"STRICT CONFIDENTIALITY MUST BE ENSURED FOR THE CURRENT AND FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS" RUSSIAN AND SWISS NUCLEAR INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES, ZURICH, 17/09/98.

INTRODUCTION

The problems facing the international plutonium industry have reached a critical stage in western Europe in recent years, and are driving industry officials to seek more and more desperate solutions to their waste problems. As the nuclear industry world-w ide has failed to develop commercially viable fast breeder reactors, the industry has found itself with less and less justification for continuing with reprocessing. The nuclear spent discharged from power plants, originally intended to provide access to the plutonium for fueling the fast reactors, is instead accumulating in massive stockpiles, with only limited use. The industry is effectively split between the reprocessing companies, increasingly desperate to secure a medium-term future through new cont racts, and the electrical utilities, aware of the mistakes they made in committing to expensive and controversial reprocessing contracts. Faced with increased competition from alternative electricity producers, continuing hostility and political oppositio n to reprocessing on environmental, public health, economic and proliferation grounds, but at the same time a growing spent fuel storage crisis, the utilities are desperately looking for least-cost option. Despite reportedly reducing their contract fees t o a percentage of earlier prices, the two principal European reprocessing companies (BNFL and Cogema) are currently unable to attract further business from their traditional European clients, including Switzerland. It is therefore in this context that the leaked ôProtocolö between Swiss utilities and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, the content and implications of which are described below, should be seen.

Swiss utilities have these past years contracted for reprocessing its spent fuel at the British Nuclear Fuels reprocessing plant at Sellafield, England, and also at the Cogema plant at cap la Hague, France. In total 1077 tonnes of spent fuel from Swiss re actors is contracted with these two European reprocessors, under so-called first decade or baseload contracts. There are no second decade, or post-baseload contracts.

As the Protocol describes below, the Swiss are clearly prepared to seek to overturn Russian National Law. This will directly assist Russian plutonium industry to sustain itself. The proposal from the Swiss utilities also disregard their own national resp onsibilities for managing hazardous nuclear waste produced in Switzerland for the supposed benefit of Swiss society. Complicit in this are senior Russian nuclear industry officials, led by actual Ministers, who are prepared to accept for a fee, the furthe r contamination of the Russian environment, when they are clearly already unable to deal with their existing nuclear waste legacy.

The secret protocol document indicates that for Swiss utilities, the preference for managing its future spent fuel arisings is neither with BNFL or Cogema, but rather to opt for storage and reprocessing in the Russian Federation. The issue raises many fun damental questions including issues of environmental pollution and proliferation, the morality of trying to avoid national responsibility, and the effect such a deal will have on supporting the continued operation of dangerous and polluting plutonium faci lities in the Russian Federation. The fact that plans laid out by Swiss and Russian agencies in the protocol are illegal as determined under present Russian Environmental Law highlights the self interest of the named parties and their total disregard for the environment.

PROTOCOL DETAILS

Recently a document detailing discussions between representatives of the Swiss nuclear industry and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, (MINATOM), was leaked to Greenpeace. The document, which Greenpeace is releasing today, is titled a ôBasis of Protoc ol of Intentions on cooperation in the field of Nuclear Power Plant spent nuclear fuel management between Minatom-AO „Techsnabexport", the Russian Federation, „Internexco GmbH", Germany, „Electrizitatsgesellschaft Laufenburg AG (EGL)", Switzerland on beha lf of Swiss utilities. The document is dated Zurich, Switzerland, September 17th 1998. The protocol summarizes the discussions and views of those attending the Zurich meeting. Principally, those of the Russian government agency representatives, including Deputy Minister Yegorov, and the Swiss utilities, specifically NOK representative, Bay, and Electrizitatsgesellschaft Laufenburg AG (EGL) representative Dr Hoop.

The Swiss Party (as described in the Protocol) stated that the preferred option for Swiss utilities was as follows:

2000 tonnes of spent fuel to be shipped to Russian Federation; the time scale was between 2000 and 2030 (thirty years); 50-80 tonnes to be delivered annually, 300 tonnes currently ready for shipment; a contract price appears to have been discussed but not included in the Protocol document.

In addition other options were proposed by the Swiss Party, namely:

The Swiss parity retains the option to have their spent fuel reprocesses in Russian facilities, with the return of plutonium and uranium to Switzerland, (though it was acknowledged that this would not be Swiss generated fissile material, but Russian pluto nium and uranium generated in Russian plants, and equivalent in quantity to that contained in the original Swiss spent fuel.)

550 cubic metres of vitrified high level waste generated by the reprocessing of Swiss spent fuel at Sellafield and la Hague, and due for return to Switzerland under the terms of reprocessing contracts with BNFL and Cogema, the Swiss Party stated its wish to consider the option of disposing of the waste permanently on the territory of the Russian Federation. Again a contract price was proposed, but not included in the leaked document.

In conclusion the Russian Party noted the financial terms for future commercial deals offered by Swiss utilities, including final waste disposal, but that the price for the "given services should be higher". It is worth noting that Russian officials have been cited as seeking to set a US$1000 per kilogram of heavy metal spent fuel for reprocessing services in the Russian Federation. It is most unlikely that the Swiss Party representatives were offering such a fee.

"STRICT CONFIDENTIALITY MUST BE ENSURED FOR THE CURRENT AND FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS"

The parties sensitive to the nature of the issues under discussion agreed that all current and future negotiations must be conducted under strict confidentiality.

Having summarized the issues discussed on September 17th, the Protocol concludes by reporting that it shall form the basis of "Applying to Executive Authorities of the Russian Federation and Switzerland, respectively, to get approval for possible renderi ng of services as above". In other words Yegorov and Minatom would seek the approval of the Russian government, and likewise NOK/EGL would seek Swiss governmental approval.

RUSSIAN MISREPRESENTATION OF THE LAW

From the Protocol it is clear that the Russian representatives deliberately misrepresented the current legislative situation in Russian pertaining to the importation of foreign nuclear spent fuel. Article 50 of the law of the Russian Federation for the pr otection of the Environment: "import of radioactive wastes and materials for storage and disposal from other states is forbidden." And yet, at the Zurich meeting it is reported that spent fuel importation is permissible, on the condition that radioactive waste and products (plutonium and uranium) are returned to Switzerland. The Russian representatives went further in stating that other options for spent fuel management could be implemented,

"provided the law in force in the Russian Federation is amended accordingly or special decisions are taken on a governmental level.".

So heavily contaminated and damaging to public health has been the Soviet and Russian plutonium production industry over the past 50 years, that public opinion is understandably strongly opposed to the further contamination that would result from Russia t rading in foreign waste. For example, in the Chelyabinsk region in the Ural mountains, one of the likely sites for Swiss spent fuel storage and reprocessing, 84.3% in a referendum (Decision of the Municipal Soviet of Peoples Deputies, 17 March 1991) voted against the dumping of foreign radioactive wastes of foreign origin in the Chelyabinsk region. Over 130 Thousands signatures of Krasnoyarsk people have been collected but on 18 April 1997 the claim of the local people was rejected by the legal authoritie s.

Thus, Swiss utility proposals for the dumping and reprocessing of waste in the Russian Federation is in direct conflict both with Russian Law and the views of the Russian people living in the vicinity of what are some of the most radioactively contaminate d environments on the planet.

RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM FACILITIES STILL PART OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Proposals by Swiss nuclear industry officials to dispose of their spent fuel waste in the Russian Federation, ignore the reality of current Russian nuclear installations, including those most likely to host Swiss waste, if ever commercial agreements were to be reached.

After more than fifty years of military plutonium production, the closed cities of Chelyabinsk, commonly known as Mayak, in the southern Urals, Krasnoyarsk on the Yenisey River in Siberia and Tomsk or Seversk, have to be considered three of the most conta minated sites on the planet. Of these, the first two are the most likely contendors to receive Swiss spent fuel and high level waste.

None of these sites are covered by International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. This raises a number of important issues, not least the fact that Swiss spent fuel is covered by IAEA safeguards, its disposal, storage and or reprocessing in Russia, withou t safeguards coverage would be a breach of the Swiss governments safeguards committments to the international community. It is not possible to believe that senior Swiss industry officials are not aware of their safeguards obligations. After all, each of t he potential sites in the Russian Federation are still involved in military production of weapons materials. Given the international origin of Swiss fuel, including from the United States and Canada, those countries also require that their supplied materi al is retained under international safeguards.

Chelyabinsk is the site of the worlds worst nuclear accident before Chernobyl, the so-called Kyshtym explosion of September 1957. The accident involving the explosion of tanks containing liquid high level waste, was only admitted to 32 years afterwards in 1989, despite releasing over 20 million curies of radioactivity, and contaminating an area of at least 15-23,000 kilometres. Strontium-90 contamination from the explosion in this area (0.1 curies per square kilometre), was twice that caused by global nuc lear fallout. (see, Plutonium: Deadly Gold of the Nuclear Age, IPPNW, 1992).The reprocessing plant at Mayak, RT-1 is still in operation reprocessing VVER fuel from Russian power reactors, as well as enriched uranium fuel from Russian nuclear submarines. P roduction of tritium for Russian nuclear warheads is also conducted at Chelyabinsk.

Due to disposal of high and intermediate level wastes produced by plutonium production into the near-by river system Techa, and Lake Karachay, both bodies of water are severely contaminated. Lake Karachay for example has surface radiation levels of 600 ra ds per hour - sufficient to give a lethal dose to anyone in the vicinity for one hour, death coming in days or weeks. According to data collected by the Institute for Biophysics of the Russian Federation, over 8000 people have died as a result of radiatio n exposure in the Techa river area. (for further details see, Outline of Environmental and Health Problems Resulting from South Urals Military Complex Activity, Natalia I. Mironova, Brussels 1992.)

Despite Russian Presidential decrees instructing the allocation of 25% of MayakÆs foreign income to assist with environmental clean-up and public health provision, it is clear that this is not the case, thus any argument that foreign currency earnings are of net benefit to public health and the environment cannot be taken seriously. (see, 1993 Russian Presidential Decree, as cited in Reprocessing of Finnish Irradiated Nuclear Fuel at Mayak, 1993, Greenpeace International).

The Krasnoyarsk-65 complex, is both a military and commercial facility, there being no separation between the two in Russia. Formerly three plutonium production reactors and supporting reprocessing plant were operated 200-500 metres underground (originall y to avoid U.S. detection and possible bombing). Two reactors are now closed at Krasnoyarsk, with the third scheduled for closure upon completion of alternative electricity and heat supply for the city of Krasnoyarsk-65 (100,000 population) that was built to support the plutonium production effort. Plans for the construction of commercial reprocessing plant at Krasnoyarsk, so-called RT-2, led to partial construction, but due to opposition and economics the plant has never been completed beyond 5% or so. I n recent years, attempts to secure foreign reprocessing contracts by Minatom, with European (including Swiss) utilities as well as countries in east Asia (Japan and the Republic of Korea) have collapsed due to opposition and poor economics. Any eventual d eal between Swiss utilities and Minatom would certainly make the completion of RT-2 more likely, thus sustaining plutonium production at Krasnoyarsk into the third millenium.

Disregard for the environment at Russian plutonium reprocessing sites is by now legendary. One illustration is the method by which liquid high level waste is disposed of at Krasnoyarsk. One of the most hazardous legacies of military (as well as commercial ) reprocessing, for almost fifty years, liquid high level waste at Krasnoyarsk is injected into underground clay caverns 270 metres below the surface. Very little precise detail is known about the migration of this material underground, but such an approa ch to waste management would not be acceptable in Switzerland.

In summary, the environmental pollution problems caused by plutonium production in the Russian Federation are so overwhelming that the last thing the Russian people and their environment needs is more plutonium and nuclear waste. If the situation were to be reversed and Russia was proposing to dispose of its nuclear waste spent fuel for the next three decades in the Swiss environment, there would rightly be utter rejection by the Swiss people. The economic tragedy that is Russia today, is being wholly exp loited by the Swiss nuclear industry by this venture, with the active support of the self-serving Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy.

CONCLUSION

The leaked Protocol provides an important insight into the current thinking of both the western nuclear industry and their Russian counterparts. The issues of waste disposal, plutonium reprocessing and finances are a powerful combination and are important factors driving the industries into ever more exotic solutions. It is perhaps a sign of the desperation felt by utility chiefs over the problem that their facilities have created. It certainly is an indication of the utter disregard they have for the hig hest environmental and public health standards and the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. Fundamental issues that arise out of this document include:

to what extent is Minatom prepared to overturn national law to permit this and possibly other deals from proceeding, and to what extent are such plans open to Parliamentary scrutiny;

will Swiss legislators and government permit the disposal/reprocessing of spent fuel and reprocessed high level waste in the Russian Federation, which after all is a problem created in Switzerland;

to what extent is the United States government informed of these negotiations, given their concern over Russian plutonium production facilities, and their limited, but still relevant, control rights over Swiss spent fuel (both having been a supplier of ur anium fuel to Swiss reactor and the contamination principal applying to Swiss reactor of U.S. design);

The protocol if it were to proceed would set a dangerous precedent for further deals between Minatom and the worlds nuclear utilities. All to varying degrees have a spent fuel management problem, some more desperate than other. So long as the utilities ar e wedded to continued nuclear power generation this problem will not be resolved. Dumping it in Russia is no solution to this problem.

Additional notes:

The Protocol makes reference to the possibility of Russia enlarging its fuel fabrication for Swiss reactors, including reference to this being ôlogical in case this fuel would go for final use to the Russian Federation.ö It should be noted that Siemens AG already has an established link between Russian nuclear facilities and the Swiss nuclear industry fabricating fuel assemblies containing Canadian supplied uranium. The fuel is fabricated at Elektrostal, near Moscow. Elektrostal is a former military plant , most likely producing uranium fuel rods for Soviet plutonium production reactors. It was reported in 1996 that the Swiss PWR reactors at Goesgen will receive Russian fabricated fuel assemblies (see Nuclear Fuel, March 11 1996).