If Northern countries can be fairly accused of viewing the Protocol as a market
creation and preservation device for their industries, Southern countries can
be similarly accused of behaving as if the Protocol were a developmental,
rather than an environmental agreement. Nowhere is this clearer than in the
ongoing discussion on "basic domestic needs".
"The real issue is this;" said the representative of one large developing
country, "do you want CFCS produced in the North by large chemical companies,
or produced in the South by our own industries". Under the terms of the
Protocol, a country in the South "shall, in order to meet its basic domestic
needs, be entitled to delay for ten years its compliance with the control
measures..."[Article 5, 1] Since only a handful of developing countries
(including China, India, and Brazil) actually have the capacity to produce,
this is a fight over who gets that remaining market share.
No matter what one may think of the relative merits of Southern vs. Northern
industry, the Protocol is quite clear that Southern production for export is
not allowed. Southern governments which seek a re-opening of this question
need to find a way to articulate their arguments in environmental terms. If,
for instance, these governments argued that keeping production in the South
would allow them to phase out CFCS faster, and to bypass HCFC substitutes,
negotiation might ensue. At the moment, though, these governments' arguments
simply appear to be attempts to bolster their own industry. At the same time,
Northern arguments for maintaining the status quo both bolster their industry
and appear to favor the environment. The North argues that it is in their
industry's economic interests to phase out CFCS as soon as possible, so that
they can continue to create markets for HCFCs and HFCs. Many observers feel
less than confident on this point, but at least it makes an environmental
argument - albeit one that rests on the premise that HCFCs and HFCs are
acceptable substitutes to CFCS. In truth, neither North or South need to be
producing more CFCS, as existing stockpiles and readily available replacement
technology are more than sufficient to meet economic demands.
Another area in which some Southern countries are violating at least the
spirit of the Montreal Protocol is by increasing production. When the Fund was
set up and the South joined the Protocol it was recognized that equity issues
dictated that the South be allowed to continue to develop and expand its use
and production of ozone depleting chemicals. However, no one foresaw the zeal
with which developing countries would seek to expand this capacity, and of
course, the increasing bills this would give to Northern governments for an
eventual phaseout. India, for example, has actually said that unless the North
compensates it for not building new CFC plants, it will go ahead and build
them. While technically this is their right under the Protocol it hardly adds
to the spirit of international cooperation for governments to behave this way.
Finally, Southern countries are failing to provide accurate and reliable data
to negotiators at the Protocol regarding the amount of ozone depleting
substances that their countries consume. The lack of this data makes it
virtually impossible to accurately forecast future needs for phaseout, or
impacts of delays in that phaseout.
