction into the environment’ and a GEO destined for
‘food, feed or for processing’ would be arbitrary and inconsistent
with the objectives of the Protocol. In most countries of
the world, such a distinction is clearly artificial as seed
originally intended for use as food will often be planted,
and surplus seed that is not needed for planting will often
be eaten.
Even
if GEOs intended for use as food did not end up being deliberately
planted, accidental releases into the environment are commonplace
(e.g. seed fed to free-range poultry, seed falling from open
trucks during transport etc.).
"A
seed is a seed," said Tewolde Berhan Gebre Egziabher, spokesperson
for the Like-minded Group. "Whether it is for planting or
processing, it will enter into the environment. It will also
have health impacts." (19)
Although
GEOs intended for food, feed and processing are covered by
the Protocol, they are covered by a weaker procedure than
the AIA. The procedure used for these commodities places the
onus on importing countries to make the effort to find out
about potential shipments of GEOs, rather than obliging the
exporter to first obtain the importing country’s explicit
consent.
Once
a country has given final approval for the domestic use of
a GEO intended for food, feed or processing, it is required
to provide information about this GEO (if it is likely to
be exported) to the Biosafety Clearing-House within 15 days
of this approval. The Biosafety Clearinghouse is basically
a website administered by the Secretariat to the Convention
on Biological Diversity.
It
is then up to importing countries to monitor these approvals,
and to judge whether or not they think these GEOs could be
exported to them. If they believe that this is possible, they
can then contact the Biosafety Clearinghouse for further information
about the GEO. The Biosafety Clearinghouse will not, however,
be able to tell them whether, or when, the GEO could be exported
to them.
Importing
countries are then required to evaluate any potential harm
to biological diversity, including human health, that could
occur if this GEO were exported to them. This evaluation should
be made in much the same way as with GEOs intended for direct
release into the environment, with the emphasis on a precautionary
approach. Importing countries may then inform the Biosafety
Clearinghouse whether or not they will allow any shipments
of this GEO to enter their countries. (20)
Contained
Use
Genetically
engineered organisms that are intended for ‘contained use’
are also excluded from the AIA procedure. This does not, however,
exempt countries from their obligations under the Protocol
to prevent GEOs intended for ‘contained use’ from harming
biodiversity, including human health. Therefore, countries
are still required to apply the precautionary principle when
making any decisions with regards to any development, handling,
trade, transport, and use of these GEOs. (21)
As
defined in the Biosafety Protocol, ‘contained use’ includes
"any operation, undertaken within a facility, installation
or other physical structure, which involves living modified
organisms that are controlled by specific measures that effectively
limit their contact with, and their impact on, the external
environment." (22)
This
definition is extremely broad, and examples of GEOs which
could potentially fall under this definition include GE fish
kept in land-based ponds or in cages in the sea, any GEO grown
in a greenhouse or used in a laboratory, GE livestock kept
in barns, or even GEOs that are released in field-trials which
have some kind of barrier or fence around them.
However,
the Protocol also states that it is up to each country to
decide whether or not a GEO is regarded as being under ‘contained
use,’ in accordance with its own standards. As many of the
above examples are effectively releases into the environment,
countries may decide that such GEOs should actually fall under
the rules which apply to the intentional introduction of GEOs
into the environment, and therefore subject to the full AIA
procedure. (23)
Pharmaceuticals
The
Biosafety Protocol does not apply to any GE pharmaceuticals
for humans, if they are ‘addressed by other relevant international
agreements or organisations’. It is thought that ‘international
agreements or organisations’ is meant to refer to bodies such
as the World Health Organisation. However, it remains to be
seen whether these organisations will be regarded as ‘relevant’
to the objectives of the Protocol, as they do not actually
address the potential of GE pharmaceuticals to have adverse
effects on biological diversity (e.g. genetic pollution from
GE crops or animals which produce pharmaceuticals and are
released into the environment). (24)
Transit
GEOs
which are ‘in transit’ are excluded from the AIA procedure.
The Biosafety Protocol does not therefore require exporting
countries to obtain the explicit consent of countries that
lie on trading routes before transporting GEOs through their
territories. However, exporting countries are still required
to respect the domestic rules and regulations which apply
to GEOs in transit through these countries. As with commodities,
countries on trading routes also have the right to monitor
new approvals of GEOs in other countries, and may inform the
Biosafety Clearinghouse if they decide they need to ban or
restrict the passage of certain GEOs through their territories.
(25)
Products
derived from GEOs
Another
major compromise made to the Miami Group was the exclusion
of all products derived from GEOs from the scope of the Protocol.
As the Protocol only applies to genetically engineered organisms
that can replicate or reproduce genetic material, products
derived from them, such as paper from GE trees, or soy protein
from GE soy beans, remain unregulated internationally. (26)
There
are, however, products which are derived from GEOs, which
would still fall within the scope of the protocol. This could
include, for example, maize that has been ground up for use
in animal feed, yet which still frequently contains pieces
that are able to germinate.
B.
2 Labelling Requirements
1.
GEOs intended for direct introduction into the environment
The
Protocol requires exporters to ensure that all consignments
of GEOs that are intended for direct introduction into the
environment are clearly labelled. This label has to include:
- Identification
of the consignment as ‘living modified organisms’
- Specific
identity and relevant traits and/or characteristics
- Any
requirements for safe handling, storage, transport and use
- The
contact point for further information and, as appropriate,
the name and address of the importer and exporter
- A
declaration that the movement is in conformity with the
requirements of the Protocol (i.e. that the importing country
has given permission for the consignment to enter its territory).
2.
GEOs intended for contained use
The
labels for GEOs intended for contained use do not have to
include the specific identity, relevant traits and/or characteristics
of the GEO. They must, however, include:
- Identification
of the consignment as ‘living modified organisms’
- Any
requirements for safe handling, storage, transport and use
- A
contact point for further information (including the name
and address of the individual and institution to whom the
GEO is being sent).
3.
GE commodities
GE
commodities, however, are not subject to the same labelling
requirements. The Miami Group of exporting countries fought
hard against the labelling of these GEOs, because they did
not want to have to segregate their GE commodities from their
non-GE commodities. For the moment, all that is required is
that commodities be labelled as ‘may contain living modified
organisms’. This label must also say that the commodities
are not intended for introduction into the environment, as
well as giving details of a contact point for further information.
A final decision about more detailed labelling of GE commodities
will be taken no later than two years after the Protocol comes
into force. (27)
B.
3 Socio-Economic Concerns
Although
socio-economic considerations are not an explicit requirement
of the risk assessment procedures in the Protocol, countries
are given the right to consider socio-economic impacts, when
evaluating potential imports of GEOs. Countries may also take
into account socio-economic considerations, such as the value
of biological diversity to indigenous and local communities,
when implementing domestic regulatory measures for GEOs. (28)
B.4
Liability
Despite
the Miami Group’s confident assurances that GEOs are absolutely
safe, this confidence was not matched in the biosafety negotiations
by a willingness to accept demands for a strict system of
liability and redress, under which exporters of GEOs would
be held responsible for any damage caused by them. However,
although agreement on this issue has not yet been reached,
countries are required to finalise a liability regime within
four years of the Protocol coming into force. (29)
B.
5 Public Consultation
Governments
are required by the Protocol to:
- consult
the public in all decision-making processes regarding GEOs
- provide
access to information on GEOs that may be imported
- publicise
the results of any decisions made. (30)
B. 6
Unintentional movements of GEOs
Each
country is required to take appropriate measures to prevent
any unintentional movements of GEOs across borders from taking
place. (31)
If
countries become aware of any unintentional movements of GEOs
originating within their jurisdiction, they must immediately
notify affected or potentially affected countries in order
to enable them to determine appropriate responses and initiate
necessary action. This notification, which must also be passed
on to the Biosafety Clearinghouse and other relevant international
organisations, should include the following:
- any
relevant information about the GEO, such as its characteristics,
traits and usage
- estimated
quantities of the GEO and on the circumstances and estimated
date of its release
- any
available information about possible adverse effects of
the GEO on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity, taking also into account risks to human health,
- any
available information about possible risk management measures,
and a point of contact for further information. (32)
The
Protocol gives affected countries the right to demand that the
country from which the GEOs originated retrieve and/or destroy
the GEO, at its own expense. (33)
C.
Ratification of the Biosafety Protocol
The
Biosafety Protocol was opened for signature on the 24 May
2000. By December 2000 it had been signed by 81 countries.
(34)
When
a country signs the Protocol, this indicates general support
for its principles, as well as that country’s intention to
become legally bound by it. However, the Protocol does not
become legally binding for a country until:
- it
ratifies the agreement (i.e. deposits a letter of accession,
acceptance or approval with the United Nations).
and
- The
Protocol comes into force as a legally binding international
agreement, which will happen 90 days after 50 countries
have ratified it. Once the Protocol has come into force,
it will be subject to review at least every five years.
Providing
that the pressure on countries to ratify the Protocol is kept
up, it is likely to enter into force by 2002 or 2003. In the
meantime, countries are expected to apply the spirit and objectives
of the Protocol to which they have agreed. (35)
Note:
Despite the pervasive influence of the US in the biosafety
negotiations, it cannot actually ratify the Biosafety Protocol
because it has failed to ratify the Convention on Biological
Diversity. In order to ratify the Protocol, it must first
ratify the CBD.
D.
Relationship between the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO
The
relationship between the Biosafety Protocol, an agreement
concerned with the protection of biodiversity, and the WTO,
which is concerned with the removal of barriers to trade,
is of critical importance and certain to be controversial.
While
the Biosafety Protocol emphasises that its rules should not
be interpreted as implying a change in the ‘rights and obligations
of other international agreements’ (such as the WTO), it goes
on to say that this does not mean that the Protocol is subordinate
to these other international agreements. The Protocol also
maintains that trade and environment agreements should be
mutually supportive. (36)
However,
the differences between the WTO and the Biosafety Protocol
are so significant that a mutually supportive relationship
looks extremely unlikely. Under the WTO, for example, the
onus is on the importing country to provide proof that a GEO
is not safe if it wishes to block an import, and the importing
country will be subject to punitive sanctions if it cannot
provide this proof. Under the Biosafety Protocol, on the other
hand, the onus is on exporting countries to provide the evidence
that a GEO is safe, and importing countries are required to
take all measures necessary to prevent a GEO from causing
any adverse effects.
In
case of disputes, countries can refer to the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which governs the interpretation of
treaties under international law. The Vienna Convention rules
that a later international agreement supersedes an earlier
one, and an agreement on a specific subject prevails over
a general one. (37)
It
would be logical to assume, therefore, that the Biosafety
Protocol should take precedence over the WTO in any dispute,
as the Protocol deals specifically with biosafety issues which
are not covered by the WTO, and because the Protocol is also
the more recent of the two agreements.
However,
a favourable interpretation such as this is far from certain,
as a lot depends on the forum where any dispute is arbitrated.
If disputes are brought in front of the WTO, where the dispute
settlement panel usually rules in favour of the interests
of big corporations and powerful countries, countries following
their obligations under the Protocol could potentially find
themselves in trouble.
But
if a country were ruled against for taking measures to prevent
GEOs from damaging biodiversity and human health, such a ruling
could end up further undermining the legitimacy of the WTO.
This is something that countries such as the US are keen to
avoid at the moment. It is possible, therefore, that the continued
public scrutiny and criticism of the WTO, together with growing
opposition to genetic engineering, makes it less likely that
countries will challenge a Protocol-based decision by appealing
to the WTO. (38)
Note:
The references to the relationship between the Biosafety Protocol
and trade agreements are not included in the articles of the
Protocol, but appear in the introductory text, which is called
the ‘preamble’. In international agreements such as the Biosafety
Protocol, while text in a preamble is relevant, it carries
less weight than if it were included as a substantive provision,
i.e. in the articles of the agreement.
Conclusion
Considering
that industry, backed by powerful governments with vested
interests to protect, had not wanted any meaningful agreement
at all, the Biosafety Protocol is a historic achievement.
For the first time under international law, there is an explicit
requirement that countries take precautionary measures to
prevent GEOs from causing harm to biodiversity and human health.
Many
essential biosafety measures have clearly been compromised
in the efforts to reach agreement, but the Biosafety Protocol
is a step in the right direction. The Protocol as it stands
lays down minimum standards that have to be adhered to, and
it is for all those who care about the protection of our environment,
food security and the preservation of our genetic resources,
to demand a more rigorous protocol that truly serves its original
objective.
References:
hyperlinks
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31.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Article 16 (3) http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/articles.asp
32.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Article 17 http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/articles.asp
33.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Article 25 http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/articles.asp
34.
List of signatures to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
to the Convention on Biological Diversity http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.asp
35.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded at
Vienna 23 May 1969, entered into force 27
January
1980, UN Doc A/Conf 39/28, UKTS 58 (1980), 8 ILM 679, Article
18.
Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Article 37
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/articles.asp
Frequently
Asked Questions about the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,
Convention on Biological Diversity website http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/faqs.asp
36.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Preamble http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp
37.
See Currie D., ‘Greenpeace Submission on International Law
to the New Zealand Royal Commission on Genetic Modification’,
9 March 2001, p.11 (can be downloaded as pdf file from http://www.gmcommission.govt.nz)
Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 30.2 and 30.4
McNair,
The Law of Treaties (1961), 219, citing the Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction) case (PCIJ) Ser.
A, No. 2, at 31, 32.
Sinclair,
Ian The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2 nd ed.),
96.
Jenks,
"The conflict of law-making treaties", 30 British Yearbook
of International Law (1953), 401-53, 448.
38.
Lin, Lim Li"The core issues in the Biosafety Protocol: An
analysis", Third World Resurgence, No. 114/115, Feb/Mar 2000
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/core.htm
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