Press Release 11 May 1995

[The.Greenbase@gb.greenpeace.org]

The 1995 Non-Proliferation Review and Extension Conference:

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                   GREENPEACE PRESS RELEASE
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The 1995 Non-Proliferation Review and Extension Conference:
      Proliferators 1; Disarmers 0


On May 11, at an historic conference 50 years after the
nuclear age began, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was
extended indefinitely.  On May 12, the NPT talks broke up
without a Final Document, and with no agreement on how
effectively the Treaty had been implemented, particularly with
regard to its nuclear disarmament provisions.

This contradictory result underlines the fundamental tension
in the Treaty, and illustrates that indefinite extension of
the NPT without more accountability from the nuclear weapon
states will be a hollow victory.  The nuclear weapon states
pledged in 1970 to reduce and ultimately eliminate their
nuclear arsenals, while non-nuclear states promised not to
acquire nuclear weapons.  While all 176 members of the Treaty
value its role in establishing a norm in favour of non-
proliferation, there was deep and divisive
disagreement about whether the nuclear weapon states have
lived up to their side of the bargain at the NPT talks.  On
the last day of the conference this split could no longer be
papered over: the nuclear weapon states refused to acknowledge
their failures to meet their Treaty obligations or commit to
disarmament measures, while the non-nuclear countries would
not accept a watered-down Final Document with no specific
disarmament pledges in it. As a result, the Conference could
not adopt a Final Statement.

This result is akin to sitting a driving test, failing it, but
then being granted a licence in perpetuity.  It occured
because the extension decision was taken not on the merits of
the NPT or its implementation, but primarily on the basis of
the exercise of raw power. Indefinite and unconditional
extension of the NPT was the named by President Clinton as the
"highest priority" of U.S. foreign policy.  The result --
indefinite extension adopted without a vote - came after
months of heavy lobbying, political and economic pressure by
the United States, the other nuclear weapon states and their
allies.  One leading figure in the NPT talks, Ambassador
Talleyradt of Venezuela resigned when pressure on his
government in Caracas forced Venezuela into supporting
indefinite extension; numerous small island states complained
of unremitting heavy pressure to accept indefinite extension;
those non-aligned states proposing 25 year rolling extensions
of the Treaty talked of 'unprecedented' pressure to change
their minds.

It would be a serious misreading of the Conference to think
that indefinite extension was a consensus decision.  Key
Middle Eastern, Asian, African and Latin American states did
not join the majority of around 110 states co-sponsoring a
resolution in favour of indefinite extension. Malaysia said
the international community had abandoned an historic
opportunity to free the world from nuclear blackmail and
safeguard future generations, and that it still believed that
a secret ballot, where countries could vote with their hearts,
would have resulted in a different outcome. The Philippines
said the price they had paid for supporting indefinite
extension had been too low: their expectations of progress on
nuclear disarmament from the nuclear weapon states in return
had not been fufilled.  Egypt said indefinite extension while
de facto nuclear weapon states like Israel and other countries
remained outside was unacceptable.

The decision to extend the treaty was made palatable to many
states because of a weak compromise: a package of measures was
adopted along with the extension decision, to strengthen the
Review mechanism of the Treaty and establish a set of
Principles and Objectives.  The Principles and Objectives --
first suggested by the South African delegation with input
from Canada -- call for a programme of action on disarmament
and a CTBT by 1996, but like the NPT itself, provide no
timeframe or enforcement mechanism.  From 1997, the NPT Review
talks will meet yearly, instead of every five years, but it
remains unclear whether the enhanced Review process will bring
the necessary leverage on the nuclear weapon states to ensure
nuclear disarmament at the swift pace most countries want to
see.

In the end, the test of whether the NPT will retain any
credibility is whether the nuclear weapon states live up to
their own 'solemn pledges' to move toward elimination of their
nuclear weapons.  Those OECD states which aggressively lobbied
for indefinite extension failed to put pressure on the nuclear
weapon states at the same time to come to the Conference with
serious proposals for further nuclear disarmament.  Instead --
with the exception of Ireland, Austria and Sweden -- the
European Union states accepted a lowest common demoninator
approach pushed by their two nuclear weapon states members,
Britain and France.  These countries, along with Canada now
have an increased responsibility to hold the nuclear weapon
states to task.

The nuclear weapon states failed  the first test of their good
faith after the new 'enhanced' NPT was in place by refusing to
make any concessions in the Final Document.  The next major
challenge will be France's decision on nuclear testing.  A
resumption of nuclear tests in the South Pacific would
severely undermine the credibility of the extension decision
and the NPT itself.

The chances that a permament extension of the NPT will be seen
as a carte blanche by the nuclear weapon states to maintain
and develop their nuclear arsenals are high.  The extension
decision has effectively endorsed nuclear power and civil
plutonium reprocessing, in spite of the proliferation risks
these activities pose, forever.  The NPT Conference did not
dismantle a single nuclear weapon or stop production of a
single gram of plutonium. The world is not a safer place
because of the indefinite extension of the NPT; on the
contrary, as diplomats talked, more than one tonne of
plutonium was produced,  a new nuclear submarine went on
patrol in Britain, the U.S. moved closer to new tritium
facilities to maintain its arsenal at START II levels until
the year 2050, Israel, Pakistan and India remained outside the
Treaty, and a controversial shipment of highly radioactive
waste - the first of dozens of plutonium and radwaste
shipments over the next decade -completed its journey from
France to Japan.

More talks cannot replace real action on nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation. If governments are serious about
following their rhetoric at the NPT with genuine political
commitment, the next steps must be an end to nuclear testing
in all environments, a ban on the production and use of all
plutonium and other nuclear weapons-usable material, a ban on
the production of all new nuclear weapons, and commencement of
negotiations on a convention to eliminate nuclear weapons
forever before the next review conference in the year 2000.
Anything less will show that the decision to indefinitely
extend the NPT conference was not only a missed opportunity,
but an impediment to the creation of a genuine and effective
nuclear disarmament and  non-proliferation regime.
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ENDS