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US-Eurtom Nuclear Agreement
US - EURATOM REACH NUCLEAR AGREEMENT
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GREENPEACE PRESS RELEASE
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US - EURATOM REACH NUCLEAR AGREEMENT
Brussels, May 11, 1995 (GP) After years of hard bargaining, the
US and Euratom concluded an agreement on the extension of the US-
Euratom Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, which entered into
force in 1960 and is comming to an end at the end of this year.
The negotiations have been so tough becouse of the stiff
resistance of Euratom to accept "prior consent rights" of the US
on the use of US nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) by
Euratom-countries. These prior consent rights mean that the US
should give a permission for the reprocessing or enrichment of US
nuclear materials. Such a right was not included in the
Agreement of 1960. But in 1978, the US Congress voted the
Nuclear Non Proliferation Act, which included the obligation of
prior consent rights for all exports of nuclear materials from
the US.
The reason for the NNPA was the concern of the Carter-
administration about the then planned large-scale so-called
"civil" reprocessing of spent fuel, which produces separated
plutonium. The plans of Germany, Japan, France and the UK to
build a large-scale plutonium economy were contradicting the non-
proliferation goals of the US, because the US wanted to prevent
as much as possible the production and international trade of
separated plutonium, which is usable for the
production of nuclear weapons.
The same non-proliferation policy was also the reason for the
conflict between the US en Euratom during the renegotiations of
the Agreement. The US wanted the (legally obligated)
possibility to detemine wat could be done and what couldn't be
done whith the nuclear materials it sold to Euratom. Euratom was
only prepared to accept one single promess: that it would not
produce nuclear weapons whith the US nuclear materials.
Thereby, Euratom asked for a preference-treatment by the US,
compared with the other countries which import nuclear
materials from the US. The motivation of Euratom for this
preference treatment was that the US and Euratom are equal
partners and that they should not control eachothers nuclear
industry.
Greenpeace says that Euratom has obtained with the new
Agreement all it wanted. The "generic programmatic approval" for
reprocessing, which applies for the complete duration of the new
Agreement, is totally meaningsless, and is only
included to give the impression that the NNPA is respected. The
US has capitulated because of the economic blackmail of Euratom,
which threatened to block all nuclear trade with the US.
Greenpeace says that this capitulation of the US is
contradicting the US legislation. Futhermore, the preference
treatment of Euratom is undermining the international non-
proliferation regime. Now, also Japan can ask a revision of its
nuclear Agreement with the US, because in the Japan-US
Agreement, there is a possibility for the US to prevent the
reprocessing of US nuclear materials. Other countries could
follow.
Furthermore, Greenpeace regrets that the US has given up its
struggle against "civil" reprocessing in the world. This
production of separated plutonium, together with the
industrial processes for use and stockpiling, are one of the main
threats to nuclear non-proliferation.
Greenpeace recalls that Japan is, thanks to its plutonium-
economy, able to produce nuclear weapons. In the past, Japan has
indicated many times that it is keeping the "nuclear
option" open. Prime Minister Nagasone said in 1984 that "the
possession of nuclear weapons does not contravene the Japanese
constitution". And in a secret document, which leaked in
1980, the Japanese Defense Agency said that :"the Agency
presented various examples of nuclear weapons which it would be
constitutionally possible to obtain". The IAEA says that Japan
is able to produce a nuclear weapon within the timeframe of one
month. Japan can therefore be regarded as a de facto nuclear
weapons state. This creates a nuclear weapons race in Asia.
North Korea pointed explicitely to the Japanese
plutonium economy to legitimise its reprocessing programme. Only
with massive political and economic pressure, North Korea could
be forced to abdicate its development of an own nuclear option.
But it will be extremely hard in the future to
explain to other countries in the world why Japan and Europe are
allowed to obtain hundreds of tonnes of bomb-making
materials, while they may not start their own plutonium-
economy.
ENDS