GREENPEACE CALLS FOR CANCELLATION OF ‘PEACEFUL’ NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH JAPAN AS SPECIAL DIET COMMITTEE DEBATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY
10 June 2002
Tokyo - Greenpeace today called for the cancellation of all bi-lateral nuclear trade agreements with Japan. The demand follows recent developments in Japan that point to a future where the country is armed with thousands of nuclear weapons.
In recent weeks, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, has stated that Japan could review its "three non-nuclear principles" (1). This includes the commitment that it shall not possess nuclear weapons. Japan’s major nuclear suppliers that have directly assisted its dual-capable nuclear program include: France, UK, Australia, Canada, and the United States (2). In addition, European Union member states are soon to consider approval of a new ‘peaceful cooperation’ Agreement with Japan, which will inevitably lead to the expansion of nuclear trade with Japan. Later today the controversy over Japanese nuclear weapons and the statements of Fukuda will form the basis of an extra-ordinary session of the Special Committee of the Japanese Lower House of Parliament where Prime Minister Koizumi is expected to be heavily criticised by opposition parties for his Government’s failure to penalize Fukuda for his remarks.
Japan currently has more than 38,000kgs of plutonium, most of which is located in France and the UK, with just over 5000kgs stockpiled in Japan.
This stockpile is set to grow to over 45,000kgs within the next five years and is scheduled to be shipped to Japan in the coming years. By 2020 on current projections Japan will have acquired more than 145,000 kilograms of plutonium, if it successfully completes and operates its new large-scale reprocessing plant at Rokkasho-mura. All of the plutonium is weapons-usable, with as little as 5 kilograms required for one nuclear weapon. With such stocks of plutonium Japan would have the material means to assemble nearly 30,000 nuclear warheads. Combined with Japan’s advanced space program based around its H2-A solid and liquid fuelled missile program, Japan is capable of deploying the most advanced nuclear weapons systems.
"The Japanese Government needs to receive a clear message from the international community that a nuclear weapons program is totally unacceptable. The nuclear supplier states bear a major responsibility for promoting Japan’s dual-capable nuclear program. While they are thousands of kilometres from Japan and east Asia, their proliferating nuclear policies have encouraged Japan to acquire vast amounts of plutonium, and the technical means to produce more. The nuclear cooperation Agreements pay lip service to international safeguards and Japan’s commitment that they will not use any material or technology for military purposes but they are fundamentally flawed. Possession of such materials and technology give Japan the means to be a nuclear weapons superpower – before this possibility builds up any further momentum it needs to be stopped," said Shaun Burnie of Greenpeace International.
In a further worrying sign controversial Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara expressed his support for Fukuda’s statement, stating to the Chief Cabinet Secretary in a telephone call "Japan can possess nuclear weapons. Go for it!" (3)
The EURATOM-Japan Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is pending sign off of all European Union member states (4). The final text was agreed in late 2001, and although very few details are in the public domain about the terms of the Agreement, there were highly sensitive issues involved during the drafting. These included the control of Japanese nuclear material inside the European Union, and similar control rights of EURATOM over material in Japan.
"For the EU to be considering extending further nuclear trade with Japan at this time is perverse. The non-nuclear countries of the EU need to unite, intervene and block this Agreement. For the rest, an urgent review of the Japanese nuclear program, the potential for weapons proliferation and the wider security implications of continued nuclear supply for peace and stability in North-east Asia is a minimum. Ultimately, cutting of supply and discouraging further nuclearization of Japan and the wider Asia region is essential," said Burnie.
The controversy over Japan and nuclear weapons was sparked in April when leading politician Ichiro Ozawa remarked that Japan if threatened by China could develop thousands of nuclear weapons from its stocks of plutonium. The issue is likely to become even more controversial during the coming month if a shipment of plutonium mixed oxide (MOX), which BNFL is proposing to make from Japan to the UK, goes ahead. The armed British transport vessels are expected to arrive in Japan later this week, prior to making their 30,000kms return journey. Over 50 en-route countries opposed the original shipment of the plutonium MOX to Japan in 1999.
"This faulty MOX, together with Japan’s stockpile of 5000kgs of plutonium should be immobilised as a waste in Japan (5). Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, whether it is in Europe, or Japan should be stopped before it leads to a new nuclear arms race," concluded Burnie.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT:
- Shaun Burnie – Greenpeace International Nuclear Campaigner in Japan +81 090 2253 7306
- Simon Boxer – Greenpeace International Nuclear Campaigner in the Pacific +31 629 0011 32
- Mhairi Dunlop – Greenpeace International Nuclear Press Co-ordinator in Amsterdam +31 20 5236 608
For more information on the plutonium shipment from Japan to UK visit www.greenpeace.org/~nuclear/bnfl
(1) Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda stated - "The principles are just like the (war-renouncing) Constitution. But in the face of calls to amend the Constitution, amendment of the principles is also possible," Fukuda May 31st 2002. Adopted in 1967.
(2) Australia - supplies 50% of all imported uranium into Japan; successive Government’s in Canberra have endorsed Japan’s plutonium program, including the reprocessing of Australian-origin spent fuel in France and the UK and in future is required to approve transport plan for plutonium and MOX shipments to Japan;
Canada - has historically been one of Japan’s largest suppliers of uranium, and recently approved the transportation of plutonium MOX fuel;
France – supplied the reprocessing technology for Japan’s first reprocessing plant at Tokai-mura, is the major vendor for the new Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant, and has reprocessed more than 2700 tons of spent fuel, yielding more than 25,000 kilograms of plutonium. The French state company Cogema is seeking to secure contracts for hundreds of tons of plutonium MOX fuel with Japanese utilities;
Britain – similar to France, the UK is actively supporting Japan on the construction of the Rokkasho-mura, and has reprocessing contracts for over 2600 tons of spent fuel. Again, like France, British Nuclear Fuels is seeking to secure contracts for hundreds of tons of plutonium MOX fuel with utilities;
The United States – Having supported Japan’s nuclear program during the 1960’s, then adopted progressive non-proliferation policy under Ford and Carter, in recent years U.S. Administrations have turned their back on past policy of actively discouraging plutonium reprocessing, and under the last Clinton Administration and to the present have increased active cooperation with Japan. Collaboration in Fast Breeder reactor technology, including the transfer of the most sensitive nuclear technology, as well as sign-off on all plutonium sea shipments, have all contributed to Japan’s acquisition of the means to develop advanced nuclear weapons.
(3) Tokyo Shimbun, June 6 2002.
(4) EURATOM is the European Atomic Community one of the founding Treaties of the European Community. As such it is almost wholly unaccountable to the European Parliament, and its activities remain highly secretive with little or no public oversight. The European Commission has actively supported the establishment of the new Agreement with Japan, in particular through its offices in Tokyo.
(5) Immobilisation techniques for dealing with plutonium include mixing it with high level nuclear waste. This would involve placing plutonium inside cans and then embedding those inside cannisters containing glass blocks of vitrified high level waste - the so-called 'can-in-cannister' method.